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The  following  thesis  confronts  pre-existing  histories  of  the  English  
conquest  of  Jamaica  which  primarily  write  about  it  within  either  the  Caribbean  
context  or  the  more  narrow  European  context.  These  prior  histories  tend  to  
misinterpret  the  central  causes  of  why  Spain  was  unable  to  successfully  dislodge  
the  English  between  1655  to  1660.  Previous  histories  typically  cite  it  as  evidence  
for  a  broader  Spanish  or  Habsburg  decline.  By  reframing  this  conquest  within  a  
broader  Atlantic  context,  which  takes  into  account  both  the  Caribbean  and  
European  perspectives,  the  reader  will  come  to  see  why  Jamaica  was  lost  by  the  
Spanish  to  the  English.  This  was  primarily  because  Iberian  forces  were  heavily  
involved  in  European  conflicts  and  thus  unable  to  traverse  the  Atlantic.  
Meanwhile,  Spanish  Caribbean  forces  were  instructed  to,  and  primarily  focused  
on,  the  defense  of  their  ports  and  territories  to  ensure  that  the  wealth  of  the  
‘Indies’  made  it  safely  to  Spain  proper.  The  thesis  relies  on  primary  source  
documents  from  both  Spanish  and  English  authors  to  show  what  the  priorities  of  
the  Spanish  were  at  the  time  and  in  doing  so  show  that  Jamaica  was  not  one  of  
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Introduction:  Paradise  Lost?  
Without  question,  1655  and  the  English  seizure  of  Jamaica  marked  a  
turning  point  in  the  history  of  the  Atlantic  world.  To  many,  this  event  definitively  
commenced  the  decline  of  Spain  as  a  world  power  and  the  rise  of  the  English  in  
their  place.  This  'conquest'  of  Jamaica  is  said  to  be  the  first  English  capture  of  
American  territory  previously  held  by  another  European  power  .   As  such,  it  is  1
lauded  prominently  as  a  milestone  in  the  development  of  the  ‘first’  British  
Empire.  To  many  historians,  it  represents  the  rise  of  this  empire  at  the  explicit  
expense  of  the  Spanish.  While  it  can  be  tempting  to  be  swept  up  in  the  drama  of  
such  a  narrative,  it  may  be  largely  untrue.  While  it  was  the  first  capture  of  
Spanish  land  by  the  English  using  force,  it  was  far  from  being  their  first  
settlement  in  the  Americas;  Jamestown  and  Plymouth  in  North  America,  along  
with  8  islands  in  the  Caribbean  were  permanently  settled  by  the  English  before  
the  conquest  of  Jamaica.  Moreover,  the  Western  Design  which  led  to  an  English  
Jamaica  took  place  within  the  chaos  of  the  civil  war  era  in  England.  In  addition,  
the  loss  of  Jamaica  by  the  Spanish  did  not  signify  an  empire  in  decline.  The  
Spanish  Empire  was  dynamic,  vibrant,  and  even  resurgent  in  the  following  
century.  To  fully  grasp  how  invalid  such  histories  are,  we  must  come  to  
understand  this  conquest  within  the  context  of  the  Atlantic  world  in  the  middle  
of  the  17th  century.  This  requires  an  understanding  of  Habsburg  notions  of  
monarchy,  actual  English  strength,  and  the  effects  of  ongoing  conflicts  in  
1  Carla  Gardina  Pestana,  The  English  Conquest  of  Jamaica:  Oliver  Cromwell’s  Bid  for  Empire ,  
Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  2017,  130.  
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Western  Europe  on  the  Caribbean.  
First,  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  was  
composite  in  nature.  This  meant  that  the  King  of  “Spain”  ruled  over  a  variety  of  
dominions,  each  with  their  own  customs,  government,  and  taxes.  King  Philip  IV  
Habsburg  had  an  exceptionally  long  title  in  which  he  was  king  of  Castile,  Aragon,  
the  Two  Sicilies,  and  the  Indies,  as  well  as  a  prince,  count,  or  duke  of  a  variety  of  
other  locations  across  Flanders,  Burgundy,  and  Italy.  Most  importantly,  the  kings  
of  “Spain”  had  been  kings  of  Portugal  since  the  time  of  Philip  IV’s  grandfather,  
Philip  II.  However,  starting  in  1640,  the  Portuguese  nobility  revolted  against  the  
Habsburgs  in  favor  of  the  native  Duke  of  Braganza.  This  revolt  was  extremely  
dear  to  Philip  IV’s  heart  because  the  central  goal  of  a  Habsburg  Monarch  was  
ensuring  the  inheritance  remained  intact  for  the  succeeding  heir.   Having  already  2
lost  the  northern  part  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  the  United  Provinces,  Philip  
IV  adamantly  refused  to  see  any  further  damage  to  the  reputacion  of  the  
Habsburgs.  In  the  Atlantic  context,  the  situation  was  somewhat  different,  as  
Philip’s  title  called  him  ‘King  of  the  Indies’  rather  than  King,  Prince,  Duke,  or  
Count  of  Jamaica,  or  any  other  specific  territory  or  island.  It  meant  that,  in  a  way  
not  unlike  the  loss  of  the  United  Provinces,  the  loss  of  a  portion  rather  than  the  
whole  could  be  rationalized  and  accepted.   
In  a  similar  manner,  England  was  grappling  with  the  turmoil  caused  in  
part  by  the  nature  of  composite  monarchy.  Starting  in  the  second  quarter  of  the  
2  Silvia  Z.  Mitchell,  Queen,  Mother,  and  Stateswoman:  Mariana  of  Austria  and  the  Government  of  Spain ,  
Penn  State  University  Press,  2019,  86.  
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seventeenth  century  England  had  found  itself  embroiled  in  the  Wars  of  the  Three  
Kingdoms,  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland.  Charles  I  had  been  the  composite  
monarch  of  all  three  but  his  personal  rule  of  11  years  had  led  to  rebellion  and  
then  civil  war.   The  increasing  reliance  on  military  force  to  resolve  political  3
disputes  had  found  power  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  Oliver  Cromwell  by  1655.  
Cromwell  desired  a  transition  to  a  civilian  government  as  well  as  the  spread  and  
triumph  of  the  Protestant  cause.  His  ‘Western  Design’  to  capture  a  piece  of  the  
Spanish  Empire  was  a  key  step  in  achieving  both  those  goals.  Its  subsequent  
failure,  despite  the  acquisition  of  Jamaica,  meant  that  new  methods  needed  to  be  
employed  to  ensure  his  political  aims.  What  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  ‘Western  
Design’  was  the  continuation  of  the  civil  war  albeit  on  the  continent  rather  than  
in  the  British  Isles.  Despite  the  conflict’s  relocation,  it  was  still  a  disruption  for  
England  which  threatened  the  project  of  pacifying  and  settling  Jamaica,  and  
eventually  the  Three  Kingdoms  themselves.  
This  continuation  of  the  civil  war  on  the  European  continent  was  part  of  
the  larger  Franco-Spanish  War,  itself  an  offshoot  of  the  larger  Thirty  Years  War  
and  smaller  War  of  the  Mantuan  Succession.  The  casus  belli  of  this  conflict  is  
largely  unimportant  as  the  war  is  really  the  start  of  the  French  expansionism  
which  culminated  during  the  long  reign  of  Louis  XIV.  As  such,  there  were  open  
fronts  in  Flanders,  Italy,  and  Catalonia.  Spain  also  had  to  contend  with  the  
Portuguese  rebellion  which  annually  saw  campaigns  around  where  Portugal  
3  Robert  Bucholz  and  Newton  Key,  Early  Modern  England,  1485-1714:  A  Narrative  History ,  2nd  ed.  
Chichester,  UK:  Wiley-Blackwell,  2009,  239.  
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borders  Galicia  and  Extremadura.  Meanwhile,  the  Portuguese  were  engaged  in  an  
ongoing  conflict  with  the  Dutch  which  mostly  took  place  in  each  belligerent’s  
respective  colonial  possessions.  These  conflicts  were  expressed  in  the  larger  
Atlantic  context  in  the  form  of  privateering.  In  an  effort  to  cut  the  costs  of  
maintaining  several  navies  deployed  across  the  globe,  early  modern  states  
granted  ‘commissions’  to  private  men-of-war  to  harass  and  capture  enemy  
merchant  ships.  The  state  received  a  portion  of  the  plunder  as  well  as  the  
knowledge  that  their  enemy’s  wealth  or  supplies  were  not  reaching  them.  The  
privateer,  of  course,  enjoyed  the  plunder  and  perhaps  even  the  satisfaction  of  
serving  their  country  or  king.  Less  scrupulous  English  privateers  could  choose  
between  English  or  French  commissions  in  the  Caribbean  or  even  Portuguese  
commissions  depending  on  whomever  Spain  happened  to  be  at  war  within  the  
continent.  This  created  a  highly  suspicious  atmosphere  in  the  Caribbean  which  
was  only  heightened  by  the  long-standing  idea  of  “No  peace  beyond  the  line”  
which  effectively  meant  that  a  permanent  state  of  war  existed  in  the  Americas.  4
Naturally,  Spanish-American  officials  had  to  be  vigilant  when  foreign  ships  
sailed  into  their  ports.  Despite  whatever  peace  might  exist  in  Europe,  those  ships  
might  still  intend  harm.    
As  we  have  already  seen  then,  Spanish  power  and  legal  claim  to  land  in  the  
Americas  were  far  from  inviolable  by  1655.  In  addition  to  an  English  presence  in  
the  Americas  and  Caribbean,  were  French,  Dutch,  Swedish,  Danish,  and  
4  Frances  Gardiner  Davenport,  and  Charles  Oscar  Paullin,  European  Treaties  Bearing  on  the  History  
of  the  United  States  and  Its  Dependencies:  To  1648 ,  P.  Smith,  1917,  220.  
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Portuguese  colonies.  Spain  maintained  her  claim  to  a  New  World  monopoly,  but  
the  Reformation,  Dutch  Revolt,  Thirty  Years  War,  and  its  successor  wars,  had  
made  enforcement  of  those  claims  increasingly  difficult.  Unsurprisingly,  most  of  
the  aforementioned  powers  first  established  permanent  colonies  towards  the  
start  of  the  17th  century  when  Spanish  forces  were  heavily  concentrated  on  the  
European  Continent.  The  Dutch  Revolt  was  acutely  damaging  to  Spain  and  
exacerbated  the  long-lasting  Thirty  Years  War  during  which  a  truce  between  
Spain  and  the  United  Provinces  expired.   To  forget  that  the  non-Spanish  5
European  colonization  of  the  Americas  was  closely  linked  to  the  wars  and  crises  
of  Europe  is  to  forget  half  of  the  history.  The  English  seizure  of  Jamaica,  despite  
occurring  a er  the  cessation  of  pan-European  conflict  in  1648,  still  took  place  at  
a  time  in  which  Spain  was  engaged  in  conflict  across  4  European  fronts.  
Therefore  the  conflicts  within  Europe  at  this  time  heavily  shaped  Spanish  
policies.  Worsening  the  problem  was  the  fact  that  they  came  at  a  time  when  
Habsburg  Spanish  revenues  began  to  decline.    The  beginning  of  the  17th  century  6
had  wreaked  havoc  on  Spain  and  her  colonial  possessions,  including  those  in  
Europe.  As  previously  mentioned  the  most  important  by  1655  was  the  rebellion  in  
Portugal.  Overseeing  the  dissolution  of  the  Iberian  Union  undeniably  marked  his  
reign  as  a  failure.  Thus,  by  the  time  of  the  English  conquest  of  Jamaica,  the  
Spanish  could  ill-afford  further  catastrophes.  Another  protracted  European  war  
was  far  too  costly,  and  the  disruption  of  the  galeones  and  flotas’  journeys  back  to  
5  Melvyn  Bragg,  The  Thirty  Years  War ,  In  Our  Time:  History,  n.d.  
6  Richard  Lachmann,  “Greed  and  Contingency:  State  Fiscal  Crises  and  Imperial  Failure  in  Early  
Modern  Europe,”  American  Journal  of  Sociology  115,  no.  1  (2009):  39–73.  
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Spain  from  America  were  equally  undesirable.   
Consequently,  we  must  understand  that  the  Spanish  were  seeking  peace  
with  England  to  ensure  that  American  wealth  crossed  the  Atlantic.  Spanish  
foreign  policy  at  this  moment  had  two  primary  objectives:  secure  an  unbroken  
Habsburg  inheritance  in  Europe,  and  utilize  the  wealth  of  the  Indies  to  fund  the  
campaigns  which  the  former  required.  The  first  objective  necessarily  meant  
peace  with  expansionist  France  and  squashing  the  Portuguese  rebellion.  
Meanwhile  the  English  sought  to  establish  more  colonies  in  the  Americas,  and  
a er  first  failing  to  capture  Hispaniola,  they  settled  on  Jamaica  and  built  it  upon  
foundations  as  shaky  as  the  sands  of  Port  Royal.  The  narrative  of  the  Spanish  loss  
of  Jamaica  hastening  their  irreversible  decline  at  the  hands  of  a  surging  England  
must  be  reconciled  with  these  facts.  By  the  time  the  Godolphin  Treaty  was  signed  
in  1670,  the  Spanish  had  ensured  peace  on  the  English  front  and  promoted  the  
further  pacification  of  the  Caribbean.  Likewise,  the  English  had  secured  free  
trade  with  the  Spanish  in  America,  and  an  internationally  recognized  Caribbean  
island  by  treaty.  We  must  not  let  this  honorable  outcome  distract  from  the  fact  
that  there  was  a  5-year  long  struggle  for  control  of  Jamaica  between  the  Spanish  
and  English  on  the  island.  
The  ultimate  failure  of  the  group  that  retreated  into  the  Blue  Mountains  in  
May  1655  to  recapture  Jamaica  is  the  primary  focus  of  what  follows.  The  goal  is  
to  answer  the  o -asked  question  of  why  the  Spanish  were  unable  to  reconquer  
Jamaica.  As  mentioned,  past  explanations  have  centered  on  the  weakness  and  
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decline  of  ‘Spain’  or  the  rise  of  England  as  the  most  important  factor.  However,  
by  analyzing  Jamaica  within  the  Atlantic  context,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  
inability  to  reconquer  Jamaica  was  not  inevitable  but  part  of  two  conscious  
decisions  and  one  fatal  assumption.  First,  Iberian-Spain  chose  not  to  dispatch  a  
relief  fleet  nor  alter  the  route  of  the  silver  fleets  to  secure  the  island  as  a  
consequence  of  European  warfare.  Second,  Spanish  American  officials  chose  to  
prioritize  the  defense  of  their  dominions  over  the  reconquest  of  Jamaica.  In  
addition,  some  officials  even  chose  to  engage  in  illicit  trade  with  the  English  
around  Jamaica.  These  decisions  ensured  that  an  external  force  did  not  play  a  
decisive  role  in  recapturing  Jamaica.   
Finally,  the  Spanish  Resistance  assumed  that  the  Black  inhabitants  of  the  
island  were  as  loyal  to  King  Philip  as  they  were,  when  in  fact  the  priorities  of  that  
group  lay  elsewhere.  So  when  the  initial  resistance  began,  it  began  with  a  retreat  
into  areas  best  known  to  the  formerly  enslaved  Blacks  or  the  descendants  of  the  
formerly  enslaved  Blacks.  These  groups,  supplemented  by  slaves  that  ran  away  
during  the  English  invasion,  formed  what  can  be  deemed  the  ‘Black  Resistance.’  
It  must  be  said  that  the  Black  Resistance  was  separate  from  and  independent  of,  
the  Spanish  Resistance.  The  Spaniards  on  the  island  failed  to  meaningfully  
incorporate  the  Black  Resistance  into  their  ranks.  This  proved  to  be  the  fatal  
error  which  doomed  their  cause.  Again,  the  Spanish  Jamaicans  chose  to  base  
their  resistance  in  the  areas  best  known  to  the  Black  Resistance.  For  4  years  then,  
the  Spanish  Resistance  relied  on  the  knowledge,  expertise,  and  strength  of  this  
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community  to  make  such  resistance  viable.  Lulled  into  thinking  the  cooperation  
between  the  Spanish  Jamaicans  and  Black  Jamaicans  was  the  obedience  of  the  
latter  to  the  former,  the  Spanish  were  shocked  when  the  Black  Resistance  was  at  
the  head  of  the  final  English  push  to  evict  them.   
Jamaica  up  to  1655  
Before  the  end  of  Spanish  control  of  Jamaica  can  be  understood,  its  time  
as  a  Habsburg  possession  must  be  explained.  Jamaica's  European  experience  
dates  back  to  Columbus'  second  voyage  in  1494  and  was  linked  with  Columbus'  
descendants  to  the  present  through  its  creation  as  a  Marquisate  of  that  family.  
The  first  Marquis  of  Jamaica  was  Columbus'  grandson,  Luis  Colón  and  the  final  
marquis  to  hold  real  power  on  the  island  was  Don  Pedro  Nuño  Colón  de  
Portugal,  who  went  on  to  serve  as  Viceroy  of  New  Spain  and  could  only  lament  
the  loss  of  his  "ancestral"  lands.   It  was  the  personal  dominion  of  the  Columbus  7
family  and  while  a  component  of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy,  it  was  not  subject  to  
its  direct  oversight.  The  administration  of  Jamaica  as  a  largely  autonomous  
marquisate  helps  to  explain  the  neglected  state  of  the  island  when  the  English  
conquered  it,  and  which  it  remained  in  throughout  the  resistance  to  that  
conquest.   
The  Marquisate  of  Jamaica  was,  therefore,  cut-off  from  direct  control  of  
the  Habsburgs  from  1557  on,  and  for  a  quarter-century  prior  the  arrival  of  Penn  
7  Francisco  Morales  Padrón,  Spanish  Jamaica,  Trans ,  Translated  by  Patrick  Bryan,  Michael  Gronow,  
and  Felix  Oviedo  Moral,  Kingston:  Ian  Randle  Publishers,  2003,  66.  
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and  Venables,  it  had  been  cut-off  from  direct  contact  with  the  Crown.   The  8
administrative  situation  of  Jamaica  coupled  with  Crown  regulations  regarding  
the  flow  of  commerce  surrounding  the  island  created  the  political  and  economic  
conditions  on  the  island.  Compounding  the  island’s  isolation  was  the  Crown’s  
strict  shipping  regulations  for  the  annual  galeones  and  flotas.  Those  shipping  
regulations  centered  on  the  need  to  effectively  protect  Spanish  vessels  during  the  
trans-Atlantic  journey.   
There  had  been  plans  for  an  Armada  de  Barlovento  permanently  stationed  
in  the  West  Indies  tasked  with  protecting  Spanish  merchants.  However,  the  
situation  in  Europe  effectively  tied  the  Crown's  hands  and  prevented  serious  
attempts  at  such  a  fleet  until  the  1660s.  The  desire  to  protect  the  merchant  ships  
remained  though,  and  developed  into  the  system  of  galeones  and  flotas .  The  
galeones  delivered  supplies  to  the  Province  of  Tierra  Firme  and  the  flotas  
conducted  affairs  with  the  Province  of  New  Spain.  Both  fleets  did  in  fact  pass  by  
Jamaica:  the  galeones  on  their  way  to  Cartagena,  and  the  flotas  on  their  way  to  
Veracruz.  Before  reaching  those  ports  the  ships  conducted  trade  with  important  
centers  in  the  Caribbean  such  as  Santo  Domingo.  Once  anchored  at  their  
respective  ports-of-call,  they  continued  to  sell  goods  to  the  residents  of  those  
provinces  while  loading  up  those  provinces'  treasures,  mostly  in  the  form  of  
silver.  What  must  be  recognized  is  that  when  the  galeones  and  flotas  passed  by  
Jamaica,  they  were  not  laden  with  bullion;  this  fact  is  o en  forgotten  when  
8  Jon  Latimer,  Buccaneers  of  the  Caribbean:  How  Piracy  Forged  an  Empire ,  Cambridge,  
Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  2009,  92.  
 
10  
scholars  exaggerate  the  threat  created  by  the  English  in  Jamaica.  
In  any  case,  the  two  fleets  would  ideally  rendezvous  in  la  Habana,  
whereupon  they  make  their  return  as  one  fleet  to  Sevilla.  The  carefully  proscribed  
route  and  schedule  effectively  denied  Jamaica  any  participation  in  the  Spanish  
Atlantic  economy.  The  residents  of  the  island  could  not  afford  the  heavily  taxed  
items  aboard  the  fleets,  and  the  ships  too  o en  appeared  at  times  where  the  
residents’  goods  either  weren't  ready  or  had  spoiled.  The  result,  as  Padrón  puts  it,  
was  that,  "no  one  dared  to  despatch  a  ship  to  Jamaica  for  the  purposes  of  trade."  9
This  predicament  required  the  residents  of  Jamaica  to  find  alternative  methods  to  
meet  their  needs.  
One  way  of  meeting  those  needs  was  through  illicit  trading  with  foreign  
smugglers.  The  composite  nature  of  the  Habsburg  monarchy  meant  that  taxation  
was  asymmetrically  applied  in  early  modern  Spain,  with  Castille  shouldering  
most  of  that  burden.  This  tax  burden  was  transferred  to  the  Indies  through  
export  and  import  duties.  A  tax  was  levied  on  goods  leaving  Seville,  and  a  second  
on  goods  entering  an  American  port.  The  result  was  a  severe  markup  on  
essentially  all  goods.  Jamaicans  were  unable  and  unwilling  to  pay  those  prices.  
Although  tax  breaks  were  granted  by  the  Crown,  the  population  still  did  not  have  
access  to  those  goods  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above.  This  pushed  the  
Jamaicans  into  the  arms  of  smugglers  who  could  provide  necessary  supplies  at  
cheaper  prices.  The  governors  of  Jamaica  o en  tacitly  allowed  the  trade  because  
9  Francisco  Morales  Padrón,  Spanish  Jamaica,  Trans ,  Translated  by  Patrick  Bryan,  Michael  Gronow,  
and  Felix  Oviedo  Moral,  Kingston:  Ian  Randle  Publishers,  2003,  159.  
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they  received  the  lowest  salary  of  all  officials  in  the  Antilles.  This  meant  the  
governors  could  supplement  their  meager  salary  with  bribes,  or  direct  
involvement  in  the  trade.   While  these  smugglers  played  a  vital  role  in  sustaining  10
the  population  of  an  island  like  Jamaica,  they  were  called  rescatadores ,  or  pirates  
by  the  Crown.  There  was  a  good  reason  for  this.  The  smugglers  who  plied  the  
Caribbean  were  o en  the  same  vessels  and  crews  who  had  forcibly  stolen  the  
goods  in  the  first  place.   
Thus,  Spanish  Jamaica  was  only  ever  theoretically  Spanish.  To  better  
reflect  this  material  truth,  Jamaica  should  be  understood  as  an  island  that  was  
predominantly  settled  by  Spaniards  who  recognized  the  authority  of  the  King.  
However,  that  kingly  authority  had  been  delegated  to  the  Marquis  of  Jamaica,  and  
was  rarely  submitted  to  by  those  inhabitants.  The  ties  that  bound  Jamaica  to  
Spain  existed  on  paper  and  could  be  broken  as  easily  as  that  paper  which  created  
the  Marquisate.   
Jamaica  was  a  thinly  populated,  forgotten  frontier  of  an  island.   An  island  11
on  the  margins  of  the  periphery.  Lack  of  direct  control  from  the  Crown  resulted  
in  a  severely  undefended  island;  requests  to  fortify  the  island  had  to  go  through  
the  Marquis  rather  than  the  King.  There  was  knowledge  of  possible  attacks  
forthcoming  at  Hispaniola  and  Jamaica  for  over  a  decade  before  the  Western  
Design.  In  a  letter  from  1644,  King  Philip  made  it  known  that  Jamaica  is  at  great  
risk  of  attack.  To  defend  the  island,  and  the  whole  of  the  Indies  he  asked  the  
10  Ibid,  70.  
11  Kathleen  Deagan,  “The  Archaeology  of  the  Spanish  Contact  Period  in  the  Caribbean,”  Journal  
of  World  Prehistory  2,  no.  2  (1988):  198.   
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viceroy  to,  “assist  and  aid  the  fortresses  and  ports  of  the  Windward  Islands  with  
the  gunpowder  munitions  and  other  necessary  things  for  its  defense  and  
preservation,  because  of  the  impossibility  that  there  is  of  doing  it  from  these  
Kingdoms  with  respect  to  how  much  they  consume  themselves  in  the  small  
armies  and  present  wars.”   When  in  1655  there  was  another  imminent  threat,  the  12
situation  in  Europe  had  not  improved  at  all.  This  meant  that  essentially  the  same  
wars  which  prevented  Spain  from  sending  direct  military  assistance  to  the  
Americas  in  1644  prevented  military  assistance  in  1655.  The  ongoing  war  with  
France,  the  continued  rebellion  in  Portugal,  and  the  additional  outbreak  of  war  
with  England  in  Europe  all  hindered  whatever  desire  there  may  have  been  to  set  
out  from  Spain  to  recapture  Jamaica,  the  final  possession  of  the  Columbian  
Dynasty.  
Therefore,  in  1670  when  the  Spanish  officially  recognized  English  
possession  of  the  island,  they  were  giving  up  an  island  that  they  never  fully  
possessed  and  which  brought  them  no  direct  income.  Past  histories  too  o en  rely  
on  English  accounts  which  amplify  the  importance  and  value  of  Spanish  Jamaica  
so  as  to  amplify  the  importance  and  value  of  its  conquest. 
Historiography  
A  major  obstacle  to  overcoming  such  an  understanding  is  the  prior  
scholarship  of  the  'English  conquest'  or  'Spanish  loss'  of  Jamaica.  Those  
descriptions  alone  necessarily  assume  the  power  of  the  former  or  the  weakness  of  
12  Felipe  IV,   “Carta  Del  Rey  a  Virrey  Garcia,”  Real  Cedulas  Originales  Y  Duplicados,  January  23,  
1644,  AGN/IC/RCO  y  DUP/RCO/Vol.  2/  4068/30/Exp.  30,  Archivo  General  de  la  Nacion,  Mexico  
D.F.,  Mexico.  
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the  latter.  Both  suffer  from  a  teleological  approach  in  which  a  profitable  English  
Jamaica  is  assumed  and  the  reduction  of  Spain  to  the  Iberian  peninsula,  is  taken  
for  granted.  How  could  Spain  permit  such  an  egregious  loss  of  such  rich  
territory?  Would  they  not  have  dispatched  all  available  resources  to  immediately  
secure  the  island?  These  answers  to  these  questions  depend  on  whether  the  
historian  places  this  event  within  either  the  American  or  Jamaican  contexts.  In  
the  former  context,  scholarship  tends  to  favor  an  explanation  wherein  England  
conquers  Spanish  Jamaica,  paving  the  route  for  the  ‘first’  British  Empire.  In  the  
latter  context,  Spain  is  an  empire  in  decline  under  the  leadership  of  the  
penultimate  Habsburg  monarch.  By  favoring  one  context  over  the  other  rather  
than  placing  them  in  an  Atlantic  context,  Jamaica  represents  either  the  
unstoppable  rise  of  England  or  an  inexcusable  breakdown  of  imperial  authority.  
It  obfuscates  the  material  conditions  which  existed  on  the  island,  as  well  as  
overstating  the  actual  importance  of  the  island  with  the  larger  scheme  of  
Habsburg  Monarchy  and  Empire.  However,  this  false  dichotomy  of  contexts  has  
persisted  because  historians  have  only  recently  pursued  Atlantic  history  as  a  
methodology,  despite  the  immediate  firsthand  accounts  of  the  actual  events  
written  by  firmly  Atlantic  characters.   
The  inescapable  fact  is  that  within  5  years  of  the  English  arrival  in  
Jamaica,  the  home  government  had  seen  the  Restoration  of  Charles  II.  The  new  
regime  had  to  square  the  Protectorate’s  ill-gotten  gains  and  looked  suspiciously  
on  ‘popery’  and  puritanism  alike.  Oddly  enough  they  even  feared  that  the  last  
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bastion  of  English  Puritanism  in  America,  Massachusetts  Bay,  would  declare  
itself  in  favor  of  the  King  of  Spain,  despite  the  vast  ideological  gulf  between  
them.   Naturally  then,  the  explanations  offered  from  that  early  point  reduced  the  13
Spanish  presence  on  the  island  as  a  foreign  other  with  a  sort  of  ‘proto-orientalist’  
gaze.  Spanish  dominion  over  the  island  had  to  exemplify  all  they  found  abhorrent  
in  Catholicism  so  as  to  further  justify  Jamaica’s  acquisition.  Or  its  acquisition  
needed  to  align  with  the  triumph  of  the  unique  Anglican  Protestant  Church.   It  is  
with  this  understanding  which  I  will  analyze  the  earliest  histories  of  Jamaica  and  
how  the  English  came  to  possess  the  island.  
Highlighting  that  perspective  are  some  of  the  earliest  accounts  created  to  
explain  the  English  conquest  of  the  island.  They  paint  the  picture  of  an  encounter  
with  a  completely  alien  civilization,  almost  like  the  interactions  between  
Spaniards  and  Native  Americans  a  century  prior.  Underscoring  the  ‘otherness’  of  
Spanish  Jamaica  is  an  account  in  which  the  Western  Design  comes  to  the  shores  
of  Jamaica  to  find  it  governed  by  a  woman  who  tried  to  defend  the  island  through  
seduction  and  bribery.   In  creating  an  account  like  this,  the  story  of  Jamaica  14
becomes  divorced  from  the  disaster  which  preceded  it  in  Hispaniola  and  
distanced  further  still  from  the  hard-fought  guerilla  campaign  which  followed  it.  
Dangerously,  it  is  upon  this  foundation  that  all  other  scholarship  was  based.  The  
emasculation  of  the  Spanish  government  in  Jamaica  in  this  literal  sense  was  
13  "America  and  West  Indies:  February  1662,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Colonial,  America  and  West  
Indies:  Volume  5,  1661-1668,  ed.  W  Noel  Sainsbury  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1880),  
71-80,  British  History  Online ,  242.  
14  James  Robertson,  “Re‐writing  the  English  Conquest  of  Jamaica  in  the  Late  Seventeenth  
Century,”  The  English  Historical  Review  117,  no.  473  (September  1,  2002):  821–22.  
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never  fully  refuted  by  later  scholars  who,  finding  no  records  of  a  female  Spanish  
governor,  perpetuated  her  myth  in  the  character  of  the  actual  officials  on  the  
island  in  1655.  The  female  governor  became  the  weakness  of  Spanish  military  
resistance  in  the  face  of  overwhelmingly  strong  English men .   
Any  earnest  historiography  of  Jamaican  history,  and  especially  the  
beginnings  of  the  English  occupation  of  that  island,  must  begin  with  Edward  
Long’s  The  History  of  Jamaica .  Written  in  1774,  Long  provides  one  of  the  most  
comprehensive  accounts  of  the  island  up  to  that  point  in  time.  It  is  also  deeply  
embedded  within  notions  of  English  superiority  engaging  with  an  inferior  
Spanish  counterpart.  Therefore  Long’s  narrative  is  firmly  within  the  Jamaican  
context,  and  he  o en  gives  precedence  to  English  decisions  and  actions.  Long’s  
account  is  slightly  more  complex  though  as  he  acknowledges  that  there  were  
moments  when  the  English  were  barely  maintaining  the  island.  Notable  too,  is  
that  Long  includes  an  account  of  the  disastrous  attempt  to  take  Hispaniola.  
However,  he  puts  much  of  the  blame  at  the  feet  of  the  commissioners  of  the  
expedition,  again  making  the  English  the  undisputed  center  of  events.  The  
Commissioners  were  some  of  the  most  severe  puritans  in  the  expedition,  and  
from  his  late  18th-century  perspective,  they  were  prime  targets  for  a  scathing  
critique.  Long’s  account  is  so  filled  with  critiques  of  the  orders  of  the  
commissioners  that  it’s  not  until  eight  pages  into  his  recounting  of  the  
Hispaniolan  campaign  that  he  actually  mentions  the  Spanish  repelling  the  
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English  on  the  island.  15
Once  the  English  moved  onto  Jamaica,  Long  appears  to  provide  a  balanced  
account  of  the  events  as  they  unfolded  in  1655.  He  includes  explicit  explanations  
of  the  poor  situation  of  the  English  troops  on  the  island,  but  he  refuses  to  
recognize  any  role  which  the  Spanish  played  in  bringing  their  misery  about.  
According  to  Long,  there  was  a  conspiracy  amongst  some  of  the  officers  who  
sought  to  force  Cromwell  to  call  for  their  return  to  England  or  redeployment  in  
Flanders.  As  evidence  Long  cites  the  poor  supplies  which  the  army  endured  in  
the  first  two  years  in  Jamaica.   Rather  than  a  conspiracy,  this  was  probably  more  16
indicative  of  embezzlement  on  the  part  of  the  victualers.  It  was  quite  common  at  
that  time  for  them  to  augment  their  salary  by  inflating  their  purchases  to  match  
the  money  which  they  had  received.   
As  the  narrative  continues  into  the  5-year  guerilla  campaign,  Long  
wholeheartedly  disavows  the  notion  that  the  Spanish  were  interested  in,  or  
actually  trying  to  bring  about  the  restitution  of  the  island.  When  recounting  the  
battles  of  Las  Chorreras  and  Rio  Nuevo,  Long  attributes  the  English  victory  to  
their  “gallantry”  and  the  Spanish  defeat  was  chalked  up  to  their  “cowardice.”  17
Long  is  also  deeply  critical  of  Christobal  Arnaldo  Isassi,  whom  he  portrays  as  a  
self-interested  villain  only  seeking  his  own  survival  and  vainglory.  He  writes  that  
15  Edward  Long,  The  History  of  Jamaica.  Or,  General  Survey  of  the  Antient  and  Modern  State  of  That  
Island::  With  Reflections  on  Its  Situation,  Settlements,  Inhabitants,  Climate,  Products,  Commerce,  Laws,  
and  Government.  In  Three  Volumes.  Illustrated  with  Copper  Plates ,  T.  Lowndes,  in  Fleet-Street.,  1774,  
230.  
16  Ibid,  242.  
17  Ibid,  267,  274-275.  
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Don  Christobal  was  the  first  to  retreat,  was  convinced  of  his  own  heroism,  and  
eager  to  remove  himself  to  Cuba.   These  accusations  don’t  stand  up  to  the  18
evidence  which  exists  in  Spanish  archives  which  show  that  Isassi  had  been  in  
Jamaica  for  the  duration  of  the  1655-1660  resistance,  had  refused  to  leave  the  
island,  and  was  engaged  in  proposing  a  return  to  the  island  a er  he  was  forced  to  
leave.  In  Long’s  defense,  he  did  not  have  the  archival  resources  at  his  disposal  
which  a  modern  historian  does.  Moreover,  Long  was  an  18th  Century  Englishman  
writing  during  the  zenith  of  the  ‘First  British  Empire,’  it  was  incredibly  difficult  
to  avoid  narratives  which  highlighted  the  triumph  of  Englishmen  when  he  could  
point  to  a  century  of  such  triumphs.  Unsurprisingly,  his  work  was  incredibly  
influential  in  perpetuating  the  myth  of  the  Jamaican  conquest  which  still  persists  
in  some  circles.  
Another  history  from  roughly  a  century  later  and  within  the  Caribbean  
context  claims  that  Spanish  wealth  and  decadence  so  so ened  them  that  they  
were  neither  productive  nor  proactive.  This  perspective  comes  from  “Jamaica:  its  
History,  Constitution,  and  Topographical  Description”  by  John  Jarrett  Wood  
written  in  1884.  Wood  appears  to  have  been  an  educator  in  Jamaica  and  wrote  the  
book  for  educational  purposes.  When  writing  on  the  English  conquest  of  Jamaica,  
Wood  spends  little  time  on  the  failure  of  the  Hispaniola  expedition  (all  of  one  
sentence).  Of  pre-conquest  Jamaica,  he  writes,  “All  accounts,  however,  agree  in  
representing  the  Hidalgos  of  Jamaica  as  leading  a  life  of  slothful  luxuriousness.”  19
18  Ibid,  279-280.  
19  John  Jarrett  Wood,  Jamaica:  Its  History,  Constitution,  and  Topographical  Description :  With  
Geological  and  Meteorological  Notes  (McCartney  &  Wood,  1884),  9.  
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Most  later  historians  disagree  with  this  assessment  of  the  island  and  the  most  
recent  scholarship  greatly  diminishes  the  validity  of  that  statement.  His  account  
of  the  conquest  does  acknowledge  the  difficulty  in  fully  removing  the  Spanish  
from  the  island  as  well  as  the  difficulty  in  persuading  English  soldiers  to  actually  
settle  the  island.  On  the  whole  though,  Wood  presents  a  highly  biased  account  of  
the  English  conquest.  
It  must  be  noted  though,  that  Wood  appears  to  have  been  writing  with  the  
purpose  of  educating  the  young  minds  of  late  19th  century  Jamaica.  The  audience  
of  his  piece  is  particularly  relevant  when  analyzing  passages  such  as  this,   
Spain  in  1658  vainly  endeavoured  to  recover  Jamaica...the  rapid  
acquirement  of  wealth  without  the  aid  of  industry,  and  almost  solely  by  
means  of  violence  and  cra ,  is  as  fatal  to  the  strength  and  happiness  of  a  
nation  as  it  is  to  that  of  an  individual,  and  the  Spanish  government,  a er  
several  unsuccessful  efforts,  abandoned  all  further  prospects  of  
repossessing  themselves  of  the  island.  20
This  passage  seems  to  be  more  directed  at  teaching  a  lesson  about  the  merits  of  
wealth  through  hard-work  than  any  attempt  at  actual  historical  work.  While  
Wood’s  assessment  may  have  some  validity  when  looking  at  particular  people  in  
other  parts  of  the  Spanish  Empire,  it  is  wholly  inadequate  in  describing  the  
actual  conditions  of  Jamaica.  Later  historians  recognize  and  understand  that  
Jamaica  was  a  frontier  island;  it  was  not  uninhabited  like  Barbados,  but  it  was  a  
far  cry  from  Santo  Domingo  or  Cuba.  When  Jamaica  is  understood  in  this  
manner,  as  a  frontier  removed  from  Spanish  wealth,  it  becomes  possible  to  
understand  why  the  Spanish  surrendered  the  island  in  a  formal  treaty.   
20  Ibid,  10.  
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Another  perspective  on  this  topic  that  firmly  places  the  events  in  question  
within  the  Jamaican  context  only  is  Irene  Wright’s  “The  Spanish  Resistance  to  
the  English  Occupation  of  Jamaica,  1655-1660.”   Wright  seems  largely  
uninterested  in  making  any  arguments  regarding  why  the  Spanish  were  unable  to  
remove  the  English  from  Jamaica.  However,  Wright  portrayed  the  Spanish  
troops,  under  the  leadership  of  Isassi,  as  inexperienced  and  the  Spanish  leaders  
as  incompetent  and  petty.  On  the  failure  of  the  first  relief  expedition  she  wrote,  
“Captain  Juan  de  los  Reyes  was  occupied  in  furnishing  history  with  a  fine  
example  of  what  envy  and  personal  animosity  can  accomplish  toward  defeating  a  
cause.”   Despite  being  one  of  the  most  capable  translators  of  Spanish  archival  21
documents,  Wright  limited  this  article  to  one  collection  of  documents  aptly  
entitled,  ‘Documents  about  the  loss  of  the  island  of  Jamaica’  in  the  Archivo  
General  de  Indias.  This  ensured  that  Wright  did  not  utilize  the  existing  English  
translation  of  de  los  Reyes’  orders  which  question  the  characterization  that  he  
was  purely  fueled  by  petty  jealousy.  Furthering  this  case,  she  wrote  that,  “surer  
sources  of  certain  failure  lay  in  the  petty  jealousies  existing  among  the  Spanish  
officials,  civil  and  military  alike.”   For  Wright,  the  success  of  the  English  lay  in  22
large  part  with  the  incompetence  and  weakness  of  the  Spanish  who  were  unable  
to  muster  a  whole-hearted  effort  to  remove  the  English  from  the  island.   
Wright  made  frequent  use  of  Spanish  archival  sources  in  formulating  her  
argument  about  the  weak  but  irritating  Spanish-American  attempts  to  reclaim  
21  Irene  A.  Wright,  “The  Spanish  Resistance  to  the  English  Occupation  of  Jamaica,  1655-1660,”  
Transactions  of  the  Royal  Historical  Society  13  (1930):  126.  
22  Ibid,  126.  
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Jamaica.  The  balance  Wright  strikes  in  primary  sources  strengthens  the  overall  
narrative,  despite  the  aforementioned  errors.  She  utilizes  documents  from  Don  
Pedro  Bayona  de  Villanueva,  the  Spanish-born  governor  of  Cuba  at  the  time,  Don  
Cristobal  Arnaldo  de  Isassi,  the  Basque  governor  of  Jamaica,  and  the  Duke  of  
Alburquerque,  the  viceroy  of  New  Spain  at  the  time.  These  men  were  the  key  
figures  tasked  with  la  reconquista  of  Jamaica  and  it  was  largely  up  to  them  to  
decide  how  to  accomplish  the  task.  Wright  is  able  to  effectively  utilize  these  
sources  when  she  discusses  the  infighting  amongst  the  Spanish-American  
officials  that  hindered  their  ability  to  take  Jamaica.  Each  man’s  account  of  what  
went  wrong  and  who  is  to  blame  furthers  Wright’s  claim  that  Spanish-American  
leadership  was  weakened  by  rivalry.  Wright  skillfully  weaves  this  into  her  overall  
narrative  of  Spanish-American  resistance.  While  these  rivalries  amongst  
Spanish-American  leadership  did  exist,  and  while  those  rivalries  hampered  the  
Spanish  in  this  instance,  they  were  neither  unique  nor  as  petty  as  presented.  One  
need  look  no  further  than  the  immediate  fate  of  Penn  and  Venables.  These  men  
raced  back  to  England  to  present  the  other  as  the  primary  factor  in  the  failure  at  
Hispaniola.  As  such,  her  use  of  English  sources  is  troubling.  
On  the  English  side,  she  mainly  relies  on  the  diary  and  correspondence  of  
Colonel  Edward  D’Oyley,  the  man  in  charge  of  repelling  Spanish  assaults  on  
Jamaica.  The  conclusions  she  comes  to  about  English  strength  come  
predominantly  from  this  English  soldier.  One  passage  illustrates  this  bias,   
But  D'oyley,  with  his  reorganised  army  into  which  courage  had  returned,  
had  pressed  the  Spaniard  hard,  and  lack  of  consistent  support  had  so  
diminished  Ysassi's  strength  that  now,  in  the  summer  of  1657,  far  from  
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remaining  penned  within  their  defences  in  the  town,  as  he  had  described  
them  in  the  spring  of  1656,  the  English  were  reported  to  sleep  abroad  
tranquilly,  even  in  the  parties  pursuing  him,  their  horses  picketed-so  great  
was  their  confidence  in  Ysassi's  inability  to  disturb.  23
Her  use  of  the  phrase,  “his  reorganised  army  into  which  courage  had  returned,”  
clearly  indicates  a  bias  in  favor  of  the  idea  of  English  strength.  Although  she  is  
an  American  historian,  Wright  seems  to  display  a  favor  towards  the  idea  that  the  
English  had  superior  strength  and  fortitude.  This  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  
she  does  not  directly  cite  D’Oyley’s  diary  or  correspondence,  leading  the  reader  
to  believe  that  this  idea  is  her  own.  While  Wright  is  successful  in  using  Spanish  
documents,  she  is  less  effective  in  utilizing  English  sources.  This  diminishes  the  
overall  validity  of  her  narrative  that  Spanish  resistance  was  mired  due  to  the  
strength  of  the  English  and  the  weakness  and  incompetence  of  the  Spanish.  
Wright  is  correct  in  citing  rivalries  among  Spanish-American  leaders  as  a  
handicap  but  does  not  recognize  that  their  counterparts,  the  English  were  
negatively  impacted  by  the  same  impulses.  The  English  forces  were  also  little  
more  than  a  ragtag  group  of  outlaws  and  misfits  cast  out  of  England  proper  to  
serve  as  at  worst,  cannon  fodder,  and  at  best  colonists.  Wright  also  fails  to  look  
beyond  the  immediate  Jamaican  context  when  considering  concepts  like  
‘strength’  and  ‘weakness.’  Wright’s  argument  is  weakened  by  this  lack  of  the  
Atlantic  context.  This  is  even  though  Wright  urged  students  of  this  history  to  
consider  this  broader  context  explicitly,   
The  wisdom  of  the  policy  which,  to  the  dominion  of  Jamaica,  preferred  the  
immediate  delivery  even  of  three  years'  "  plate  "  from  Peru  plus  one  year's  
profit  from  Mexico  must  be  judged  in  the  light  of  European,  rather  than  
23  Ibid,  128.  
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American  history.  The  relative  importance  of  these  alternatives  does  not  
appear  to  the  student  who  confines  his  consideration  to  the  Jamaican  
enterprise  alone.  24
Unfortunately,  Wright  does  little  in  that  article  to  elucidate  exactly  what  made  
such  a  policy  so  wise.  This  present  scholarship  intends  to  do  just  that.   
Meanwhile,  the  main  Spanish  authority  on  the  subject  is  Francisco  
Morales  Padrón,  whose  book,  Spanish  Jamaica  provides  one  of  the  fullest  accounts  
of  the  entire  history  of  the  island.  Of  particular  note  are  his  chapters  regarding  
the  loss  of  Jamaica  to  the  English.  In  the  book,  Padrón  builds  a  case  that  
sufficiently  shows  that  Jamaica’s  value  to  Spain  had  long  since  peaked  by  the  time  
the  English  washed  upon  the  shore.  On  no  less  than  3  separate  occasions  Padrón  
writes  that  Jamaica  was  an  unimportant  island  in  the  larger  Habsburg  scheme.  
He  wrote  of  the  lack  of  mineral  wealth  on  the  island,  “This  was  the  reason  and  
none  other  that  caused  the  island  to  be  relegated  to  oblivion  for  a  number  of  
years."   Additionally,  Padrón  analyzed  the  absence  of  Jamaica  in  significant  25
trans-Atlantic  commerce,  stating  that  “no  one  dared  to  despatch  a  ship  to  
Jamaica  for  the  purpose  of  trade."  and  "few  ships  arrived  in  the  island  from  
Spain,  and  all  European  products  had  to  be  purchased  at  exploitative  prices  in  the  
market  of  Cartagena  de  Indias."   26
Despite  fundamentally  understanding  the  diminished  role  of  Jamaica  
within  contemporary  imperial  aims  and  pursuits,  Padrón  descends  into  a  
24  Ibid,  139-140.  
25  Francisco  Morales  Padrón,  Spanish  Jamaica ,  Trans,  Translated  by  Patrick  Bryan,  Michael  
Gronow,  and  Felix  Oviedo  Moral,  Kingston:  Ian  Randle  Publishers,  2003,  157.   
26  Ibid ,  159  and  177.  
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teleological  approach  when  explaining  how  the  Spanish  lost  the  island.  Best  
summarizing  his  position  is  what  follows,  “Jamaica,  an  integral  part  of  the  
Spanish  Empire,  became  the  hub  of  the  English  West  Indies.”   It  is  puzzling  how  27
the  description  of  Jamaica  as  an  ‘integral  part’  of  the  Spanish  Empire  is  
juxtaposed  with  overwhelming  evidence  he  provided  on  the  contrary.  This  
unhelpful  assumption  deeply  alters  Padrón’s  analysis  of  the  guerilla  campaign  
which  followed  the  initial  invasion.  It  places  his  narrative  within  a  firmly  
Caribbean  context  and  leads  to  two  substantial  flaws.  First,  in  working  back  from  
the  knowledge  that  Jamaica  was  going  to  become  an  immensely  profitable  colony  
for  England,  and  second  in  assuming  that  17th  Century  Spain  had  been  able  to  
extract  similar  profit,  or  even  had  the  knowledge  that  such  profit  was  possible.   
These  core  assumptions  necessarily  color  his  analysis  of  Spanish  attempts  
to  recover  the  island.  Summed  up,  the  energy  expended  to  recover  the  island  was  
never  commensurate  with  what  one  might  expect  given  the  assumed  wealth  at  
stake.  Momentous  orders  like  Philip  IV’s  decision  not  to  dispatch  a  fleet  from  
Spain  to  the  island  seem  deeply  misguided  when  framed  with  the  potential  for  
profit  Padrón  assumes  they  were  aware  of.  On  the  contrary  (and  in  Padrón’s  
history),  we  see  that  very  recently  Philip  had  made  a  conscious  decision  not  to  
engage  further  with  Jamaica  on  any  meaningful  level.   Because  the  importance  28
placed  on  Jamaica  was  never  very  high,  the  resources  gained  from  it  little,  and  the  
population  small,  the  effort  to  recover  it  matched  in  nearly  every  way.  Small  
27  Ibid ,  185. 
28  Ibid,  167.  
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numbers  of  reinforcements  were  sent,  little  funding  and  material  allocated  for  
the  cause,  and  references  to  the  island  only  briefly  and  in  the  context  of  larger  
issues.  Padrón’s  history  of  Jamaica  reads  like  a  response  to  the  generation  of  1898  
and  a  return  to  the  defeatism  which  they  objected  to.  While  his  book  is  the  
definitive  Spanish  language  history  of  the  island,  it  is  not  the  only  non-English  
source  of  information.  
There  is  also  a  French  history  of  the  island  written  by  Thibault  
Ehrengardt,  The  History  of  Jamaica  from  1494  to  1838 .  The  sweeping  survey  style  of  
this  single-volume  book  means  that  there  is  only  so  much  detail  regarding  the  
English  invasion  of  the  island.  However,  given  that  this  account  comes  to  us  in  
the  French  language,  it  is  important  in  getting  a  broader  view  of  the  perspectives  
which  exist  on  this  event.  Being  both  a  Black  and  Francophone  author,  
Ehrengardt  offers  one  of  the  more  unique  perspectives  on  the  events  of  the  
island.  Ehrengardt  at  times  relies  too  heavily  on  Padrón’s  work  but  still  manages  
to  come  to  some  important  original  conclusions.  Chief  among  those  is  the  
emphasis  which  Ehrengadt  places  on  the  maroon  community  in  determining  the  
outcome  of  the  Spanish  resistance  to  the  English  invasion.  On  the  subject,  he  
writes,  
Ysassi  did  his  best  to  make  sure  they  remained  loyal—when  they  shi ed  
allegiance,  the  Spaniards  definitively  lost  Jamaica.  But  some  of  the  Spanish  
slaves  sided  the  invaders  like  Juan  de  bolas.  Others  took  advantage  of  the  
chaotic  situation  to  stay  on  their  own;  they  started  to  roam  the  island  in  
small  groups,  and,  knowing  no  friends,  attacked  everyone.   29
The  gravity  which  Ehrengardt  attributes  to  the  decisions  of  the  maroon  
29  Thibault  Ehrengardt,  The  History  of  Jamaica  from  1494  to  1838 ,  Paris:  DREAD  Editions,  2015.  
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community  in  determining  the  larger  outcome  is  entirely  justified.  However,  
conceptions  of  loyalty  viz  a  vis  the  Black  community  are  deeply  speculative.  
While  the  actions  of  someone  like  Juan  de  Bolas,  who  handed  the  Spaniards  their  
last  defeat,  might  appear  to  signify  a  change  of  allegiance,  we  have  no  sources  
from  de  Bolas  himself  to  elucidate  his  motivations.  From  strictly  his  actions  
though,  it  seems  more  likely  that  he  was  steadfastly  loyal  to  the  independence  of  
his  community  from  Spanish  and  English  interference  alike.   
A  more  recent  history  of  the  conquest  of  Jamaica  is  Carla  Gardina  
Pestana’s  book,  The  English  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  Oliver  Cromwell’s  Bid  for  Empire  in  
which  she  presents  the  conquest  within  the  context  of  English  raiding  in  the  
Caribbean.  However,  her  central  argument  is  to  show  that  the  apparatus  which  
supported  future  Restoration  colonization  was  created  by  Cromwell  and  
embodied  in  his  Western  Design.  The  central  narrative  is  that  the  experience  of  
pacifying  and  settling  Jamaica,  which  was  carried  out  under  both  Cromwell  and  
Charles  II,  required  a  strong  central  government  that  could  adequately  govern  
colonial  affairs.  While  it  does  not  presuppose  any  inherent  English  strength,  it  
does  fall  into  the  idea  of  the  Spanish  ‘losing’  Jamaica.  Though  not  the  central  
figures  of  this  history,  the  Spanish  are  presented  as  being  unable  to  grasp  the  dire  
situation  in  which  they  found  themselves.   
Pestana  argues  that  the  Spanish  authorities  gave  up  Jamaica  because  they  
had  mistakenly  assumed  that  the  English  did  not  intend  to  settle  permanently  on  
the  island.  She  writes,  “The  Spanish,  having  mounted  no  resistance  initially,  
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claimed  that  they  stumbled  in  that  they  were  caught  off  guard  by  their  own  
conviction  that  the  English  meant  only  to  rob  them.  With  a  long  history  in  the  
region  of  such  visits  by  English  (and  other)  ‘piratas,’  the  Jamaicans  might  be  
forgiven  for  expecting  more  of  the  same.”   In  addition  to  justifying  the  Spanish  30
response,  Pestana  criticizes  General  Venables’  actions,  or  rather  inaction.  
Pestana  cites  Venables’  delay  in  marching  his  troops  to  Santiago  de  la  Vega  as  a  
key  setback  to  a  complete  English  conquest  of  Jamaica.   It  is  also  clear  that  31
Pestana  does  not  view  the  English  conquest  as  a  show  of  strength.  Earlier  in  the  
book,  Pestana  writes  about  the  decision  to  move  on  Jamaica,   
The  Design  planners  in  England  and  its  leaders  in  America  all  envisioned  
a  more  substantial  prize,  either  a  larger  island  such  as  Hispaniola  or  Cuba,  
or  Cartagena,  a  major  city  on  the  mainland.  Only  on  leaving  Hispaniola  
did  the  Commissioners  settle  on  this  more  modest  initial  object...Jamaica  
served  no  particular  purpose  within  the  Spanish  Empire...The  English  
initially  considered  Jamaica  too  minor  to  satisfy  the  expedition’s  goals.  But  
once  the  campaign  began  to  go  awry,  the  smaller  island  looked  more  
attractive.  32
Far  from  narratives  of  English  exceptionalism,  Pestana  presents  the  English  
conquest  as  an  effort  to  rescue  the  Design  from  the  complete  failure  it  had  been  
up  to  that  point.  33
Pestana’s  book  represents  the  most  recent  scholarship  on  the  subject  of  
the  English  conquest  of  Jamaica  and  continues  in  the  tradition  of  balanced  
sources.  Like  earlier  historians,  Pestana  utilizes  the  accounts  of  Admiral  William  
30  Carla  Gardina  Pestana,  The  English  Conquest  of  Jamaica:  Oliver  Cromwell’s  Bid  for  Empire .  
Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  2017,  135.  
31  Ibid,  133 . 
32  Ibid,  132.  
33  Ibid,  132.  
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Penn,  Robert  Venables,  and  Edward  D’Oyley.  Unlike  those  historians,  Pestana  
uses  some  sources  and  accounts  from  unnamed  Englishmen.  She  also  introduces  
a  new  Spanish  source  into  this  history.  Pestana  describes  the  account  of  Captain  
Julian  de  Castilla  as  “the  most-detailed  Spanish  version”  of  the  English  conquest  
of  Jamaica.   It  is  notable  though  that  Pestana  makes  use  of  Wright’s  translation  34
of  that  account,  for  better  or  worse.  As  stated  before,  this  balance  of  sources  from  
the  men  participating  in  the  conquest  or  loss  of  Jamaica  is  praiseworthy.  The  
addition  of  de  Castilla’s  account  is  especially  crucial  as  his  writings  illuminate  
the  Spanish  perspective  of  the  negotiated  surrender  of  the  island  of  Jamaica.  
Pestana  uses  de  Castilla  to  illustrate  that  the  Spanish  were  caught  off-guard  by  
English  desires  to  settle  the  island  while  still  looking  down  upon  the  English.   35
While  Pestana’s  book  furthers  historical  knowledge  on  this  important  
event,  she  fails  to  fully  recognize  the  insignificance  of  Jamaica  to  the  Spanish  at  
this  time.  She  writes,  “Fulfilling  no  specific  need,  Jamaica  nonetheless  had  to  be  
kept  out  of  the  hands  of  others.”   Her  citation  here  is  misleading,  as  one  might  36
assume  it  leads  the  reader  to  archival  Spanish  documents.  Instead,  it  leads  the  
readers  to  a  few  sources  from  previous  historians  discussing  population  estimates  
for  Jamaica  at  this  time.   While  that  information  is  useful  in  its  own  right,  I  37
believe  that  actually  gathering  and  reading  available  archival  Spanish  evidence  
will  show  that  the  loss  of  Jamaica  was  insignificant  and  to  a  certain  extent  
34  Ibid,  135.  
35  Ibid,  138.  
36  Ibid,  131.  
37  Ibid,  311.  
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beneficial  to  the  Spanish.  The  Spanish  became  willing  to  surrender  Jamaica  to  
the  English  once  it  became  clear  that  it  meant  gaining  safer  passage  for  their  
flotas,  in  and  out  of  the  Caribbean.  I  agree  in  many  ways  with  Pestana  and  her  
argument,  but  I  feel  that  it  falls  short  to  fully  explain  the  conquest  of  Jamaica.  
The  final  key  piece  in  the  historiography  comes  via  Casey  Schmitt’s  
article,  “Centering  Spanish  Jamaica”  from  2019.  Despite  disavowing  the  Atlantic  
perspective  in  favor  of  a  Caribbean  context,  “Squaring  a  weak  and  undersupplied  
resistance  with  the  relative  strength  of  surrounding  Spanish  kingdoms,  especially  
the  Viceroyalty  of  New  Spain,  requires  analyzing  Spanish  Jamaica  from  a  regional  
perspective”  it  provides  a  worthwhile  analysis  that  moves  away  from  traditional  
assumptions.   Schmitt’s  central  argument  is  that  an  English  controlled  Jamaica  38
provided  economic  opportunity  to  other  Spanish  colonies  in  the  vicinity  through  
illicit  trade.  The  economics-driven  policy  of  non-intervention  which  Schmitt  
develops  in  the  article  is  wholly  new  in  the  scholarship  of  Jamaica.  Recognizing  
this,  Schmitt  provides  numerous  examples  of  Spanish-American  officials  
profiting  from  illicit  trade  and  then  those  same  officials  acting  against  the  
interests  of  the  Spanish  Resistance  in  Jamaica.  Schmitt  specifically  targets  
Eastern  Cuba  or  Santiago  de  Cuba,  which  was  under  the  leadership  of  Bayona  y  
Villanueva  for  most  of  the  guerilla  resistance  in  Jamaica.   
Honing  in  on  Bayona  y  Villanueva  and  Santiago  de  Cuba  provides  the  best  
evidence  in  support  of  Schmitt’s  argument.  Of  Santiago  de  Cuba  she  writes  that  
38  Casey  Schmitt,  “Centering  Spanish  Jamaica:  Regional  Competition,  Informal  Trade,  and  the  
English  Invasion,  1620–62,”  The  William  and  Mary  Quarterly  76,  no.  4  (2019):  701.  
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they  were  excluded  from  “official  circuits  of  Spanish  imperial  trade”  and  “limited  
access  to  official  trade  networks  and  administrative  postings  led  residents  
in....eastern  Cuba….to  cultivate  commercial  ties  with  European  traders  involved  
in  informal,  or  unauthorized,  commerce.”   The  conclusion  from  this  evidence  is  39
that  governors  like  Bayona  y  Villanueva  were  reluctant  to  give  up  on  the  access  to  
illicit  trade  they  enjoyed  by  giving  aid  to  the  Spanish  Jamaicans.  Strengthening  
the  argument  is  that  Schmitt  views  it  as  a  structural  problem  rather  than  a  
personal  one,  which  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  Isassi  had  trouble  with  both  
Bayona  y  Villanueva  and  his  successor  Pedro  de  Morales.  Schmitt  writes,  “In  
deciding  between  coming  to  the  aid  of  neighboring  Jamaica  or  guaranteeing  the  
regular  traffic  of  informal  trade  and  using  the  supplies  sent  for  Jamaica  to  bolster  
his  port's  defenses  against  a  possible  English  attack,  the  governor  of  Santiago  de  
Cuba  chose  the  latter.”   This  analysis  of  the  two  governors  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  is  40
critical  in  understanding  that  their  actions  were  not  the  result  of  petty  rivalries  
but  based  on  a  consistent  economic  policy.  However,  it  does  not  fully  explain  the  
ultimate  failure  of  the  Spanish  Resistance.  
If  one  were  to  ‘zoom  out’  from  the  small  window  between  northern  
Jamaica  and  eastern  Cuba,  Schmitt’s  argument  starts  to  unravel.  Even  just  
looking  at  New  Spain  itself  undermines  the  argument.  Schmitt  tries  to  
incorporate  New  Spain  into  the  article  as  evidence  of  a  relatively  strong  location  
which  nonetheless  felt  that  it  was  more  important  to  shore  up  their  ports  rather  
39  Ibid,  703-704.  
40  Ibid,  724.  
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than  assist  Jamaica.   While  this  is  true,  Schmitt’s  own  refusal  to  engage  in  an  41
Atlantic  perspective  prevents  the  reader  from  understanding  why  exactly  the  
Duke  of  Alburquerque  would  pursue  such  a  policy  if  his  dominions  were  
immersed  in  the  Spanish  imperial  economy.  It  was  not  related  to  Alburquerque’s  
involvement  in  illicit  trade,  so  why  then  did  he  pursue  such  a  course.  By  shi ing  
to  an  Atlantic  perspective  it’s  clear  that  this  was  done  with  an  eye  towards  
ensuring  the  delivery  of  the  galeones  and  flotas  to  Spain.  Despite  this  failing  of  the  
article,  Schmitt’s  analysis  is  still  invaluable  in  offering  new  explanations  that  
avoid  unquantifiable  judgments  on  moral  fiber  or  shi ing  definitions  of  strong  
and  weak.  Rather,  her  scholarship  is  based  on  solid  foundations  that  rely  on  more  
simple  cost-benefit  analyses  done  by  Spanish-American  officials.  This  is  not  
without  its  own  flaws  though,  as  it  assumes  a  capitalist  outlook  that  was  wholly  
foreign  to  those  officials.  In  that  case,  then,  scholarship  should  try  to  grapple  
with  how  these  officials  rationalized  their  role  within  the  maxims  of  the  day.  
Ideas  like  reputacion ,  obedezco  pero  no  cumplo  (I  obey  but  I  do  not  comply),  and  the  
position  of  honor  and  faith  in  Spanish  society,  all  informed  the  decision  making  
of  Spanish-American  officials.  Even  the  more  shrewd  among  them.  
41  Ibid,  723.  
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The  Invasion  and  Some  Early  Successes  
A er  Admiral  Penn  and  General  Venables'  failed  to  seize  Hispaniola,  their  
main  objective,  it  was  decided  that  they  should  pursue  an  alternative  conquest.  
While  Cuba,  Veracruz,  Porto  Bello,  and  Cartagena  de  Indies  all  lay  to  the  
windward,  they  decided  on  Jamaica  as  their  prey.  Cromwell's  instructions  had  
given  him  and  Penn  such  freedom  to  make  these  decisions  and  at  least  Venables  
was  willing  to  exercise  it.  This  of  course  begs  the  question  as  to  why  they  
believed  Jamaica  was  within  their  grasp.  Perhaps  it  was  because  previous  forays  
in  the  Caribbean  had  successfully  besieged  Jamaica  and  made  off  with  "plunder,"  
though  it  in  fact  amounted  to  little  more  than  stolen  supplies.  That  probably  
played  a  role,  but  the  degree  of  their  failure  on  Hispaniola  convinced  Venables  
that  those  aforementioned  cities  lay  beyond  their  capabilities  at  this  moment.  42
Jamaica  offered  a  means  to  avoid  certain  punishment  back  in  England  and  
seemed  to  be  in  a  desirable  location.  Even  though  Jamaica  geographically  sat  at  
the  crossroads  of  the  galeoness  and  flotas  as  they  made  their  way  from  Spain  to  the  
West  Indies  and  back  again,  Jamaica  occupied  a  far  less  important  role  both  
politically  and  economically.  
Therefore,  we  should  understand  that  when  Venables  and  his  men  
stormed  the  island  in  1655,  they  set  foot  on  a  backwater.  Understanding  this  fact  
is  critical  to  understanding  the  events  of  the  five  years  following  the  English  
invasion  of  Jamaica.  The  neglected  state  of  Jamaica  meant  that  coordinated  
42  Robert  Venables,  The  Narrative  of  General  Venables:  With  an  Appendix  of  Papers  Relating  to  the  
Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  1654-1655 ,  Longmans,  Green,  and  
Company,  1900,  34. 
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action  between  colonial  governors  was  a  prerequisite  to  defending  the  island.  
When  word  was  sent  ahead  to  Santo  Domingo  warning  of  an  English  invasion,  
those  colonial  governors  utilized  all  available  resources  to  strengthen  Hispaniola,  
Cuba,  and  New  Spain.  The  same  could  not  be  said  for  Jamaica.  Again  any  
fortification  had  to  be  approved  by  the  Marquis  of  Jamaica  first.  The  
contemporary  Marquis  of  Jamaica  believed  that  his  island  was  undesirable  to  
other  European  powers  because  of  its  small  port,  and  could  be  defended  from  its  
mountains  without  requiring  additional  fortifications.   Needless  to  say,  he  43
elected  not  to  reinforce  the  island.  
Thus,  on  May  16 th ,  1655,  when  the  English  landed  their  men  at  Caguaya  
they  faced  little  resistance.  Accounts  from  soldiers  there  or  in  the  fleet  covering  
them  recorded  that,  "the  [Spanish]  seeing  our  resolution  did  not  stand  to  give  any  
resistance,  But  run,  leaving  3  guns  mounted."   At  first  glance,  such  an  account  44
may  seem  to  suggest  Spanish  Jamaican  cowardice  or  weakness  and  therefore  
serve  the  narrative  of  a  Spain  in  decline.  However,  one  must  take  into  account  the  
lived  experience  of  the  Spanish  Jamaicans.  A  decade  prior,  William  Jackson  and  
his  men  had  raided  Jamaica  for  supplies,  received  them,  and  then  sailed  off  to  
complete  their  otherwise  disastrous  voyage.   The  inhabitants  of  Jamaica,  then,  45
had  little  reason  to  expect  different  from  this  particular  group  of  marauders.  
43  Ibid,  132.  
44  Robert  Venables,  The  Narrative  of  General  Venables:  With  an  Appendix  of  Papers  Relating  to  the  
Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  1654-1655 ,  Longmans,  Green,  and  
Company,  1900,  162.  
45  Jon  Latimer,  Buccaneers  of  the  Caribbean:  How  Piracy  Forged  an  Empire ,  Cambridge,  
Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  2009,  93.   
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From  this  perspective,  their  lack  of  resistance  is  not  cowardice  or  inherent  
weakness  of  spirit,  it  was  a  rational  decision  based  on  the  protection  of  their  
self-interest.  The  defensive  force  was  little  more  than  a  diversion  to  allow  the  rest  
of  the  island's  inhabitants  to  flee  into  the  mountains  and  the  quick  retreat  
allowed  that  force  to  join  their  family  members  there.   
With  this  frame  of  mind,  the  Spanish  Jamaicans  sent  emissaries  to  the  
English  camp  to  discern  their  demands,  that  is  what  hides,  meat,  or  produce  they  
desired.  It  was  quite  clear  from  these  opening  interactions  that  the  Spanish  
Jamaicans  assumed  these  men  to  be  of  the  familiar  buccaneering  sort.  As  
Venables'  narrative  goes,  "A  priest  and  a  Major  came  to  us  to  desire  a  treaty,  and  
that  they  would  give  us  what  in  Reason  we  could  desire."   The  General  claims  to  46
have  indicated  that  they  wished  to  settle,  but  his  immediate  demands  betrayed  
that  claim  and  fell  more  in  line  with  raids  these  Spanish  Jamaicans  had  
experienced.  In  desperate  need  of  provisions,  he  demanded  cattle  and  bread;  the  
former  was  readily  available  and  delivered,  the  latter  was  not.  Needing  a  quick  
peace  a er  their  failure  on  Santo  Domingo,  Venables  chose  to  overlook  the  lack  
of  bread  and  laid  out  his  terms  which  he  proudly  based  on  the  terms  imposed  on  
the  evicted  Englishmen  of  Santa  Catalina.  It  was  at  this  point  that  it  became  clear  
to  the  Spanish  delegation  that  the  English  truly  did  intend  to  settle  and  colonize  
the  island.   47
46  Robert  Venables,  The  Narrative  of  General  Venables:  With  an  Appendix  of  Papers  Relating  to  the  
Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  1654-1655 ,  Longmans,  Green,  and  
Company,  1900,  36. 
47  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  51. 
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The  terms  required  that  those  who  did  not  wish  to  submit  to  the  laws  of  
England  should  turn  in  their  weapons  and  any  slaves  they  may  have.  A erward,  
arrangements  were  made  to  transport  them  to  New  Spain.  Those  that  did  wish  to  
remain  were  also  forced  to  turn  over  their  slaves,  but  could  keep  their  other  
possessions,  which  for  the  elite  of  the  island  included  their  rapiers.  These  
provisions  had  clearly  indicated  that  the  English  intended  to  colonize  this  island  
with  or  without  Spanish  cooperation.  What  followed  then,  was  an  elaborate  
diversion  created  by  the  Spanish  Jamaicans  to  decide  on  a  guerilla  resistance  to  
defend  the  island.  They  complained  that  they  needed  time  to  decide  on  Venables'  
terms,  and  when  that  time  expired  they  next  explained  that  their  governor  was  
going  to  come  and  acquiesce  to  the  terms  within  ten  days'  time.  In  all,  about  a  
week  was  gained  through  Spanish  pretension.  During  this  time  they  were  able  to  
gather  what  supplies  and  equipment  they  had  and  disappear  into  the  mountains.  
Ironically,  when  on  May  26 th ,  Governor  Ramirez  de  Arellano  signed  the  surrender  
of  the  island,  the  conflict  for  its  control  actually  began.   
There  are  three  central  figures  in  the  Spanish  Jamaican  resistance  to  the  
English  invasion,  only  one  of  which  actually  fought  on  the  island.  The  man  with  
that  distinction  is  Don  Cristobal  Arnaldo  Isassi  (or  Ysassi),  the  last  Spanish  
governor  of  Jamaica.  His  resistance  campaign  was  aided  from  New  Spain  by  its  
Viceroy,  Don  Francisco  Fernández  de  la  Cueva,  a  grandee  from  an  illustrious  
Spanish  family.  Lastly,  there  was  the  governor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  Don  Pedro  de  
Bayona  y  Villanueva;  a  man  who  lost  that  position  as  a  result  of  his  efforts,  or  
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lack  thereof.  Around  these  central  figures  were  the  other  governors  and  high  
ranking  officials  in  the  Americas,  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  and  of  course  King  
Philip  IV  himself.   
Don  Cristobal  Arnaldo  Isassi  was  a  native  of  Jamaica  of  Basque  descent  
and  his  family  came  from  what  could  be  considered  Jamaica’s  ‘upper  class.’  He  
had  no  formal  military  training  but  his  nobler  birth,  age,  and  most  importantly,  
health  thrust  him  into  the  Governorship  of  the  island,  which  from  the  
"surrender"  of  the  island  onwards,  was  essentially  a  military  post.  Isassi  was  
either  deeply  devoted  to  the  King's  service  or  more  than  happy  to  play  that  part  
when  requesting  further  support.  More  likely  than  not,  he  was  some  of  both.  His  
letters  reveal  a  man  who  understood  his  duty  and  was  able  to  recognize  his  faults.  
They  also  indicate  that  he  was  deeply  suspicious  of  other  governors  who  did  not  
come  to  his  aid.  At  first,  Isassi  was  deferential  in  accosting  others,  but  as  the  
situation  unfolded,  he  dropped  the  veil  of  humility  and  preferred  more  outright  
attacks  on  other  officials.  Such  attacks  were  largely  reserved  for  the  governors  of  
Santiago  de  Cuba,  whom  he  felt  undermined  his  efforts  at  every  turn.   
The  first  such  governor  was  Don  Pedro  Bayona  y  Villanueva,  who  is  o en  
cast  as  Isassi's  greatest  rival  and  enemy.  It  is  unfortunately  not  so  simple.  While  
the  case  has  been  made  that  Bayona  y  Villanueva  disdained  Isassi  and  allowed  
petty  jealousies  to  hamper  the  relief  effort,  it  might  not  be  that  straightforward  
or  trivial.  Historians  like  Casey  Schmitt  in  "Centering  Spanish  Jamaica"  have  
offered  explanations  that  place  Bayona's  actions  within  the  context  of  colonial  
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Caribbean  competition  for  illicit  trade.   
As  previously  mentioned,  this  "informal"  trade  thrived  in  Jamaica  as  
official  channels  regularly  passed  the  island  by.  Schmitt  argues  that  Bayona,  and  
his  successor  de  Morales,  was  distinctly  aware  of  this  fact  and  sought  to  divert  
forms  of  illegal  trade  to  Santiago  de  Cuba;  if  for  no  other  reason  than  to  ensure  
that  the  proper  taxes  were  paid.  Bayona's  Lieutenant  Governor  even  accused  him  
of  actively  courting  this  trade,  as  did  Isassi.  His  Lieutenant  Governor  may  have  
been  biased  though,  as  he  was  Don  Francisco  Leiva  Isassi,  Cristobal's  own  
brother.  Schmitt  claims  that  an  English  controlled  Jamaica,  therefore,  presented  
an  economical  opportunity  for  Santiago  de  Cuba,  as  it  brought  that  illicit  trade  to  
their  doorstep  and  granted  easier  access  to  the  slave  trade.   This  certainly  helps  48
to  explain  the  jealousy  earlier  authors  have  noted,  and  give  it  credibility.  Schmitt  
believes  this  explains  why  the  Spanish  were  unable  to  retake  Jamaica.  The  
staging  area  for  all  relief  efforts  was  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  a  self-interested  
Governor  could  and  did  interfere  with  those  efforts.   
This  argument  is  convincing  but  could  be  brought  further.  Schmitt  sees  
this  action  as  exemplary  of  Colonial  conditions  not  reflecting  European  contexts.  
However,  I  argue  that  these  jealousies,  arguments,  and  selfish  officials  fit  within  
the  European  context  as  well.  Where  Schmitt  is  lacking,  is  in  framing  it  within  
the  terms  of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  as  a  composite  monarchy.  The  "Habsburg  
Crown"  in  the  singular,  was  actually  several  all  sat  atop  one  head.  Each  kingdom,  
48  Casey  Schmitt,   “Centering  Spanish  Jamaica:  Regional  Competition,  Informal  Trade,  and  the  
English  Invasion,  1620–62,”  The  William  and  Mary  Quarterly  76,  no.  4  (2019):  697–726.  
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principality,  duchy,  county,  and  margravate  had  different  tax  burdens.  Recall  that  
Castille  bore  the  largest  burden  of  taxes.  It  is  not  unthinkable  that  an  official  in  
Castille  might  look  upon  untaxed  trade  in  Barcelona  or  Santander  with  envy  and  
seek  to  siphon  it  off  for  themself.  What  was  different  in  the  Caribbean  context  
was  the  opportunity,  not  the  motivation.  A  landlocked  grandee  in  Spain  could  
never  hope  to  direct  trade  away  from  a  major  port  city.  In  order  to  do  so,  they  had  
to  obtain  the  king's  favor  for  a  better  posting  in  one  of  those  cities,  and  perhaps  
could  resort  to  besmirching  the  current  occupant  of  the  desired  post.  This  was  
unlike  the  letters  that  Bayona,  Francisco  Leiva  Isassi,  and  Cristobal  Arnaldo  
Isassi  sent  to  the  king.   
However,  one  should  not  forget  that  genuine  disagreements  over  best  
practices  could  also  be  an  important  factor.  Colonial  governors  have  their  unique  
personal  histories  which  must  be  accounted  for  when  analyzing  the  decisions  
they  made.  While  it  is  tempting  to  strictly  think  of  these  men  as  privileged,  but  
inexperienced  recipients  of  great  honors,  that  was  o en  untrue  in  the  Americas.  
Hardened  war  veterans  transitioned  from  soldiers  to  statesmen  in  the  Americas,  
and  Bayona  y  Villanueva  is  only  one  such  case.  It  is  with  this  perspective  that  we  
must  interpret  their  actions  to  follow,  and  the  steps  taken  by  the  colonial  official  
directly  above  them.  
Of  course,  that  official  was  the  Viceroy  of  New  Spain,  Francisco  
Fernández  de  la  Cueva,  Duke  of  Alburquerque.  Alburquerque  eventually  became  
mayordomo  for  Charles  II,  but  at  present,  he  served  his  father,  Philip  IV.  
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Alburquerque  in  many  ways  was  the  quintessential  Spanish  noble.  Devout,  loyal,  
and  honorable,  he  served  the  King  first  and  foremost  and  expected  others  to  do  
the  same.  As  Viceroy  he  held  tremendous  power  as  the  head  of  the  Spanish  
Government  in  the  New  World.  His  power  assisted  Isassi's  efforts,  but  the  
corresponding  responsibility  Alburquerque  had  also  harmed  Isassi's  recovery.  He  
had  to  attend  to  matters  of  the  Church,  both  physical  and  spiritual.  The  
Cathedral  of  Mexico  City  was  not  yet  complete,  and  Alburquerque  put  
considerable  energy  into  hastening  its  completion.  Moreover,  the  conversion  and  
subjugation  of  indigenous  people  continued  to  be  an  ongoing  drain  on  the  
Viceroy's  focus.  As  the  highest-ranking  official  in  that  part  of  the  world,  he  was  
also  responsible  for  coordinating  relief  to  the  Philippines.   New  Spain  was  a  vital  49
link  between  Spain  and  the  East  Indies  and  as  viceroy,  he  had  to  embody  that  
link.  A  look  through  the  documents  from  his  reign  as  viceroy  in  the  Archivo  
General  de  la  Nación  in  Mexico  City,  along  with  his  predecessor  and  successors,  
indicates  a  daunting  position  with  a  myriad  of  problems  requiring  at  least  some  
level  of  attention.  This  meant  that  he  was  spread  exceptionally  thin  on  any  single  
issue,  so  he  could  only  designate  so  much  time  and  energy  in  overseeing  the  
reconquest  of  Jamaica.   
As  viceroy,  his  actions  carried  the  same  weight  as  if  the  king  himself  had  
been  present  in  the  Indies.  This  meant  that  he  was  also  bound  by  Habsburg  belief  
49  Francisco  Fernández  de  la  Cueva,  Duque  de  Alburquerque,  “Carta  Del  Duque  de  Alburquerque,”  
Indiferente  Virreinal,  September  5,  1653,  Caja-exp.:  6350-03,.  Archivo  General  de  la  Nacion,  
Mexico  D.F.,  Mexico.  
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in  keeping  all  the  kingdoms  part  of  the  Monarchy.   Understanding  that  duty  was  50
what  compelled  him  to  act  as  he  did.  Unlike  the  King  though,  he  could  lose  his  
position  and  honors  should  he  fail  in  upholding  that  central  goal  of  the  Habsburg  
monarchy.  That  added  further  pressure  to  ensure  that  not  only  domains  under  his  
control  remained  so,  but  that  his  own  realm  of  New  Spain  did  not  fall  prey  to  
foreign  invasion.  As  many  letters  between  the  viceroy  and  the  king  indicated,  it  
was  imperative  that  Albuquerque  kept  his  coasts  safe  from  English  predators.  For  
a  monarchy  o en  deprived  of  reserves  of  gold  and  silver,  these  two  
responsibilities:  recapturing  Jamaica  and  preserving  New  Spain,  threatened  to  
utterly  ruin  their  treasuries.  
However,  Albuquerque  committed  himself  to  disavow  money  from  the  
King's  estate  to  fund  or  manage  the  defense,  and  from  incurring  higher  than  
normal  costs  for  the  King.   He,  therefore,  had  two  goals  of  seemingly  equal  51
importance:  preserve  these  provinces  for  Spain,  and  preserve  her  treasury.  This  
significantly  shackled  his  ability  to  act  decisively  and  in  the  end,  Albuquerque  
came  to  the  conclusion  that  his  most  important  responsibility  was  keeping  royal  
debts  to  a  minimum.  He  eventually  decided  to  pay  for  arms  on  his  own  accord  to  
defend  New  Spain  but  made  no  such  effort  for  Jamaica.  Moreover,  he  also  shared  
the  belief  of  the  Duke  of  Veragua  that  the  land  could  provide  for  defense.  
Albuquerque  believed  that  a  scorched  earth  guerrilla-style  campaign  could  work  
50  Francisco  Fernández  de  la  Cueva,  Duque  de  Alburquerque,  “Carta  Del  Virrey  Francisco  
Fernández  de  La  Cueva,  Duque  de  Alburquerque,”  Cartas  Y  Expedientes  Del  Virrey  de  Nueva  
España,  Vistos  En  El  Consejo,  June  10,  1655,  MEXICO,38,N.9.  Archivo  General  de  Indias,  Sevilla,  
España. 
51  Ibid. 
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to  defend  his  dominion  of  New  Spain,  by  cutting  off  the  enemy  from  supplies  and  
harassing  them  constantly.  He  also  believed  that  other  European  forces  at  this  
time  did  not  possess  a  pilot  skilled  enough  to  land  at  Veracruz.  This  tactic  was  
both  cheap  and  effective  at  protecting  New  Spain.  This  thinking  was  music  to  
King  Philip  IV’s  ears.  It  allowed  Philip  IV  to  rationalize  not  dispatching  
assistance  from  Spain  because  his  viceroy  had  assured  him  it  was  unnecessary.   
Of  course,  any  serious  resistance  first  came  from  those  on  the  island  itself.  
Under  Isassi's  command  and,  as  the  Duke  of  Veragua  had  predicted,  such  
resistance  was  centered  on  a  guerrilla  campaign  in  the  mountains.  One  of  
Venables'  orders  during  his  brief  stay  on  the  island  highlights  the  style  of  
fighting  that  the  Spanish  were  carrying  out,  and  continued  to  carry  out  during  
their  5-year  resistance.  He  ordered  "that  no  private  Soldier  should  hence-forward  
go  forth  to  kill  cows  alone,  but  that  commanded  parties  should  constantly  be  sent  
forth  to  fetch  in  cows  for  the  Army's  necessary  supply"  because  "the  Men  [were]  
sometimes  slain  by  stragling  [sic] ."   From  fairly  early  on  then,  the  Spanish  were  52
willing  and  able  to  participate  in  small  scale  ambushes  on  small  numbers  of  
Englishmen.  While  not  devastating  to  the  thousands-strong  English  force,  it  was  
both  demoralizing  and  fear-inducing.  It  is  noteworthy  that  these  English  were  
the  same  troops  who,  while  on  Santo  Domingo,  had  been  startled  by  crabs  and  
fireflies  fearing  they  were  Spanish  defenders.   Moreover,  the  state  of  the  English  53
52  Robert  Venables,  The  Narrative  of  General  Venables:  With  an  Appendix  of  Papers  Relating  to  the  
Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  1654-1655 ,  Longmans,  Green,  and  
Company,  1900,  39.   
53  Henry  Whistler,  "Extracts  from  Henry  Whistler's  Journey  of  the  West  India  Expedition."  in  
Venables,  Robert.  The  Narrative  of  General  Venables:  With  an  Appendix  of  Papers  Relating  to  the  
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forces  could  not  afford  more  death.  Disease,  mostly  in  the  form  of  dysentery,  and  
famine  were  killing  off  large  numbers  of  English  troops.  Venables  himself  le   the  
island  on  account  of  illness  on  15  July  1655,  leaving  command  to  Major-General  
Fortescue.  Worse  still  for  the  English,  diseases  did  not  respect  rank,  and  so  
Fortescue  himself  had  passed  not  long  a er  Venables'  departure.  From  that  point  
forward,  the  English  forces  were  led  intermittently  by  Edward  D'Oyley,  formerly  
a  colonel  in  Venables'  command.  His  command  was  interrupted  by  the  occasional  
arrival  of  a  more  ‘republican’  general  from  England.  In  any  event,  the  English  
were  only  strong  in  number  at  this  point.  It's  hard  from  the  sources  available  to  
ascertain  what  the  actual  fighting  capacity  of  the  English  was  but  it  was  far  less  
than  reported  amounts.  The  best  estimate  was  that  they  numbered  around  2,500  
men  in  total,  bolstered  by  a  fluctuating  number  of  ships  off  the  coast.   
Despite  the  debilitating  effects  of  sickness  running  through  their  men,  the  
English  were  able  to  realize  a  great  fear  of  Spanish  officials.  Once  the  English  
had  established  themselves  in  Jamaica,  some  Spanish-American  officials  feared  
that  this  was  going  to  directly  result  in  attacks  on  their  cities  and  towns.  In  
October  1655,  the  Vice-Admiral  and  Commander  of  the  Jamaica  Station,  William  
Goodson  was  authorized  by  Cromwell  to  attack  Spanish  shipping  in  the  region  
and  capture  or  sink  any  ships  he  encountered.  He  went  a  bit  further  than  those  
orders  and  laid  siege  to  Santa  Marta,  which  lies  in  present-day  Colombia.   On  54
Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  1654-1655 ,  Longmans,  Green,  and  
Company,  1900,  161.  
54  Noël  W.  Sainsbury,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  Series,  Preserved  In...  the  Public  Record  




October  3 rd   Goodson  and  his  ships  approached  the  city  alerting  the  inhabitants  of  
their  presence.  What  followed  was  the  stereotypical  English  raid.  A er  an  
exchange  of  cannon  fire  between  the  English  ships  and  Spanish  ramparts  the  
English  were  able  to  sail  into  the  port.  A  brief  skirmish  (no  longer  than  a  
half-hour  according  to  one  participant),  gave  the  people  of  Santa  Marta  time  to  
withdraw  into  the  surrounding  hills  and  forest  along  with  their  valuables.  55
Goodson  demanded  a  ransom  of  2000  pounds  for  the  city,  however,  a er  14  days  
the  promised  sum  was  not  delivered.  Fearing  that  staying  any  longer  increased  
the  chances  of  a  Spanish  relief  force  arriving,  Goodson  and  his  men  departed  
Santa  Marta.  Before  doing  so,  they  burnt  some  buildings  in  the  town  for  good  
measure.   
The  raid  produced  little  material  gain  for  the  English  aside  from  32  pieces  
of  ordinance  and  as  such  was  met  with  apathy  from  Cromwell  and  the  
Protectorate.  It  made  Major  Robert  Sedgwicke  question  the  validity  of  this  style  
of  attack  in  the  West  Indies.  Sent  to  take  up  command  a er  Fortescue’s  death,  he  
remarked  to  the  Admiralty,  "this  kind  of  marooning  cruising  West  India  trade  of  
plundering  and  burning  of  towns,  though  it  hath  been  long  practised  in  these  
parts,  yet  is  not  honorable  for  a  princely  navy...   While  dishonorable,  this  small  56
raid  and  others  like  it,   were  tremendously  effective  in  keeping  Spanish  forces  
55  M.S.  Rawlinson,  "Letters  Concerning  the  English  Expedition  into  the  Spanish  West  Indies  in  
1655,"  in  Robert  Venables,  The  Narrative  of  General  Venables:  With  an  Appendix  of  Papers  Relating  to  
the  Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  Conquest  of  Jamaica,  1654-1655 ,  Longmans,  Green,  and  
Company,  1900,  161.  
56  Noël  W.  Sainsbury,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  Series,  Preserved  In...  the  Public  Record  




contained  to  their  cities  and  ports.  So,  Major  Sedgwick  continued  in  that  letter,  
“...perhaps  it  may  be  tolerated  at  present."  Ever  unsure  about  when  the  next  
attack  was  coming  and  how  large  a  force  was  being  assembled  for  that  purpose,  
Spanish  governors  felt  uneasy  about  dispatching  men  across  the  Caribbean  to  
assist  people  they  had  never  come  in  contact  with  and  had  no  relationship  with  
outside  of  their  allegiance  to  the  same  king.  The  safer  choice  was  to  consolidate  
their  defense  and  dig  in.  What  was  cast  as  Spanish  cowardice  and  later  Spanish  
weakness  was  actually  a  conscious  Spanish-American  defense  policy.  If  it  meant  
leaving  Isassi  and  the  other  Spanish  Jamaicans  to  their  own  devices,  the  other  
Spanish-American  officials  were  willing  to  pay  that  price.  
All  the  while,  Isassi  established  his  base  of  operations  in  the  mountain  of  
Manatines.  Initially,  he  withdrew  to  Caobana  in  the  southwest  of  the  island  near  
the  modern-day  Black  River  but  decided  a  more  central  location  better  served  his  
purpose.  Once  there  he  claimed  that  the  English  pursued  him.  In  the  ensuing  
battle,  one  of  very  few  on  the  island,  the  Spanish  were  able  to  hold  their  ground,  
but  at  the  loss  of  a  substantial  number  of  men.  Given  the  trouble  of  sending  
reinforcements,  losses  like  these  were  particularly  devastating  for  the  Spanish  
Resistance.  Isassi's  brother,  Francisco  Leiva  Isassi,  the  Lieutenant  Governor  of  
Santiago  de  Cuba,  noted  in  1659  the  apparent  ease  with  which  the  English  
resupplied  and  reinforced  their  numbers  from  the  Leeward  Islands,  New  
England,  and  Virginia.   
However  it  should  have  been  just  as  easy  for  the  Spanish  to  send  such  
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reinforcements  given  their  numerous  possessions  in  the  areas.  Recognizing  this,  
Isassi  wrote  voraciously  demanding  such  supplies.  The  response  came  in  the  
form  of  the  first  relief  sent  from  Cartagena  de  Indies  in  October  of  1655.  Despite  
claims  by  historians  that  colonial  leaders  were  sluggish  and  lacked  any  agency  to  
operate  outside  of  royal  orders,  Governor  Pedro  Zapata  was  able  to  coordinate  
and  send:  powder,  balls,  cord,  lances,  hoes,  machetes,  spades,  salt,  cassava,  maize,  
wine,  and  vinegar.  Notably,  the  aid  was  delivered  to  Isassi  at  the  south  of  the  
island.  Isassi  felt  that  resupplying  in  the  south  offered  the  best  chances  of  
success,  though  it  was  not  a  widely  held  belief.  Zapata's  actions  stood  out  as  an  
example  for  colonial  officials  elsewhere  to  follow.    
As  for  the  makeup  of  his  men  at  the  start  of  the  resistance,  he  notified  the  
king  in  1656  that  he  was  in  charge  of  the  naturales ,  the  Spanish  born  and  raised  in  
Jamaica,  as  well  as  the  blacks  on  the  island.  This  included  free-blacks,  the  
maroons,  and  still  enslaved  Africans.  While  these  were  all  Blacks  of  African  birth  
or  descent,  they  represented  different  social  groups  and  identities.  However,  as  
the  guerilla  campaign  continued,  they  can  all  be  considered  groups  of  the  Black  
Resistance.  O en  when  Isassi  took  an  account  of  his  forces  he  recorded  these  
groups  separately  from  the  Euro-American/  Spanish-Jamaicans  but  assured  other  
authorities  that  he  was,  nonetheless,  in  firm  command  of  them.  Isassi  may  not  
have  been  intentionally  lying,  but  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  Black  Resistance  was  
made  up  of  three  autonomous  communities,  each  with  their  own  interests.  While  
these  interests  were  o en  pro-Spanish  and  anti-English,  one  should  not  mistake  
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this  for  obedience  to  Isassi.  Their  chief  interest  was  the  preservation  of  their  
autonomous  communities.  Isassi’s  depiction  of  them  as  a  separate  unit  in  his  
command,  along  with  English  hopes  that  they  would  ‘turn  on  their  former  
masters’  relegates  them  to  secondary  figures  in  this  history.  However,  threats  on  
their  autonomy  thrust  the  Black  Resistance  to  the  frontlines  of  the  conquest  of  
Jamaica.  In  short,  they  were  the  deciding  factor  in  Isassi’s  reconquest  of  Jamaica.  
The  very  plausibility  of  success  depended  on  them.  
While  still  in  the  south  of  Jamaica,  Isassi  was  also  able  to  secure  more  
small  victories  over  the  English.  According  to  Francisco  Leiva  Isassi,  they  had  
burnt  English  fortifications  at  Anaya  and  Guanabacoa.  However  successful  
Isassi's  guerilla  raids  were  in  demoralizing  a  sick  English  force,  they  were  never  
enough  to  totally  recover  the  island.  Documentary  evidence  and  the  
historiography  all  acknowledge  that  a  fleet  was  needed  to  completely  retake  the  
island.  Moreover,  they  were  not  sustainable.  They  relied  on  two  shaky  
foundations.  One  was  the  local  knowledge  of  the  terrain;  the  longer  the  English  
spent  on  the  island,  the  less  of  an  advantage  it  was  for  him.  The  second  
foundation  was  the  support  of  the  Black  Resistance.  Whatever  ‘control’  Isassi  
claimed  over  that  group  was  voluntary  and  could  at  any  point  be  withdrawn.  So  
while  he  may  have  had  success  early  on,  from  the  end  of  1655  onwards,  his  role  on  
the  island  dramatically  changed.  Going  forward  Isassi  was  confirmed  as  a  
resistance  leader,  not  a  reconquistador;  a  change  welcomed  by  King  Philip  IV.   
One  of  the  issues  regarding  the  study  of  this  subject  is  that  
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mistranslations  and  omissions,  intentional  or  not,  become  regarded  as  truth  in  its  
history.  Worse  still,  in  their  acceptance  as  truth,  they  are  repeated  without  a  
second  thought  of  further  investigation.  In  this  vein,  it  has  been  understood  that  
when  King  Philip  received  word  that  the  English  seized  Jamaica  he  was  gripped  
with  anguish.  Hume,  in  The  Court  of  Philip  IV,  claimed  that  the  King  wrote  that  
this  occasion  was,  "the  final  ruin  of  this  monarchy."   Latimer,  in  Buccaneers  of  the  57
Caribbean ,  cites  this  quote  along  with  other  claims  by  Hume  that  people  were  
cursing  in  the  streets,  though  Hume  provided  no  such  citation  for  that  claim.  For  
the  above  quote  however,  Hume  cited  the  letters  of  King  Philip  IV  to  Sor  Maria,  a  
miraculous  nun  and  his  confidant.  Further  inspection  of  those  letters  reveals  
that,  as  of  the  date  of  that  letter  (30  June  1655),  the  king  did  not  have  news  that  
the  English  seized  Jamaica.  That  portion  of  the  letter  goes  as  follows,  "England  
wants  war  with  us,  because,  although  there  is  no  certainty  so  far,  the  great  clues  
that  we  have  are  of  two  large  armadas  which  they  bring  in  the  seas,  One  has  gone  
into  the  Indies  to  infest  them,  and  the  other  is  kept  in  these  coasts  waiting  for  the  
galleons ;  a  matter  which  if  it  happens  would  be  the  final  ruin  of  this  Monarchy."  58
In  its  full  form,  one  sees  the  reality  behind  the  quote.  Yes,  Philip  IV  was  
concerned,  however,  his  concern  was  that  the  English  may  capture  the  silver  
galleons  returning  from  America.  Not  yet  aware  of  the  English  presence  on  the  
island,  the  King  feared  the  possible  loss  of  income  which  the  galeones  brought.  
57  Martin  Hume  and  Andrew  Sharp,  The  Court  of  Philip  IV:  Spain  in  Decadence ,  Eveleigh  Nash,  
1907,  439. 
58  María  de  Jesús  de  Ágreda,  Francisco  Silvela,  y  Felipe  IV,  Rey  de  España.  Cartas  de  La  Venerable  
Madre  Sor  María  de  Agreda  Y  Del  Señor  Rey  Don  Felipe  IV,  Est.  tipográfico  “Sucesores  de  
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This  fear  guided  the  Monarchy  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  decade,  and  not  
unfoundedly.  Blake,  the  admiral  of  the  fleet  waiting  for  the  galeones  mentioned  
above,  eventually  delayed  the  return  of  those  ships  in  his  daring  1657  attack  on  
Santa  Cruz  de  Tenerife.  King  Philip  IV's  response,  or  lack  thereof,  to  the  English  
invasion  of  Jamaica,  must  be  viewed  through  this  perspective;  he  feared  for  and  
desired  the  safety  of  the  flotas  and  galeones .  Control  of  Jamaica  was  thus  
subsumed  into  this  larger  fear.  With  this  fear  in  mind,  we  must  come  to  better  
understand  King  Philip's,  as  well  as  the  royal  apparatus  surrounding  him,  role  in  




The  Failure  of  the  First  Relief  
King  Philip's  letters  during  1656  to  Isassi,  Alburquerque,  and  Pedro  
Zapata  elucidate  in  no  uncertain  terms  his  approach  to  the  developing  situation  
in  Jamaica.  As  for  Isassi,  King  Philip  expected  his  role  to  be  that  of  a  thorn  in  the  
English  side,  and  one  that  prevented  the  military  occupation  from  becoming  a  
colonial  settlement.  His  order  to  Isassi  was,  "not  only  to  make  a  very  rigorous  
diversion  against  the  English  to  keep  them  continually  with  arms  in  hand,  
but...attempt  to  dislodge  them...compelling  them  to  embark  on  their  ships  and  
leave  Jamaica…"   While  it  may  appear  from  this  letter  that  King  Philip  expected  59
Isassi  to  completely  evict  the  English  from  the  island,  he  qualified  that  
expectation  by  asking  only  that  Isassi  “attempt”  to  evict  them.  He  did  fully  expect  
Isassi  to  act  as  a  diversion,  and  Isassi's  subsequent  actions  indicate  that  this  was  
what  he  understood  his  role  to  be,  even  if  that  meant  shirking  attempts  at  
completely  evicting  the  English.  The  belief  went  that  if  a  presence  could  be  
maintained  on  the  island,  a  fleet  could  be  dispatched  once  the  European  situation  
had  improved.  
In  his  letters  from  the  same  year  to  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque,  King  Philip  
IV  explained  both  the  purpose  of  Isassi's  resistance  and  his  incoming  relief,  as  
well  as  where  that  relief  must  come  from.  Echoing  his  letter  to  Isassi,  King  Philip  
explained  to  Albuquerque  that  the  relief  was  sufficient  to  maintain  a  presence  on  
the  island,  "since  [they]  cannot  dislodge  them  from  all  the  ports  and  land  that  
59  Felipe  IV,  “Carta  Del  Rey  a  Virrey  Alburquerque,”  Real  Cedulas  Originales  Y  Duplicados,  
October  25,  1656,  AGN/IC/RCO  y  Dup/RCO/Vol.5/4071/151/Exp.151,  Archivo  General  de  la  
Nacion,  Mexico  D.F.,  Mexico. 
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they  occupy  in  Jamaica,  at  least  in  the  meantime  [they]  can  maintain  war  until  the  
appropriate  time  for  another  force  executing  it  with  the  greatest  rigor."   Again,  60
from  the  perspective  of  the  Crown,  it  was  the  best  use  of  resources  to  keep  a  
force  capable  of  harassing  the  English  until  a  more  opportune  time  came  along  to  
root  them  out  entirely.  This  perspective  also  reinforced  the  notion  that  it  was  
unnecessary  for  the  mother  country  to  send  direct  relief  at  this  juncture.   
In  a  follow-up  letter,  King  Philip  ordered  the  governors  of  all  the  
Windward  Islands  to  send  infantry  and  supplies  to  Jamaica.  Each  island  was  
ordered  to  send  varying  amounts  of  men  depending  on  the  population  of  the  
island  and  the  risk  of  attack  on  their  doorstep.  Places  like  Santiago  de  Cuba,  the  
closest  to  Jamaica,  were  not  expected  to  send  as  many  men  as  they  were  at  great  
risk  and  could  ill  afford  to  do  so.  Even  more  notable  was  the  exclusion  of  
Cartagena.  Fairly  close  to  Jamaica,  but  more  important  to  the  Crown  than  
Santiago  de  Cuba,  Cartagena  de  Indies  was  no  longer  expected  nor  required  to  
send  aid  of  any  kind  to  Jamaica.  In  fact,  it  was  undesirable  for  them  to  do  so.  The  
varying  requirements  again  illustrate  the  Iberian  and  Spanish-American  
priorities;  protect  the  important  ports  first,  recover  Jamaica  second.  Of  course,  
there  was  perhaps  no  more  important  location  than  Spain  itself.  Also  exempt  
from  sending  aid  at  this  time,  the  King  summarized  it  as  such  "the  relief  from  
[Spain],  is  for  a  total  lack  of  means,  because  in  the  present  state  what  is  cared  
most  about  in  the  Indies,  is  to  find  the  English,  with  feet  on  Jamaica,  impeding  
60  Felipe  IV,  “Carta  Del  Rey  Al  Duque  de  Alburquerque,”  Real  Cedulas  Originales  Y  Duplicados,  
October  30,  1656,  AGN/IC/RCO  y  Dup/RCO/Vol.5/4071/152/Exp.152,  Archivo  General  de  la  
Nacion,  Mexico  D.F.,  Mexico.  
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the  commerce  of  all  the  Windward  Islands  with  the  coasts  of  [South  America]  and  
New  Spain  and  running  great  risk  to  the  Spanish  fleets  and  galleons  around  
Jamaica."  With  very  limited  means  at  his  disposal  due  to  incessant  continental  
conflict,  King  Philip  was  primarily  focused  on  the  protection  of  commerce.  Any  
relief  from  Spain  needed  to  be  directed  towards  that  purpose,  rather  than  direct  
intervention  on  Jamaica  itself.  Thus,  the  English  presence  on  Jamaica  was  a  
problem  insofar  as  it  was  a  threat  to  the  Spanish  silver  fleets  and  the  commerce  
they  carried:  
the  utmost  importance  and  convenience  would  be  followed  by  restoring  it  
by  expelling  the  English  to  ensure  the  passage  of  the  fleets  and  galleons  
that  so  fervently  have  to  go  through  one  and  another  part  of  that  island  
and  also  to  ensure  the  passage  of  the  merchant  frigates  between  the  
Windward  Islands  and  of  the  coasts  of  the  mainland  that  are  really  
[emphasis  added]  oppressed  with  the  English  ships  having  their  fortified  
ports  on  Jamaica.  61
 
For  the  Spanish  (both  Iberian  and  American),  recovering  Jamaica  was  never  about  
Jamaica,  it  was  about  the  threat  to  their  commerce  that  the  English  posed  by  
being  there.  The  Monarchy  searched  for  any  possible  means  to  circumvent  that  
problem  without  expending  energy  on  direct  reconquest.  Philip  IV  explained  
that,  by  ordering  that  the  relief  came  from  the  Indies,  it  was  more  expedient  to  
accomplish  the  recovery  of  that  island.   If  Isassi  and  his  men  could  cause  a  62
significant  enough  distraction,  the  English  were  forced  to  stay  in  Jamaica  and  
61  Felipe  IV,  “Carta  Del  Rey  Al  Duque  de  Alburquerque,”  Real  Cedulas  Originales  Y  Duplicados,  
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October  25,  1656,  AGN/IC/RCO  y  Dup/RCO/Vol.5/4071/151/Exp.151,  Archivo  General  de  la  
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unable  to  attack  other  Caribbean  ports.  In  that  same  letter,  he  complained  that  it  
was  going  to  take  a  year  to  get  relief  from  Spain  to  Jamaica  by  utilizing  the  
galeones  and  flotas .  Such  a  long  investment  of  time,  with  so  uncertain  a  return,  
was  out  of  the  question.  King  Philip  had  far  too  many  more  urgent  matters  closer  
to  home  to  attend  to  at  that  time.  
Meanwhile,  it  appeared  that  Isassi  was  not  providing  enough  of  a  
distraction  for  the  English.  Vice-Admiral  Goodson  was  once  again  fulfilling  his  
orders  to  go  on  the  offensive  and  attack  the  Spanish.  He  dispatched  5  ships  to  
loiter  about  Portobelo  and  Cartagena  de  Indias  to  await  the  flota  carrying  silver  
between  the  two  cities.  He  also  dispatched  10  ships  to  Hispaniola  to  capture  the  
galeones .  However,  these  ships  failed  to  find  the  galeones  and  were  instead  forced  
to  pursue  a  stationary  target.  Eventually,  they  settled  on  Rio  de  la  Hacha.  Much  
like  the  raid  on  Santa  Marta  a  year  earlier,  it  accomplished  very  little  in  terms  of  
plunder.  Undeterred,  the  ships  passed  by  Santa  Marta,  and  eventually  made  their  
way  to  the  great  city  of  Cartagena.  Upon  seeing  six  ships  in  the  harbor  there,  the  
English  feared  that  a  force  was  being  assembled  to  recover  Jamaica  and  beat  a  
hasty  retreat  to  the  island.  While  they  were  mistaken  in  this  assumption,  their  
actions  reveal  two  things;  one,  that  Spanish  fears  of  increased  English  raids  were  
not  unfounded,  and  two,  that  the  English  still  respected  Spanish  forces  in  the  
region.   
As  for  the  Spanish,  they  are  o en  criticized  for  appearing  to  be  lethargic  
when  refusing  to  move  quickly  to  defend  and  recover  Jamaica.  Yet,  when  the  
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Spanish  received  reports  from  captives  that  the  English  were  preparing  for  a  raid,  
they  were  not  foolish  for  believing  those  reports  and  acting  on  them.  Raids  like  
Goodson's  and  later  Myngs'  justified  the  fear  which  kept  Spanish  ships  docked  or  
otherwise  close  to  home.  Likewise,  the  English,  despite  having  10  ships  of  their  
own,  still  felt  they  were  no  match  for  the  six  Spanish  ships  and  their  forces  
within  the  city.  Though  the  English  themselves  preached  that  the  Spaniards  were  
no  match  for  them,  that  laziness  had  made  them  ineffective  fighters,  and  that  
God  was  on  their  side,  they  recognized  there  was  still  some  might  le   in  Spanish  
guns.  Furthermore,  the  English  reacted  in  the  same  way  as  the  Spanish  when  
they  thought  an  enemy  invasion  was  imminent.  They  also  sought  to  protect  their  
colony  and  the  opportunity  it  provided.   
So  while  raids  on  Spanish  ports  may  have  been  an  effective  defense  
through  offense,  they  were  not  the  means  by  which  Jamaica  eventually  became  a  
profitable  island.  The  English  did  have  experience  in  setting  up  profitable  
colonies  in  the  Caribbean  though.  By  the  1640s  colonies  like  Barbados  were  
becoming  economic  engines  through  the  production  of  sugar,  linked  to  the  
Transatlantic  Slave  Trade.  Leadership  in  London  and  Jamaica  sought  to  replicate  
that  success  in  Jamaica  as  soon  as  possible,  even  if  the  island  was  not  entirely  
pacified.  The  threat  which  they  posed  to  the  Spanish  was  not  sufficient  enough  
justification  for  their  presence  in  Jamaica.  A  colony  modeled  on  Barbados  was  
the  desired  future  for  Jamaica.  However,  this  proved  extraordinarily  difficult  to  
do  in  the  1650s,  the  Spanish  resistance  notwithstanding.   
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First,  as  has  been  mentioned,  the  English  did  not  have  the  technological  
nor  biological  means  to  fight  off  tropical  diseases.  The  eventual  commander  on  
the  island,  Colonel  D’Oyley  was  himself  sick  in  1655.   Compounding  the  issue  63
was  the  fact  that  the  English  troops  on  the  island  were  constantly  fighting  off  
starvation.  In  one  letter  to  Cromwell,  Major  Sedgwicke  sums  up  the  problems  
facing  the  English  as  such,  
it  is  certain  we  have  enemies  both  of  Spaniards  and  Blacks  in  the  island,  
and  they  watch  for  an  opportunity  of  our  men;  as  for  planters  we  have  not  
above  one  family  settled,  if  one  amongst  us,  neither  do  I  expect  any  from  
our  English  colonies,  till  God  give  health  amongst  us.  Here  hath  come  
down  to  us  from  many  of  the  windward  islands  divers  people,  with  
intentions  of  sitting  down  with  us,  but  at  their  coming  hither,  either  fall  
sick  and  die,  or  are  so  affrighted  and  dismayed,  as  that  although  to  their  
much  impoverishing,  yet  will  not  be  persuaded  to  stay  with  us.  
 
Jamaica  was  struggling  to  draw  in  honest  planting  families  for  those  reasons  
mentioned  above.  If  diseases  did  not  wipe  out  a  family,  then  the  Spanish  or  Black  
population  on  the  island  would.  At  this  point,  all  news  coming  from  the  island  
was  negative  and  life  on  the  island  was  seen  as  more  of  a  punishment  than  an  
opportunity.  In  that  letter,  Sedgwicke  also  gets  at  another  key  component  in  this  
history,  that  of  the  Black  communities  on  the  island.   
Isassi  had  indicated  that  same  year  that  he  was  in  control  of  the  whole  
populous  which  had  existed  before  English  occupation.  Yet,  English  accounts  of  
the  time  indicate  that,  at  least  from  their  perspective,  this  was  not  the  case.  Two  
Spanish  prisoners  were  reported  to  have  stated:  “that  the  negroes,  that  are  not  of  
63  “Letter  from  Major  Sedgwicke  to  the  Protector,  5  November  1655”  in  "State  Papers,  1655:  
November  (1  of  8),"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  4,  Sept  1655  -  May  
1656 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  (London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  138-155,  British  History  Online ,  143.  
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the  Spanish  party,  are  some  200;  but  knoweth  not  in  what  part  of  the  island  they  
are.”   Unfortunately,  no  primary  evidence  exists  which  was  created  by  the  Black  64
Resistance,  so  we  can  only  speculate  what  their  motives  were,  but  it  seems  likely  
that  the  preservation  of  their  freedom  was  chief  among  them.  The  Maroons,  
which  made  up  part  of  such  Resistance,  had  already  established  their  own  
settlements  before  the  English  occupation  of  Jamaica  and  had  even  erected  a  
fortress  in  the  northwest  of  the  island.  From  a  base  of  operations  like  that,  they  
were  able  to  swi ly  attack  Englishmen  searching  for  Spaniards  and  then  vanish  
back  into  the  landscape.  This  was  an  advantage  which  they  maintained  well  into  
the  18th  century.  
1656  in  Europe  
If  the  Spanish  position  in  the  Caribbean  could  be  described  as  defensive,  
much  the  same  could  be  said  for  their  position  in  Europe.  Ongoing  war  with  
France  in  Flanders  and  Italy,  rebellions  in  Catalonia  and  Portugal,  and  an  English  
fleet  off  the  coast  of  Cadiz  required  King  Philip's  full  attention.  Fully  aware  that  
there  were  more  open  battlefronts  than  could  be  managed,  the  Monarchy  knew  it  
needed  to  seek  peace  somewhere.  The  Duke  of  Medina  de  las  Torres,  Ramiro  
Núñez  de  Guzmán,  felt  that  Austria  and  England  provided  natural  and  traditional  
allies  for  Spain.  However,  he  was  at  that  time  in  the  opposition,  and  the  ruling  
clique  headed  by  Luis  de  Haro  supported  a  cessation  of  hostilities  with  France.  A  
successful  defense  of  Valenciennes  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands  in  July,  led  by  the  
64  “ The  examination  of  two  Spanish  prisoners  taken  the  20th  of  March  1656.”  in  Ibid,  131.  
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King's  son  Juan  de  Austria  is  believed  to  have  convinced  Philip  IV  that  he  may  
prevail  over  France.  His  letters  with  Sor  Maria  betray  that  sentiment  as  it  appears  
Philip  IV  felt  the  situation  remained  quite  hopeless,  or  at  least,  still  requiring  
divine  intervention.   Nonetheless,  the  ruling  faction  at  court  felt  the  need  to  65
maintain  the  war  with  France  until  they  had  a  clear  advantage  and  then  join  in  
league  with  them  as  the  dominant  Catholic  powers  in  Europe.  In  1656  then,  
peace  was  not  sought  a er  on  the  French  front,  but  as  always,  it  was  desired  on  
the  Portuguese  front.   
That  ongoing  rebellion,  part  of  the  general  crisis  of  the  1640s,  was  acutely  
damaging  to  the  Habsburg  reputation.  Recall  that  the  House  of  Habsburg  called  
on  its  monarchs  to  defend  all  its  constituent  realms  in  perpetuity.  Independence,  
or  the  concession  of  a  kingdom,  principality,  duchy,  or  county,  was  severely  
disparaged  by  the  Habsburgs.  Therefore,  Philip  felt  it  was  his  duty  to  preserve  
Portugal  as  a  dominion  of  Spain  for  the  good  of  his  heir  and  his  people.  However,  
the  King  also  recognized  that  as  of  1656,  Spain  was  unable  to  squash  the  rebellion  
in  Portugal  without  external  aid.  Enter  Charles  Stuart,  exiled  King  of  England,  
Scotland  and  Ireland.  
From  King  Philip  IV's  perspective,  there  were  two  Englands  to  bargain  
with.  One  led  by  Cromwell  in  London,  and  the  other  led  by  Charles  Stuart  in  his  
mobile  court-in-exile.  Earlier,  Spain  had  sided  with  Parliamentary  England.  In  
April  of  1652,  Alonso  de  Cárdenas  had  been  authorized  by  King  Philip  to  treat  
65  María  de  Jesús  de  Ágreda,  Francisco  Silvela,  Felipe  IV,  Rey  de  España,  Cartas  de  La  Venerable  
Madre  Sor  María  de  Agreda  Y  Del  Señor  Rey  Don  Felipe  IV ,  Est.  tipográfico  “Sucesores  de  
Rivadeneyra,”  2013,  456.  
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with  the  Parliament  of  England  to  ensure  that  peace  treaties  made  with  the  
monarchy  continued  to  be  upheld  by  whichever  form  of  government  came  next.  66
Indeed,  the  following  year  Spain  recognized  the  Protectorate  of  Cromwell,  
becoming  the  first  nation  to  do  so.  However,  by  1656  the  situation  was  drastically  
different.  Cromwell's  provocation,  embodied  in  the  Western  Design,  and  the  
ongoing  persecution  of  Catholics,  had  pushed  Spain  towards  the  restoration  of  
Charles.  The  former  ambassador  to  England,  Alonso  de  Cardenas  circulated  a  
book  around  the  court  in  which  he  laid  out  just  how  duplicitous  Cromwell  had  
been  in  planning  and  carrying  out  the  attack  on  Hispaniola  and  Jamaica.   No  67
further  agreements  could  be  reached  between  these  two  nations  in  light  of  such  
information.  Thus,  foreign  policy  was  directed  sharply  away  from  Cromwell  and  
towards  his  opposite  number,  Charles.  As  for  Charles,  he  found  that  his  family  in  
the  Netherlands  and  France  were  unwilling  to  shelter  and  support  him  and  so  he  
was  pushed  into  the  arms  of  Spain.  Consequently,  the  two  monarchs  agreed  to  
the  Treaty  of  Brussels  in  April  of  1656.   
Among  its  provisions  and  secret  articles  regarding  religion,  the  treaty  
centered  on  an  exchange  of  services.  Spain's  major  assistance  to  Charles  was  an  
article  requiring  4,000  infantry,  2,000  cavalry  and  an  unclear  sum  of  money  to  be  
66  Consejo  de  Estados,  “Copia  de  La  Plenipotencia  Conferida  Por  El  Rey  Felipe  IV  a  Alonso  de  
Cárdenas  Para  Tratar  Con  El  Parlamento  de  Inglaterra,”  Tratado  de  Madrid  Firmado  Por  España  
E  Inglaterra  El  23  de  Mayo  de  1667,  April  27,  1652,  ESTADO,2778,Parte  1 a ,Exp.7,  Archivo  
Histórico  Nacional,  Madrid,  España.   
67  Alonso  de  Cárdenas,  La  Revolución  Inglesa  (1638-1656):  Relación  Del  Estado  Presente  de  Las  Cosas  
de  Inglaterra  Deducida  Desde  El  Principio  de  Sus  Movimientos  Hasta  El  Año  de  1656.  Escriuiola  D.  




used  to  restore  him  to  the  Crown  of  England.  In  exchange  for  this  aid,  Charles  
was  expected  to  enlist  men  and  ships  to  fight  for  a  term  of  5  years  against  
Portugal  and  renounce  his  alliance  with  the  Braganzas.  This  was  not  all  that  
Charles  promised  Spain  in  this  treaty  though.  Most  critically  to  the  evolving  
situation  in  Jamaica,  Charles,  "promise[d]  and  oblige[d]  that  he  [would]  not  
consent  to  his  subjects  making  new  plantations  in  the  West  Indies,  nor  occupy  
islands  in  them,  nor  ports  in  Tierra  Firme,  and  that  he  will  restore  everything  the  
English  have  occupied  from  the  year  1630  onwards,  so  in  America  as  in  any  other  
part  of  the  world,  and  particularly  in  the  time  that  Oliver  Cromwell  has  governed  
with  the  title  of  Protector."   Of  course  this  is  an  obvious  allusion  to  Jamaica  68
without  outright  admittance  of  the  fact.  This  article  is  therefore  critical  to  
understanding  the  Iberian  perspective  on  reclaiming  Jamaica.   
Most  scholarship  regards  this  treaty  as  one  driven  by  the  singular  vision  of  
a  monarch  in  exile,  and  as  such  inherently  duplicitous.  At  this  time  though,  the  
Crown  had  no  reason  to  suspect  that  King  Charles  was  going  to  be  peacefully  
asked  to  reclaim  his  throne  and  subsequently,  renege  on  the  treaty.  They,  
therefore,  approached  colonial  policy  with  an  understanding  that  regardless  of  
their  efforts,  they  could  achieve  their  desired  ends  by  restoring  Charles  II  to  the  
throne  of  England.  Why  expend  desperately  needed  arms,  munitions,  and  men  to  
reclaim  an  island  across  an  ocean  when  a  diplomatic  treaty  can  ensure  the  same  
68  Consejo  de  Estado,  “Tratado  Secreto  de  Paz  Y  Alianza  Ajustado  Entre  Los  Reyes  Felipe  IV  de  
España  Y  Carlos  II  de  Inglaterra  Firmado  En  Bruselas  Con  Un  Artículo  Secreto  Tocante  a  La  
Religión,”  Tratado  de  Madrid  Firmado  Por  España  E  Inglaterra  El  23  de  Mayo  de  1667,  April  12,  
1656,  ESTADO,2778,Parte  1 a ,Exp.12,  Archivo  Histórico  Nacional,  Madrid,  España.   
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result?  The  more  prudent  use  of  those  same  resources  was  to  focus  on  King  
Charles  II's  restoration.  This  offered  the  potential  to  secure  a  useful  ally  against  
France,  the  return  of  Jamaica,  the  subjugation  of  Portugal,  and  of  course,  peace  
with  England.  If  we  look  back  at  the  letters  from  King  Philip  to  the  colonial  
officials  through  the  lens  of  this  treaty,  it's  clear  that  he  was  of  this  mindset.  In  
his  letters  with  Sor  Maria,  King  Philip  o en  emphasizes  how  thinly  stretched  he  
believed  Spanish  forces  to  be.  Dispatching  soldiers  so  far  from  home  was  too  
abstract  for  a  king  so  bound  to  the  reality  of  a  kingdom  constantly  at  war  with  its  
neighbors  and  itself.  Through  the  restoration  of  Charles  II,  King  Philip  IV  could  
alleviate  problems  both  near  and  far.  This  outlook  colors  all  of  Philip  IV’s  
subsequent  decisions  regarding  Jamaica  up  until  his  own  death  in  1665.  Only  
within  the  context  of  Atlantic  history  does  the  Treaty  of  Brussels  take  a  
tremendously  important  role  in  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  Spanish  to  reclaim  
Jamaica.  
1657  in  the  Caribbean  
Until  the  ultimate  return  of  Charles  II  to  the  throne  of  England,  a  
presence  needed  to  be  maintained  in  Jamaica.  This  message  was  reiterated  by  
numerous  Caribbean  officials  including  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque  in  a  letter  to  
Cristobal  Arnaldo  Isassi  in  March  of  1657.  In  that  same  letter,  Albuquerque  also  
informed  Isassi  of  the  threat  which  the  English  posed  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  "[The  
English]  are  hourly  awaiting  their  fleet  which  they  say  is  bringing  orders  to  
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invade  this  fortress  of  Santiago  de  Cuba."   The  threat  which  the  English  posed  69
in  1656  and  which  had  resulted  in  much  paralysis  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  
showed  no  signs  of  going  away  in  1657.  However,  the  Spanish  were  able  to  shake  
off  the  sluggishness  which  had  plagued  them  a  year  earlier,  and,  in  late  July  1657,  
the  relief  force  which  King  Philip  IV  had  ordered  in  1656  finally  arrived  in  
Jamaica.  This  force  of  roughly  400  men  and  supplies  played  a  defining  role  not  
just  in  1657  but  in  the  remaining  years  of  Spanish  efforts  to  recover  the  island.  
They  supposedly  represented  the  combined  might  of  Hispaniola,  Havana,  Puerto  
Rico,  and  New  Spain.  Ultimately,  their  defeat  at  Las  Chorreras  in  the  north  of  
Jamaica  effectively  marked  the  end  of  large,  full-scale  conflict  between  the  
English  and  Spanish.  In  a  sense,  it  heralded  the  endgame.  
Organizing  such  a  force  from  the  scattered  dominions  of  the  Caribbean  
required  a  rendezvous  point  before  continuing  on  towards  Jamaica.  For  better  or  
worse,  and  really  for  worse,  that  point  was  Santiago  de  Cuba,  the  city  controlled  
by  Don  Pedro  Bayona  y  Villanueva.  As  previously  mentioned,  Bayona  was  less  
than  keen  on  rapidly  assembling  and  deploying  forces  that  could  undermine  
other  lucrative  endeavors.  He  was  even  less  enthusiastic  about  sending  away  
detachments  that  could  provide  defense  for  Cuba.  Unsurprisingly,  when  the  men  
from  across  the  Caribbean  landed  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  they  were  delayed  for  a  
period  of  time  which  Isassi  considered  unacceptable.  Moreover,  he  felt  that  
Bayona  y  Villanueva  had  kept  the  strongest  men  and  that  his  ally  Albuquerque  
69"Letter  from  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque  to  Cristobal  Arnaldo  Isassi,  March  1657,"  in  Frank  
Cundall,  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  Archives  of  
Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  55.  
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had  not  even  bothered  to  send  fit  men  for  his  cause.  Isassi  had  significant  
grounds  to  lodge  such  a  complaint  against  Bayona,  as  roughly  570  men  had  been  
assembled  at  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  only  400  of  those  men  made  it  to  Jamaica.  As  
a  last  insult  to  Isassi,  Bayona  y  Villanueva  appointed  Juan  de  los  Reyes  as  the  
head  of  this  contingent  on  dubious  authority.  
To  say  that  Juan  de  los  Reyes  cut  a  divisive  figure  is  an  understatement.  
First,  his  introduction  as  leader  of  the  relief  force  came  as  a  surprise  to  Isassi  as  
Bayona  y  Villanueva  had  not  sent  prior  word  to  Isassi.  According  to  Cundall  in  
Jamaica  Under  the  Spaniards ,  upon  meeting  this  supposed  commander,  Isassi  
informed  Reyes  that  he  should  turn  over  command  to  his  nephew.  This  is  said  to  
be  the  catalyst  for  the  deterioration  of  their  relationship  if  such  a  thing  existed  at  
all  between  the  two  men,  and  the  breakdown  of  Isassi's  resistance  campaign.  
However,  Cundall  provides  no  evidence  to  support  such  a  claim  and  seems  to  be  
relating  a  commonly  used  excuse  for  the  coming  dissension  between  Isassi  and  
Reyes.  Its  prevalence  in  English  historiography  is  likely  due  in  part  to  its  role  in  
furthering  the  broader  narrative  of  Spanish  incompetence.  What  appears  more  
likely  is  that  Bayona  y  Villanueva  always  intended  for  Reyes  to  be  antagonistic  
towards  Isassi  and  to  challenge  his  authority.  The  man  who  should  have  been  
commander  of  these  forces,  one  Captain  Salinas,  sent  by  Albuquerque,  was  not  
permitted  to  leave  Santiago  de  Cuba.   Bayona  y  Villanueva  did  not  respect  Isassi  70
as  a  governor  and  especially  not  as  a  soldier.  By  sending  Reyes  as  head  of  the  
70  "Inquiry  of  the  Council  of  Indies,  1659,"  in  Frank  Cundall,  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  
under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  
1919,  86.  
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relief  force,  he  attempted  to  neutralize  Isassi's  authority  and  thus  validate  his  
disrespect.   71
More  recent  scholarship,  such  as  Schmitt’s  aforementioned  article,  has  
shi ed  discourse  away  from  petty  jealousies  as  the  source  of  conflict.  However,  it  
still  essentially  maintains  that  jealousy,  in  this  case,  jealousy  of  profitable  illicit  
trade  relationships,  was  responsible  for  the  failure  to  retake  Jamaica.  Neither  
Schmitt  nor  Cundall  make  use  of  what  may  have  been  the  actual  source  of  
conflict;  the  orders  Bayona  y  Villanueva  gave  to  Reyes  before  his  departure  to  
Jamaica.  In  these  orders,  confiscated  by  the  English  a er  the  defeat  at  Las  
Chorreras,  Bayona  y  Villanueva  first  orders  that  Reyes  obeys  Isassi  in  all  things  
that  relate  to  the  service  of  the  king  (i.e.  combatting  the  English).  If  Bayona  y  
Villanueva  truly  wanted  that  to  be  the  case  though,  the  document  should  end  
there.  As  it  is  though,  that  is  the  first  of  many  orders  Reyes  was  supposed  to  
follow.  Bayona  y  Villanueva  continues  specifically  commanding  that  Reyes  
should  avoid  long  marches  before  conflict  so  as  to  avoid  tiring  his  own  men,  “and  
to  be  sure,  that  it  be  at  such  a  distance  from  the  enemy,  that  you  may  be  able  to  
make  war  with  him  without  making  of  long  marches...And  the  governor  and  
serjeant-major  are  to  have  special  care,  that  the  soldiers  be  not  weary  with  
marching  when  they  come  to  fight…”   It  is  clear  that  Bayona  y  Villanueva  felt  72
such  orders  were  imperative  based  on  his  own  experience  as  a  soldier  in  
71  "Letter  from  Blass  Arnaldo  Isassi  to  the  Duke  of  Albuquerque,  September  1657,"  in  Frank  
Cundall,  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,   Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  Archives  of  
Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  62.    
72  John  Thurloe,  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe...:  1658  to  1660 ,  executor  of  F.  Gyles,  
1742,  540-541.  
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Catalonia  and  Italy.  Later  in  the  document  he  orders  Reyes  to  treat  the  English  
civilly  to  induce  mass  surrenders,  something  he  noted  had  worked  in  Catalonia.  73
Notably,  Bayona  y  Villanueva  did  not  provide  Reyes  with  a  course  of  action  
should  his  orders  conflict  with  those  of  Isassi.  
Thus,  the  relief  that  arrived  on  the  island  found  itself  consumed  by  the  
dispute  between  the  two  men.  Isassi  does  deserve  some  credit  in  attempting  to  
blunt  the  effects  of  the  argument  becoming  either  a  full-scale  civil  war  between  
the  two  factions,  or  a  complete  mutiny.  Beyond  their  personal  differences,  Isassi  
and  Reyes  disagreed  about  the  best  course  of  action  and  the  purpose  of  this  relief  
force  on  the  island.  When  the  contingent  arrived  in  La  Maguana  (near  
present-day  Ocho  Rios)  some  men  remained  there  to  guard  the  provisions  that  
accompanied  them.  The  rest  of  the  force  was  intended  to  accompany  Isassi  and  
his  men  towards  the  interior  of  the  island  to  camp  and  create  ambushes.  This  was  
Isassi's  preferred  method  of  attack  and  one  that,  recall,  brought  him  success  in  
the  early  days  of  resistance.  Reyes  on  the  other  hand  sternly  disagreed  with  this  
course  of  action.  Bayona  y  Villanueva  had  warned  him  to  avoid  such  marches.  He  
wrote  to  Isassi  that  success  in  the  interior  of  the  island  was,  "impossible."   The  74
issue  was  further  compounded  by  the  hardships  which  the  men  experienced  in  
marching  from  La  Maguana  towards  points  inland.  In  testimony  given  to  the  
Council  of  Indies  two  years  later,  Isassi's  brother  indicated  that  the  relief  force  
73  Ibid.  541.  
74"Letter  from  Juan  de  los  Reyes  to  Cristobal  Arnaldo  Isassi,  1657,"  in  Cundall,  Frank,  and  Joseph  
Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  
Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  59-60.  
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did  not  have  enough  food  to  last  them  fi een  days  in  Jamaica.   
Taking  advantage  of  the  disgruntled  state  of  the  men,  Reyes  demanded  a  
Council  of  War  to  permit  his  return  to  the  supplies  at  La  Maguana.  Isassi,  
wanting  to  avoid  mutiny  while  still  accomplishing  his  central  mission,  agreed  to  
allow  Reyes  and  some  of  the  men  to  return  to  La  Maguana.  Isassi  continued  
towards  the  interior  and  south  of  the  island  while  ordering  that  Reyes  move  the  
supplies  to  Baycani  (in  the  vicinity  of  Ocho  Rios).  However,  Bayona  y  Villanueva  
had  instructed  Reyes  to  “to  choose  out  a  place  upon  that  coast,  from  whence  
correspondency  may  be  kept  with  this  city,  and  to  fortify  it  very  well,  and  leave  a  
guard  of  soldiers  therein,  and  to  make  huts  for  the  sick  and  wounded.”   Reyes  75
therefore  ignored  Isassi’s  orders  and  instead  constructed  a  stockade  around  the  
supplies  at  La  Maguana.   
Meanwhile,  the  English  were  trying  to  consolidate  the  villages  and  areas  
in  their  control.  Under  D'Oyley's  command  and  with  the  Lord  Protector's  aid,  
they  attempted  to  make  Jamaica  a  profitable  settlement.  While  Cromwell  tried  to  
convince  settlers  from  other  Caribbean  islands  and  New  England  to  move  to  
Jamaica,  D'Oyley  attempted  to  induce  the  soldiers  into  settling  down  and  
planting.  That  endeavor  was  paused  when  the  word  was  received  through  a  
captured  Portuguese  sailor  that  the  Spanish  relief  had  indeed  landed  in  the  north  
of  the  island.  D'Oyley  himself  boarded  the  Indian  to  lead  the  forces  which  
departed  from  Cagway  on  October  24th.  6  days  later,  they  landed  two  miles  from  
75  John  Thurloe,  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe...:  1658  to  1660 ,  executor  of  F.  Gyles,  
1742,  541. 
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the  Spanish  camp  at  La  Maguana  near  Las  Chorreras  and  began  to  march  
towards  the  Spanish  position.  Along  the  way,  they  encountered  one  of  the  famous  
Spanish  ambuscadoes  which,  despite  past  success,  was  ineffective  that  day.  Isassi  
later  bemoaned  the  futility  of  Reyes'  ambush  and  subsequent  abandonment  of  all  
defensive  trenches  between  the  English  and  their  stockade.   76
Despite  not  actually  having  been  present  at  the  battle,  Isassi  believed  that  
those  earthwork  defenses  could  have  held  out  against  the  advancing  English  and  
prevented  the  disaster  to  come.  Whether  or  not  that  was  true  became  irrelevant  
as  the  English  made  their  way  to  the  stockade  protecting  the  Spanish  provisions.  
Understanding  the  tenuous  situation  in  which  they  found  themselves,  Isassi  
ordered  that  should  the  English  find  the  Spanish  provisions  and  defeat  seem  
imminent,  the  provisions  should  be  burnt.  This  was  an  unfortunate  necessity  to  
prevent  the  English  from  becoming  stronger  at  direct  Spanish  expense.  Once  
again  Reyes  dismissed  that  order  and  determined  to  stand  his  ground  at  Las  
Chorreras.  According  to  D'Oyley's  account  of  the  battle,  the  English  forces  were  
able  to  breach  the  fortification  a er  a  45-minute  gunfight  along  the  walls  by  
using  their  hatchets.  In  addition  to  seizing  the  munitions  there,  the  English  were  
also  able  to  capture  the  former  governor,  Don  Francisco  de  Proenza.  
Unfortunately,  while  en  route  to  New  Spain,  he  died  aboard  the  ship  upon  which  
the  English  had  placed  him.  With  the  death  of  the  last  pre-English  governor,  
Spanish  control  of  Jamaica  was  truly  no  more.  
76  "Letter  from  Cristobal  Arnaldo  Isassi  to  Don  Pedro  Bayona  y  Villanueva,  February  1658,"  in  
Cundall,  Frank,  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  65. 
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While  Spanish  control  of  the  island  had  ceased  to  exist,  the  Spanish  
presence  on  the  island  remained,  though  greatly  reduced.  In  light  of  his  blatant  
insubordination,  Reyes  and  a  large  majority  of  the  Spanish  forces  on  the  island  
returned  to  Cuba.  Isassi  asked  that  he  be  kept  there  in  some  form  of  confinement  
or  as  an  outright  prisoner.  Unsurprisingly,  Bayona  did  not  honor  this  request  and  
instead  sent  Reyes  to  Madrid  to  explain  the  devastating  defeat.  Isassi  was  
understandably  incensed  upon  hearing  this  news  as  it  meant  that  Reyes'  account  
of  events  reached  the  king  before  his  own  depiction  of  30  October  could.  As  these  
officials  saw  1657  draw  to  a  close,  they  well  understood  that  a  herculean  task  
awaited  them  the  following  year.  
Now  while  the  Spanish  had  suffered  a  catastrophic  defeat,  they  were  still  
succeeding  in  preventing  the  English  from  effectively  settling  the  island  and  
making  it  profitable.  Uncooperative  governors  in  the  Leeward  Islands,  Virginia  
and  New  England  refused  to  send  planter  families  to  settle  the  island,  so  it  
remained  little  more  than  a  military  outpost.  In  February  of  1657  D’Oyley  had  
remarked  that  the  Spanish  presence  on  the  island,  coupled  with  reinforcements  
from  New  Spain,  “interrupt[s]  our  work  of  planting,  to  attend  them.”  77
Additionally,  D’Oyley  was  also  cautious  about  engaging  in  or  endorsing  
privateering  at  this  time,  displaying  an  unusual  amount  of  caution.  He  appeared  
to  be  preparing  the  island  for  the  end  of  martial  law  and  seeking  to  transition  to  a  
peaceful  civilian  government.   Moreover,  the  constantly  fluctuating  situation  of  78
77  Edward  D’Oyley,  “Letter  from  Col.  D’Oyley  to  Secretary  Thurloe,”  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  
Papers  of  John  Thurloe ,  Google  Books,  1742,  834.  
78  Ibid,  834.  
 
66  
English  politics  meant  that  the  soldiers  who  were  ‘expendable’  in  1654-55  and  
thus  shipped  off  on  the  Western  Design,  were  suddenly  very  much  in  need  back  
in  Europe.  
1657:  The  European  Perspective  
While  the  Spanish  forces  were  largely  crushed  at  Las  Chorreras,  events  on  
the  continent  provided  opportunities  for  optimism.  For  Spain,  and  King  Philip  IV  
in  particular,  1657  was  a  complicated  year  punctuated  by  victories,  defeats,  
miracles,  and  foreboding.  While  the  main  theaters  of  his  attention  continued  to  
be  Portugal,  Catalonia,  Flanders,  and  Italy,  new  ones  opened  up  in  the  Canary  
Islands,  Central  Europe,  and  his  own  Court.  In  the  Canaries,  the  English  raid  on  
Santa  Cruz  de  Tenerife  posed  the  greatest  threat  to  the  Spanish  silver  fleet  since  
Piet  Hein  three  decades  earlier  while  the  death  of  Ferdinand  III,  Holy  Roman  
Emperor,  had  implications  which  resounded  far  beyond  1657.  Finally,  a er  the  
campaign  season  of  1657  had  drawn  to  a  close,  King  Philip  celebrated  the  birth  of  
his  first  son  in  twenty-eight  years  and  the  first  viable  heir  in  over  a  decade.   
To  understand  the  complexities  which  colored  1657,  a  brief  overview  of  
that  year's  campaign  season  of  the  Franco-Spanish  war  is  necessary,  as  it  
continued  to  be  the  main  source  of  conflict.  In  February  1657  King  Philip  
considered  Italy  most  important  and  most  in  need  of  relief.   To  his  surprise  and  79
benefit,  the  French  army  started  slowly  despite  the  return  of  warm  weather.  
 
79  María  de  Jesús  de  Ágreda,  Francisco  Silvela,  y  Felipe  IV,  Rey  de  España,  Cartas  de  La  Venerable  
Madre  Sor  María  de  Agreda  Y  Del  Señor  Rey  Don  Felipe  IV ,  Est.  tipográfico“  Sucesores  de  
Rivadeneyra,”  2013,  465.    
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Indeed,  it  was  actually  the  Spanish  forces  which  mobilized  first  and  le   their  
winter  camp.  The  French  did  eventually  get  moving  and  put  the  city  of  
Alessandria  to  siege.  Lying  roughly  midway  between  Turin  and  Milan,  
Alessandria  in  French  hands  could  provide  a  launchpad  for  future  strikes  both  in  
the  Duchy  of  Milan,  and  the  city  itself.  King  Philip  seemed  keenly  aware  of  this  
fact  and  wrote  that  its  loss  could  result  in,  "the  loss  of  all  the  State."   Possibly  80
because  they  had  been  on  the  move  first,  the  Spanish  army  was  in  the  same  area  
and  able  to  come  to  the  relief  of  the  city.  The  region  which  had  so  plagued  Philip  
IV  managed  to  resist  French  domination  for  another  year.  
Portugal  meanwhile  continued  to  be  a  knife  in  Spain's  figurative,  and  
geographically  literal,  back.  Despite  a  campaign  season  cut  short  due  to  heat,  
Spanish  forces  were  dealt  a  significant  blow  with  the  loss  of  Olivenza.  While  they  
achieved  victory  and  secured  Mourao,  the  trade-off  was  imbalanced.  Philip  IV  
still  held  out  hope  that  through  prayer  and  arms  he  could  make  the  Portuguese  
resubmit  and  rejoin  the  Crown  of  Spain.  Such  adherence  to  what  scholars  
considered  a  lost  cause,  while  not  disastrous  in  1657,  was  distracting.  Firmly  
upholding  the  Habsburg  belief  in  the  union  of  all  dominions  in  perpetuity,  Philip  
IV  continued  to  siphon  valuable  men  and  supplies  to  this  fool's  errand.  This  
became  all  the  more  pressing  as  events  unfolded  in  Flanders  and  the  Canaries.  
In  1656,  Spain  and  the  exiled  King  Charles  II  had  reached  an  agreement  in  
which  Charles  provided  immediate  men-at-arms  to  fight  in  Flanders,  and  Spain  
80  Ibid,  494.  
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was  to  return  the  favor  at  a  later  date  to  assist  Charles  in  reclaiming  his  throne.  
Meanwhile,  through  his  Western  Design,  Cromwell  had  removed  himself  from  
Spanish  favor  and  the  Treaty  of  Brussels  had  propelled  him  further  into  the  orbit  
of  France.  The  result  was  the  Treaty  of  Paris  which  reads  as  a  mirror  of  the  
Brussels  treaty  a  year  prior.  Cromwell's  England  was  tasked  with  supplying  ships  
to  France  and  in  turn,  France  was  meant  to  help  ensure  that  Charles  never  
regained  his  throne.  The  key  component  of  the  treaty  was  that  the  combined  
Franco-Protectorate  forces  go  on  campaign  in  Flanders  with  the  goal  of  
capturing  Dunkirk.  This  was  intended  to  drive  Charles  from  his  exile  in  Flanders,  
cut  off  the  logical  staging  ground  for  any  Royalist  invasion,  and  to  cease  the  
predation  of  the  Dunkirker  privateers  on  English  shipping.  Thus,  1657  should  be  
considered  a  resumption  of  the  English  Civil  War.  Royalist  and  Parliamentarian  
forces  once  again  squared  off  on  the  battlefield,  contributing  considerably  to  
their  allied  causes.  
The  weight  of  English  forces  on  both  sides  impacted  the  larger  conflict  in  
the  years  to  come.  In  1657,  it  was  Charles  II's  forces  who  carried  the  day  and  
brought  success  to  the  court  of  Philip  IV.  At  St.  Ghislain,  English  and  Irish  forces  
under  the  command  of  James,  Duke  of  York,  and  the  Army  of  Flanders  led  by  Don  
Juan  secured  victory  in  that  city  thereby  blocking  a  path  to  Brussels.  Meanwhile,  
the  Condé  was  able  to  successfully  relieve  Cambrai  from  the  Comte  de  Turenne  
and  prevent  a  hasty  collapse  of  Spanish  power  there.  However,  there  were  losses  
at  Montmedy  and  Mardyck  which  the  King  lamented  over.  The  latter  came  to  be  
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particularly  disastrous  as  it  placed  Anglo-French  troops  in  striking  distance  of  
the  all-important  Dunkirk.  As  with  so  much  of  the  Franco-Spanish  War,  and  
conflicts  involving  Spain,  the  campaigns  of  1657  were  inconclusive.   
Furthering  this  theme  of  inconclusive  results  was  the  English  raid  on  
Santa  Cruz  de  Tenerife,  led  by  Admiral  Robert  Blake.  Numerous  historians,  when  
supplying  evidence  for  the  decline  of  Spain,  describe  this  event  as  Blake's  capture  
of  the  Spanish  Silver  Fleet.  This,  however,  is  deeply  misleading.  First,  Blake  did  
very  little  capturing  and  far  more  destroying.  It  was  certainly  an  unwelcome  
outcome  for  Spain  but  not  as  abysmal,  all  things  considered.  Secondly,  his  fleet  
did  not  carry  off  the  silver  of  the  Indies.  Despite  the  over-simplified  and  
condensed  narrative  presented  by  past  historians,  the  battle  of  Santa  Cruz  de  
Tenerife  was  far  more  inconclusive  when  considering  the  larger  strategy  of  the  
belligerents.  Around  April  28 th   Blake's  fleet  appeared  within  sight  of  the  silver  
fleet  stationed  at  Santa  Cruz.  On  the  following  day,  Don  Diego  Egues  y  
Beaumont,  admiral  of  the  fleet  received  notice  of  Blake's  fleet  and  immediately  
ordered  that  the  silver  be  disembarked  and  secured  on  Tenerife  itself.  This  quick  
action  meant  that  the  impending  assault  was  thus  prevented  from  reaching  the  
silver  and  causing  fatal  harm  to  the  Spanish  monarchy.   
In  any  case,  Blake  approached  the  silver  fleet  with  roughly  30  ships  (the  
number  ranges  from  28-36  depending  on  the  account)  on  the  morning  of  30  April.  
When  asked  for  his  surrender,  Egues  is  reported  to  have  said  “Let  [Blake]  try  to  
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come  here  if  he  wishes.”   When  the  English  ships  did  come,  the  seventeen  81
Spanish  ships  under  Egues  attempted  to  fight  off  the  English  but  by  
mid-morning  Egues  knew  that  his  cause  was  lost.  His  ship  and  the  Vice-Admiral  
continued  the  fight  into  the  a ernoon  before  he  ordered  that  the  ships  be  burnt  
to  avoid  becoming  English  trophies.  The  English  account  of  events  respects  
those  two  ships  for  their  “considerable  resistance”   and  Spanish  pride  was  82
spared  by  not  losing  such  large  warships  to  Cromwell’s  Navy.  More  than  pride  
was  spared  though,  as  critically  the  English  sailed  off  with  far  fewer  prizes  than  
they  had  hoped.  Whatever  cargo  from  the  Indies  had  not  yet  been  brought  
onshore  was  wrested  off  Spanish  ships  by  Blake’s  men.  In  his  report  to  King  
Philip,  Egues  highlights  that  the  loss  of  material  goods  was  not  so  great.  
Moreover,  he  claimed  that  in  looking  over  the  records  of  the  voyage,  he  
discovered  and  corrected  fraud  which  has  netted  the  royal  treasury  more  than  
what  Blake  escaped  with.   This  was  no  more  than  evidence  of  an  officer  83
attempting  to  save  their  own  neck;  however,  King  Philip’s  response  to  these  
events  indicated  that  he  felt  it  to  be  something  more.  
Recall  that  in  1655  when  King  Philip  IV  first  received  word  of  Blake's  fleet  
stationed  off  Cadiz  he  feared  that  their  capture  of  the  silver  fleet  would  bring  
about  the  ultimate  ruin  of  the  Monarchy.  When  news  reached  him  that  Blake  had  
81  Cesáreo  Fernández  Duro,  Bosquejo  biográfico  del  almirante  D.  Diego  de  Egues  y  Beaumont  y  relacion  
del  combate  naval  que  sostuvo  con  ingleses  en  Santa  Cruz  de  Tenerife,  año  1657 ,  La  Andalucía,  1892,  16.   
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indeed  attacked  the  fleet  he  wrote  to  Sor  Maria,  "[the  silver  fleet]   fought  with  
[the  English],  but  as  they  were  few  they  were  forced  to  burn  them,  so  that  the  
enemy  did  not  take  them;  but  as  what  they  brought  was  already  disembarked  on  
land,  it  was  only  the  loss  of  the  vessels.”   Clearly,  King  Philip  IV  did  not  consider  84
this  to  be  the  death  blow  to  the  Monarchy.  In  a  body  of  letters  brimming  with  the  
lamentation  of  a  man  who  believed  himself  cursed  by  God,  this  remark  stands  out  
as  a  mere  half-hearted  shrug  in  the  face  of  the  event.  Moreover,  he  awarded  
Egues  with  an  encomendero  in  a  location  of  his  choosing,  as  well  as  further  
government  appointments.  This  should  have  been  entirely  out  of  place  had  the  
King  felt  Egues  had  behaved  dishonorably  or  was  deserving  of  punishment.  
Instead,  it  further  indicates  that  the  Monarchy  was  singularly  concerned  with  
ensuring  the  silver  reached  Spain,  without  much  thought  as  to  how,  nor  how  
quickly.  
While  they  were  primarily  interested  in  the  idea  of  American  silver  
reaching  Spain,  it  was  not  because  it  was  contributing  significantly  to  enriching  
their  coffers.  By  this  time,  the  wealth  of  the  Americas  was  not  directed  to  the  
Crown  treasuries,  rather  it  was  o en  directed  to  foreign  bankers  to  continue  
paying  off  loans  which  were  in  considerable  arrears.  Some  historians  have  
attempted  to  use  Santa  Cruz  as  an  explanation  for  Spanish  defeats  in  Flanders,  or  
an  abandoned  invasion  of  Portugal,  yet  such  an  explanation  is  destroyed  by  the  
84  María  de  Jesús  de  Ágreda,  Francisco  Silvela,  y  Felipe  IV,  Rey  de  España,  Cartas  de  La  Venerable  
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Rivadeneyra,”  2013,  484.  
 
72  
paper  trail.   Silver  from  the  Americas  was  rarely  able  to  go  from  Veracruz  or  85
Lima  to  Cadiz,  to  Madrid,  and  then  back  out  to  the  average  soldier.  First,  because  
the  currency  in  the  Spanish  Empire  fundamentally  did  not  operate  like  that.  A  
number  of  different  coins  existed  as  intermediaries  of  exchange  which  gave  
finance  ministers  considerable  manipulation  of  the  currency.  Then,  there  existed  
the  considerable  foreign  interest,  in  the  form  of  bankers,  who  essentially  could  
lay  claim  to  the  silver  at  Cadiz  as  recompense  for  the  loans  which  the  Spanish  
Monarchy  had  taken  from  them.  An  inability  to  arm  troops  in  the  campaign  
season  of  1657  had  more  to  do  with  financial  trouble  in  years  prior  than  it  did  
with  any  singular  event  that  occurred  during  that  campaign  season.  To  suggest  
otherwise  demonstrates  a  fundamental  misunderstanding  of  Spanish  finances,  
and  gives  undue  credit  to  the  speed  at  which  they  operated.  
Additionally  as  was  so  o en  the  case,  King  Philip  was  more  interested  in,  
and  more  disheartened  by  events  and  concerns  in  Portugal  and  Flanders.  
Whether  the  battle  be  in  Santa  Cruz  de  Tenerife,  Southern  Italy,  or  Jamaica,  King  
Philip,  and  by  extension  the  royal  apparatus  he  headed,  ranked  it  below  the  
concerns  of  Portugal  and  Flanders.  Indeed  one  observer  noted  that  “It  is  resolved  
in  Spain  to  invade  Portugal  by  land  with  a  formidable  army,  and  to  send  a  fleet  to  
the  Indies  to  beat  the  English  out  of  Jamaica;  but  there  being  care  to  be  had  for  
Catalonia  for  these  parts  and  for  Italy,  I  know  not  how  the  king  of  Spain  will  be  
able  to  supply  all  places,  where  his  assistance  is  required.”   This  remark  86
85  C.  H.  Firth,  The  Last  Years  of  the  Protectorate,  1656-1658 ,  London,  New  York:  Longmans,  Green,  
1909.  
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succinctly  represents  the  divided  attention  of  Philip  IV,  and  the  need  to  prioritize  
certain  places  over  others.  In  a  similar  vein,  from  1657  through  1658  King  Philip  
was  deeply  invested  in  the  forthcoming  election  of  Holy  Roman  Emperor.  The  
relationship  to  the  Austrian  Habsburgs  was  understood  to  be  the  bedrock  of  
Spanish  foreign  policy  at  this  time  so  it  was  critical  that  Philip’s  desired  
candidate  sit  on  the  throne  as  Emperor.  In  this  particular  election,  he  favored  his  
nephew  Leopold  over  Archduke  Leopold  Wilhelm.  Mazarin  pushed  both  the  
unlikely  election  of  Louis  XIV  himself  or  the  somewhat  more  likely  Ferdinand  
Maria  of  Bavaria  from  the  house  of  Wittelsbach.  That  Philip  IV  helped  in  
securing  Leopold’s  elevation  to  the  Holy  Roman  Emperor  was  not  sufficient  to  
secure  Leopold’s  full  support  in  the  future.  
Meanwhile,  the  domestic  situation  in  England  in  1657  was  colored  by  the  
question  involving  Cromwell  and  the  Crown.  It  was  not  the  only  issue  causing  
concern  in  the  country,  but  it  was  certainly  one  that  informed  much  of  the  
discourse  at  this  time.  Agents  of  all  the  major  European  powers  wrote  letters  and  
reports  indicating  that  they  expected  Cromwell  to  accept  the  crown  and  begin  a  
new  dynasty  in  England.  The  move  seemed  surprising  to  some,  as  the  republic  
appeared  well  embraced  by  many  in  England.  It  also  frightened  the  newly  allied  
French  who  believed  that  a  newly  crowned  ‘King  Oliver  I’  was  going  to  seek  a  
separate  peace  with  Spain  to  ensure  domestic  tranquility  a er  securing  his  
throne.   The  basis  of  such  a  treaty  held  that  Cromwell  was  satisfied  with  his  87
87  Ibid ,  176.  
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gains  thus  far  and  was  willing  to  work  towards  peace  at  home  and  abroad.  Such  
thinking  had  little  grounding  in  fact  as  it  was  unlikely  that  either  side  would  
entertain  a  treaty  at  that  point.  Spain  surely  was  not  able  to  consent  to  a  peace  
wherein  England  retained  Jamaica,  and  the  English  desire  underlying  the  Treaty  
of  Paris  was  the  capture  of  Dunkirk,  a  feat  which  was  as  yet  unaccomplished.   
There  was  also  internal  opposition  to  the  coronation  of  Cromwell.  Loudest  
amongst  the  dissenters  was  the  Army  which  had  more  or  less  been  ruling  the  
country  in  the  period  now  referred  to  as  the  Rule  of  the  Major  Generals.  The  
calling  of  the  Second  Protectorate  Parliament  had  largely  ended  that  period,  but  
the  influence  of  the  army  was  still  strong.  Leading  this  faction  was  General  John  
Lambert,  who  felt  that  a  return  to  monarchy  betrayed  the  central  purpose  of  the  
revolution.  Considering  that  Cromwell  and  his  Protectorate  were  in  the  midst  of  
war,  it  behooved  the  government  to  avoid  antagonizing  the  army  if  it  could  be  
avoided.  The  “Humble  Petition  and  Advice”  as  it  was,  already  upset  the  military  
by  reducing  their  budget  to  a  still  staggering  million  pounds  per  annum.  Such  
outspoken  dissent  was  watched  intently  by  foreign  observers  and  royalists  
abroad,  who  felt  the  instability  it  created  was  detrimental  and  beneficial,  
respectively.  To  assuage  such  fears  of  internal  turmoil,  and  perhaps  to  quiet  his  
own  conscience,  Cromwell  responded  to  the  Humble  Petition  in  a  speech  before  
Parliament  saying,  “I  am  perswaded  [sic]  to  return  this  answer,  That  I  cannot  
undertake  this  government  with  the  title  of  king;  and  this  is  my  answer  to  this  
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weighty  affair.”   Cromwell’s  rejection  was  not  just  of  the  crown  but  of  the  entire  88
Humble  Petition  and  Advice  which  meant  turmoil  was  avoided,  but  stability  was  
unachieved.  General  Monck  wrote  to  Secretary  Thurloe  that  month  imploring  
both  Cromwell  and  Parliament  to  reach  an  agreement  for  such  stability’s  sake,  
indicating  perhaps  his  chief  desire.   It  appeared  that  stability  was  achieved  later  89
that  same  month  when  Parliament  agreed  to  reinstate  Cromwell  as  Lord  
Protector  while  Cromwell  accepted  the  remainder  of  the  Humble  Petition,  
including  its  call  for  the  “Other”  House.  While  the  Humble  Petition  and  Advice  
in  its  modified  form  retained  the  republican  government,  the  monarchist  
thinking  which  produced  it  remained  active  in  English  political  life  beyond  1657.    
88  "State  Papers,  1657:  May  (2  of  6),"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  6,  
January  1657  -  March  1658 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  (London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  260-272.  British  
History  Online.  
89  "State  Papers,  1657:  May  (4  of  6),"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  6,  
January  1657  -  March  1658 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  (London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  287-303.  British  
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Twilight  of  the  Franco-Spanish  War  and  its  Effect  on  Jamaica  
Despite  fundamentally  seeing  Jamaica’s  cause  as  less  important,  in  1657  
King  Philip  claimed  to  be  sending  the  Armada  to  the  island.  However,  he  
rescinded  that  offer  by  April  of  1658  because,  "it  is  so  important  that  the  galleons  
depart  later  to  bring  the  treasure  of  silver  that  one  hopes  with  all  abundance  
those  of  the  kingdoms  of  Peru  and  Tierra  Firme,  as  well  as  that  New  Spain  have."  
Still  dealing  with  the  fallout  of  the  attack  on  Santa  Cruz,  which  finally  ended  
with  the  silver  reaching  Cadiz  in  May  1658,  King  Philip  could  ill  afford  to  risk  his  
galleons  on  a  mission  that  did  not  enrich  his  needy  Royal  Treasury.  It  was  more  
important  that  the  galeones  and  flotas  proceeded  along  their  set  course  without  
making  dangerous  detours  to  engage  English  vessels  eager  to  plunder  the  richly  
laden  ships.  Clearly  Philip  IV  subsumed  the  recovery  of  Jamaica  to  his  immediate  
need  to  get  the  treasure  from  the  Indies.  That  need  was  the  Crown's  driving  
policy  governing  the  Indies  at  this  time.  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the  
Court  in  Madrid  viewed  the  Indies  as  a  source  of  silver  and  little  else.  The  
Spanish  monarchy  had  not  yet  reached  a  point  where  it  viewed  its  colonial  
empire  as  a  source  of  income  through  investment  in  agriculture  and  industry.  It  
was  still  very  much  a  distant  place  from  which  mineral  wealth  was  to  be  
obtained.  Again,  there  had  been  little  need  to  seek  alternative  revenue  streams  at  
this  point  in  time.  
Thus  by  1658,  the  government  in  Madrid  had  well  and  truly  come  to  
believe  that  the  reconquest  of  Jamaica  had  to  be  carried  out  by  local  force.  That  is  
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to  say,  by  arms,  money,  and  leadership  which  was  already  located  in  the  
surrounding  area.  1657  marked  the  end  of  real  open  warfare  for  the  island,  and  
1658  can  be  seen  as  the  end  of  Peninsular  interest  in  recovering  the  island  
through  military  force.  With  that  mentality  in  mind,  King  Philip  was  greatly  
displeased  with  the  performance  of  local  forces  before,  during,  and  a er  the  
defeat  at  Las  Chorreras.  In  particular,  the  king  was  enraged  by  the  lack  of  
coordination  between  his  officials.   
having  increased  the  relief  that  all  the  Windward  Islands  have  sent  to  that  
island  for  its  defense,  and  more  particularly  what  you,  with  all  abundance  
and  providence,  had  sent,  all  have  rotted,  not  only  fruitless,  but  with  
disgrace  to  my  arms  because  of  the  disobedience  and  vileness  of  Captains,  
corporals,  and  soldiers  from  which  the  failures  resulted.  
 
Apparently,  Reyes  had  not  made  enough  of  an  impression  on  the  king  and  did  not  
merit  the  praise  which  Egues  had  received  a  year  earlier.  It  was  imperative  that  
officials  in  the  Caribbean  work  together  if  the  Crown  was  going  to  successfully  
recover  Jamaica  without  dispatching  aid  from  the  peninsula.  The  insubordination  
of  Reyes’  caliber  contributed  heavily  to  the  “rotten”  status  of  Jamaica.   
The  disorder  and  disagreement  between  local  officials  was  simultaneously  
resolved  and  exacerbated  by  the  defeat  at  Las  Chorreras.  In  1657  there  had  been  
disagreement  between  Isassi  and  Bayona  y  Villanueva  about  where  to  land  relief  
troops  and  supplies  on  Jamaica.  Isassi  had  favored  the  southern  portion  of  the  
island  as  there  was  looser  English  control  and  less  naval  presence.  Bayona  y  
Villanueva  on  the  other  hand,  favored  the  north  of  the  island,  as  it  was  an  easier  
journey  to  make;  all  it  required  was  a  simple  channel  crossing.  A  demoralized  and  
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desperate  Isassi  conceded  to  Bayona  y  Villanueva’s  northern  plan  to  ensure  that  
supplies  could  reach  him.  However,  he  did  so  while  scolding  Bayona  y  Villanueva  
and  criticizing  de  los  Reyes’  actions  before,  during,  and  a er  the  defeat  at  Las  
Chorreras.   While  Bayona  y  Villanueva  may  have  won  that  issue,  it  did  not  mean  90
that  he  was  in  the  right.  Far  from  it,  as  his  superior  in  the  Americas,  the  viceroy  
Duke  of  Albuquerque  rebuked  him  in  a  letter  from  21  March  1658.  Albuquerque  
wrote:   
I  do  not  know  this  man  nor  have  I  ever  seen  him  in  my  life,  but  I  know  
that  the  King  and  the  Council  have  appointed  and  elected  him  and  all  
whom  the  King  and  Council  appoint  and  elect  represent  Him  in  the  place  
where  they  are,  and  subjects  have  no  right  to  oppositions,  competitions  or  
slander  but  only  blind  obedience,  which  is  the  best  road  by  which  to  merit  
the  favor  of  the  King  and  of  his  Council...I  also  find  in  Don  Cristobal  that,  
being  a  native  of  the  island...he  must  know  them  better  than  any  other.  91
This  accostment  of  Bayona  y  Villanueva  was  truly  indicative  of  how  Castilian  
nobility  viewed  themselves,  their  role  in  government,  and  how  that  role  served  
them.   
Albuquerque  demanded  blind  obedience  from  Bayona  y  Villanueva  and  
reminded  him  that  such  obedience  is  imperative  to  advancement  within  the  
Crown  hierarchy.  It  is  a  poignant  reminder  of  the  constraints  which  bound  
colonial  officials.  Blind  obedience  to  orders  which  came  either  infrequently  or  in  
dizzying  succession  coupled  with  other  orders  which  were  out  of  date  by  the  time  
they  arrived,  without  a  doubt  created  frozen  colonial  governments  which  
struggled  to  keep  up  with  the  rapidly  evolving  situation  created  by  strong  English  
90  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz.  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville .  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  68-69.  
91  Ibid,  72.   
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naval  presence  around  Jamaica.  The  constant  threat  of  English  attack  was,  as  has  
been  shown,  paralyzing,  but  fear  of  losing  one’s  position,  power,  and  reputation  
were  also  powerful  reasons  for  inaction.  The  case  of  don  Pedro  Zapata  provides  a  
powerful  example.  Zapata  had  been  one  of  the  first  colonial  officials  to  send  aid  
to  Jamaica  and  had  sent  it  on  three  occasions.  In  February  of  1658,  3  years  a er  
having  sent  that  aid,  he  had  to  justify  doing  so  to  the  King.  He  informed  the  king  
that  “help...sent  to  Jamaica  in  no  way  deprived  Cartagena  of  anything  necessary  
for  the  safety  of  that  port.”   He  had  no  orders  to  send  such  relief  and  if  he  had  92
done  so  while  exposing  Cartagena  to  damage  or  capture  he  faced  severe  
reprimand  that  could  have  cost  him  his  position.  His  case  highlights  the  lag  in  
communication  and  the  severity  of  acting  without,  or  outside  of,  clear  orders.  It  
also  shows  that  actions  were  taken  without  prior  orders  to  do  so  when  the  ability  
and  opportunity  presented  itself  and  that  perhaps  colonial  administrators  were  
not  drones  awaiting  orders  from  the  hive.  Taken  in  combination,  it’s  quite  
apparent  why  colonial  officials  chose  to  fortify  their  ports  and  strengthen  their  
defenses.  
At  the  core,  King  Philip  did  not  want  colonial  governors,  presidents,  or  
even  the  viceroys  to  risk  their  domains  for  the  recuperation  of  Jamaica.  To  that  
end,  King  Philip  did  authorize  relief  from  Spain  to  New  Spain  on  22  September  
1658.  This  showed  that  while  there  was  an  ability  to  mobilize  arms  and  relief  in  
Spain  and  get  it  to  the  Indies,  it  is  just  that  it  was  not  intended  for  Jamaica.  
92  Ibid,  70.   
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Despite  earlier  assuaging  the  king  by  stating  that  New  Spain  could  withstand  any  
invasion  by  resorting  to  scorched  earth  policies  (assuming  an  enemy  had  a  skilled  
enough  pilot  to  land  troops  in  New  Spain),  Albuquerque  had  later  come  to  the  
realization  that  he  required  some  assistance.  King  Philip  heard  Albuquerque  and  
was  able  to  authorize  arms  be  sent  there.  There  was  however,  a  large  fuss  over  the  
costs  and  how  those  arms  were  to  be  delivered,  by  whom,  and  in  what  quantities.  
It  also  appears  that  this  aid  was  to  be  paid  for  by  two  Basque  men  from  San  
Sebastian  rather  than  the  Crown  directly.  This  made  sense  considering  that  the  
Crown  had  supplemented  taxes  through  donativos  or  voluntary  donations  to  the  
Crown  by  the  nobility.   It  hardly  bears  repeating,  but  this  is  yet  another  clear  93
example  of  the  Crown’s  priorities;  the  defense  of  the  colonial  centers  came  before  
any  organized  attempts  at  the  recovery  of  the  colonial  periphery.  Since  Jamaica  
was  not  producing  steady  Crown  income  for  generations,  a  concerted  effort  to  
maintain  the  island  was  not  considered.   
Meanwhile,  the  president  of  the  audience  of  Panama  had  obtained  
information  from  a  former  prisoner  of  Jamaica  who  explained  all  the  best  places  
to  enter  the  island.  These  positions  could  be  used  to  resupply  the  people  and  
recover  the  island.  Guzman  decided  that  the  information  should  go  to  Don  Pedro  
Zapata,  the  governor  of  Cartagena  so  that  he  could  arrange  the  dispatch  of  a  ship  
to  those  spots.  This  made  sense  since  Cartagena  is  closest  to  the  southern  part  of  
Jamaica  and  satisfied  Isassi’s  desire  to  have  provisions  land  there.  Guzman  also  
93  Graham  Darby,  Spain  in  the  Seventeenth  Century ,  Oxfordshire,  England:  Routledge,  2014,  14. 
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notified  Albuquerque  of  this  information  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  is  not  clear  if  
Guzman  was  aware  of  Bayona  y  Villanueva's  incorrigibility  and  sought  to  
circumvent  his  authority.  It  could  just  have  been  that  from  the  information  given  
to  him  he  came  to  the  same  conclusion  as  Isassi  that  the  southern  part  of  the  
island  made  for  the  best  landing  spot.  The  former  prisoner  had,  as  many  other  
prisoners  had  before,  informed  Guzman  that  the  English  were  planning  further  
attacks.  Guzman,  like  Albuquerque  and  Bayona  y  Villanueva,  took  measures  to  
secure  his  own  dominion  first  and  foremost  before  seeking  to  recover  Jamaica.  
His  aid  was  in  forwarding  pertinent  information  along  the  chain  of  command.  He  
could  not  and  did  not  send  material  aid.  
Moreover,  from  Isassi’s  perspective,  sending  further  men  to  Jamaica  only  
intensified  his  difficulty  in  supplying  those  men.  In  May  1658,  a  second  relief  
force  from  New  Spain  under  Alvaro  de  Raspuru  arrived  in  Jamaica  to  assist  Isassi.  
However,  this  force  proved  no  more  successful  than  the  last  force,  albeit  for  
different  reasons.  A er  he  received  news  of  the  disaster  at  Las  Chorreras,  Isassi  
returned  to  the  North  of  Jamaica  and  established  a  camp  at  Rio  Nuevo.  
Meanwhile,  the  contingent  from  New  Spain  landed  on  the  island.  Their  journey  
was  not  far  from  direct  though.  Like  the  relief  force  a  year  prior,  they  had  been  
routed  through  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  the  hands  of  its  infamous  governor.  Bayona  
y  Villanueva  had  been  instructed  to  notify  Isassi  a er  eight  days  if  he  was  not  
going  to  be  sending  that  force  immediately.  Instead,  Bayona  y  Villanueva  delayed  
sending  the  force  for  fi y  days.  Isassi  accused  Bayona  y  Villanueva  in  August  
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1658  of  using  that  time  to  siphon  off  the  best  supplies,  troops,  and  most  of  the  
money  destined  for  Jamaica.  The  550  men  sent  compared  to  the  roughly  400  that  
landed  in  Jamaica  support  this,  though  it  was  also  believed  at  the  time  that  some  
men  had  simply  deserted  while  in  Jamaica.  In  either  case,  the  force  that  arrived  in  
Jamaica  had  already  run  through  most  of  their  supplies  of  food.  Additionally,  they  
did  not  join  forces  with  Isassi  for  eight  days  a er  landing.  Once  they  had  met  up,  
the  combined  force  of  roughly  520  men  was  soon  challenged  by  English  forces.   
As  the  men  from  New  Spain  were  disembarking,  a  small  scouting  party  of  
English  ships  encountered  them.  In  the  ensuing  naval  skirmish,  Raspuru  
remarked,   “Each  little  frigate  of  ours  seemed  a  galleon  of  the  royal  fleet,  the  way  
they  fought  and  palpably  damaged  them.”   A er  the  brief  engagement,  the  94
English  ships  sailed  off  under  the  cover  of  night.  According  to  D’Oyley,  the  ships  
were  not  driven  off  due  to  Spanish  resistance;  rather,  they  were  becalmed  and  
thus  unable  to  engage  further  and  board  the  Spanish  ships.   In  any  event,  the  95
English  were  now  aware  of  the  presence  and  location  of  Spanish  troops  in  the  
north  of  the  island.  No  sooner  had  Isassi  and  Raspuru  met  than  they  found  
themselves  engaged  in  combat.   
Having  resolved  on  21  June  to  attack  the  Spanish,  the  English  returned  at  
Rio  Nuevo  with  10  ships  and  over  two  thousand  men  (according  to  Isassi)  on  the  
following  day.  The  amphibious  assault  landed  men  on  the  beach  where  they  were  
94  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  75.  
95  Edward  D’Oyley,  “A  Brief  Relation  of  a  Victory,  Obtained  by  the  Forces  under  the  Command  of  
Gen.  Edward  Doyley,  Commander  in  Chief  of  His  Highnesse’s  Forces  in  the  Island  of  Jamaica,”  
Early  English  Books  Online ,  1659,  California  State  Library,  4. 
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able  to  vanquish  23  Spaniards  and  take  more  than  that  number  prisoner.  In  the  
English  account,  this  forlorn  hope  had  managed  to  secure  the  beach  under  a  
consistent,  though  futile,  Spanish  artillery  barrage.  Before  continuing  onto  the  
fort  which  the  Spanish  had  constructed,  the  English  opened  fire  from  aboard  
their  ships.  However,  as  D’Oyley  himself  noted,  their  cannon  shot  was  as  
successful  as  the  Spanish.  As  D’Oyley  indicated  in  his  account,  he  believed  that  
he  was  outnumbered,  though  if  Isassi’s  estimation  is  to  be  believed  the  English  
outnumbered  the  Spanish  roughly  4  to  1.   D’Oyley’s  calculation  had  convinced  96
him  to  halt  for  the  day  and  attempt  an  assault  the  following  day.  
Having  resolved  to  make  such  an  attempt,  D’Oyley  nevertheless  offered  
Isassi  terms  the  night  before.  These  terms  were  slightly  but  critically  different  
from  those  offered  in  1655  in  that  they  made  no  provision  for  these  men  to  stay.  
Surrender  now  meant  a  departure  from  the  island.  English  controlled  Jamaica  no  
longer  tolerated  a  Spanish  presence  on  the  island.  Isassi,  who  had  orders  from  the  
King  to  remain  in  Jamaica,  and  who  was  resolved  to  blindly  obey  them,  refused  
D’Oyley  kindly  and  stated  that  Spanish  troops  would  not  surrender  so  easily.   So,  97
a  confrontation  was  had  the  following  day.  Isassi  utilized  a  mixed  defense  of  his  
fortification.  Some  of  his  troops  lay  in  wait  for  the  advancing  English  and  fired  
from  the  woods  before  retreating  back  towards  the  fort.  This  was  the  style  of  
fighting  which  Isassi  was  known  to  have  preferred,  but  the  fact  that  the  main  
96  Frank  Cundall,  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
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97  Edward  D’Oyley,  “A  Brief  Relation  of  a  Victory,  Obtained  by  the  Forces  under  the  Command  of  
Gen.  Edward  Doyley,  Commander  in  Chief  of  His  Highnesse’s  Forces  in  the  Island  of  Jamaica,”  
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force  was  in  the  fort  showed  he  was  capable  of  more  traditional  fighting.  In  
actuality,  it  was  not  very  much  unlike  the  type  of  defense  which  the  Spanish  
forces  in  Santo  Domingo  had  mustered  against  the  Western  Design.  However,  as  
the  English  forces  soon  discovered,  the  flanks  of  the  Spanish  fortification  were  
not  yet  complete.  The  result  of  the  hasty  fortification  was  foreseeable  disaster.  
The  English  were  able  to  pour  into  the  fort  from  the  flanks  while  those  Spanish  
not  already  dead  or  wounded  attempted  to  flee  into  the  woods.  Isassi,  in  his  own  
report  to  King  Philip,  claimed  to  have  lost  over  300  men.   Put  another  way,  98
three-quarters  of  the  poorly  armed,  poorly  equipped  men  who  arrived  on  18  May  
were  dead  by  26  June.   
The  similarities  between  the  defeats  at  Las  Chorreras  and  Rio  Nuevo  are  
not  purely  coincidental.  They  are  indicative  of  the  enormous  disruption  which  
Pedro  de  Bayona  y  Villanueva  represented  in  coordinated  attempts  at  relieving  
and  recovering  the  island.  His  intransigence  twice  resulted  in  less  men,  supplies,  
arms,  and  money  reaching  Jamaica,  and  reaching  the  island  later  than  intended.  
It  is  not  impossible  to  imagine  a  scenario  in  which  a  different  governor  
immediately  sent  relief  to  Jamaica,  that  relief  was  not  spotted  by  the  English,  and  
was,  therefore,  able  to  complete  a  fortification  before  any  imminent  assault.  
Moreover,  he  need  not  be  seen  as  some  traitorous  conspirator,  only  a  governor  
interested  in  maintaining  a  fruitful  partnership  with  nearby  merchants.  He  is  not  
the  sole  reason  why  the  Spanish  were  unable  to  retake  Jamaica,  but  he  was  the  
98  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  78.  
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primary  reason  why  Spanish  Caribbean  forces  were  unable  to  do  so.   Towards  the  
end  of  the  year,  Isassi  was  able  to  report  on  English  forces  in  Jamaica.  According  
to  his  report,  they  now  had  3,000  armed  men  on  the  island,  8  merchant  ships,  7  
Dutch  vessels,  a  flagship  with  54  guns,  200  men  spread  across  two  forts  on  the  
future  Port  Royal,  at  Morante  Point:  100  soldiers,  ten  pieces  of  infantry,  and  most  
importantly,  300  farmers.  Even  before  his  defeat  at  Rio  Nuevo  Isassi  had  
bemoaned,  “that  [the  English]  know  the  island  so  well  that  they  make  war  on  me  
all  over  it."   Nearly  all  possible  Spanish  advantages  were  erased  by  1658.  The  99
only  thing  remaining,  and  barely  so,  was  the  support  of  the  maroon  community.  
1658:  The  European  Perspective  
Although  it  occurred  in  the  final  quarter  of  the  year,  the  death  of  Oliver  
Cromwell  could  claim  to  surpass  any  other  event  from  that  year  in  importance.  
The  only  other  possible  event  to  rival  it  was  the  English  seizure  of  Dunkirk.  In  
combination,  these  two  events  mark  the  end  of  the  Protectorate  and  the  English  
experiment  with  republicanism;  the  beleaguered  rule  of  Richard  Cromwell  being  
its  unfortunate  epilogue.  While  the  death  of  Cromwell  hastened  Charles’  return  
to  the  throne,  the  capture  of  Dunkirk  came  to  color  that  monarch’s  foreign  policy.  
For  Spain,  and  the  ever  pious  Philip,  Dunkirk’s  fate  represented  the  realization  of  
the  worst-case  scenario.  
Philip  had  been  concerned  about  the  precarious  situation  of  Dunkirk  since  
the  combined  Anglo-French  forces  had  captured  Montmedy  and  Mardyck  in  
99  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  75.  
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1657.  Anyone  with  a  map  in  front  of  them  came  to  a  similar  conclusion,  as  they  
lay  so  close  to  Dunkirk.  Despite  such  knowledge,  resupplying  and  refortifying  
Flanders  had  been  challenging  for  the  Spanish  monarchy  since  the  closing  of  the  
so-called  “Spanish  Road”  from  Italy  to  the  Low  Countries  in  the  1630s,  and  the  
rampant  piracy  harassing  the  sea  route.   As  such,  the  most  Philip  IV  felt  he  100
could  do  was  pray  for  deliverance.  This  should  not  be  mistaken  for  complete  
helplessness,  as  the  army  of  Flanders  was  typically  the  largest  Spanish  army,  
larger  than  any  on  the  Iberian  or  the  Italian  Peninsula.  Moreover,  early  modern  
conflict  favored  the  defenders  in  a  siege,  so  for  whatever  despair  Philip  may  have  
felt,  he  was  not  staring  down  an  inevitably  grim  situation.  
While  it  may  not  have  been  inevitable,  Dunkirk  did  of  course,  fall.  The  
siege  began  on  25  March,  and  was  supported  by  the  Protectorate  Navy  
blockading  the  port  and  assisting  in  the  landing  of  French  troops.  Indeed,  history  
o en  credits  the  English  with  playing  the  decisive  role  at  Dunkirk.  According  to  
one  estimate,  30,000  French  troops  were  assisted  by  40  English  warships  and  men  
preventing  relief  from  reaching  Dunkirk  by  sea  (the  reality  was  that  15,000  
French  troops  were  augmented  by  6,000  Englishmen).  However,  it  was  also  
possible  that  another  English  force  could  have  turned  the  tide  for  the  Spanish  
side.  James,  Duke  of  York,  and  Henry,  Duke  of  Gloucester,  were  commanding  the  
2,000  Royalist  forces  alongside  Don  Juan  and  the  Prince  of  Condé.  Their  plan  was  
to  cut  through  Flanders  amassing  men  and  supplies  along  the  way,  expecting  to  
100  Graham  Darby,  Spain  in  the  Seventeenth  Century ,  Seminar  Studies,  Oxfordshire,  England:  
Routledge,  2014,  11.  
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rally  as  much  as  40,000  men  to  their  banner.  Clearly  there  existed  in  the  Spanish  
imagination  the  idea  that  there  were  as  yet  untapped  human  resources  spread  
about  the  empire.  Regrettably  for  the  Spanish,  this  relief  force  managed  to  gather  
up  to  15,000  men  before  approaching  Dunkirk.  At  Valenciennes,  the  Spanish  
relief  commanded  by  that  same  Don  Juan  had  been  able  to  overrun  Turenne’s  
forces  and  successfully  li   the  siege.  At  Dunkirk  however,  Turenne  seized  the  
initiative  and  attacked  the  Spanish,  leaving  6,000  men  to  maintain  the  siege.  
What  caused  this  defeat  in  the  ensuing  battle  and  its  narrative  is  not  nearly  as  
what  it  signified  in  the  European  and  American  contexts.  
First,  we  can  see  in  the  Battle  of  the  Dunes  the  central  struggle  of  the  
second  half  of  the  17th  century.  The  “Spanish”  forces  were  extremely  diverse,  as  
already  noted,  English  forces  made  up  a  noteworthy  component  of  this  army.  
There  were  also  German,  Walloon,  Irish,  and  French  troops  in  this  force.   Yes,  101
these  men  were  mercenaries,  but  the  rise  of  France  ensured  that  men  from  across  
Europe  found  themselves  lining  up  against  the  armies  of  France.  In  time  they  
were  joined  by  Dutch  forces,  and  the  Restoration  brought  still  more  English  
troops.  What  once  cost  Spain  a  considerable  fortune,  amassing  an  army  in  
Flanders,  was  now  to  be  given  voluntarily  out  of  self-interest.  The  latter  half  of  
the  17th  Century  marked  the  incorporation  of  north-western  Europe  in  the  
Spanish  project  through  commercial  interests.  Fearing  Louis  XIV  on  their  
doorstep,  the  Dutch,  English,  and  German  princes  came  to  the  defense  of  
101  Graham  Darby,  Spain  in  the  Seventeenth  Century ,  Seminar  Studies,  Oxfordshire,  England:  
Routledge,  2014,  18.   
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Flanders  to  prevent  outcomes  that  threatened  the  commerce  they  maintained  
with  Spain.  Part  of  the  traditional  ‘decline  of  Spain’  narrative  is  their  inability  to  
come  to  the  defense  of  Flanders.  However,  the  need  to  do  so  outright  actually  
dissipated  a er  this  defeat.  The  Dutch  and  Holy  Roman  Empire  supplied  the  
force  while  lax  Spanish  rule  fostered  the  loyalty  to  the  Crown.  This  outsourcing  
of  military  might  was  part  of  the  ingenious  durability  of  the  Spanish  Monarchy  
and  was  replicated  in  Jamaica,  as  will  be  shown.   
From  the  Protectorate  perspective,  Dunkirk  marked  the  apex  of  
Cromwell’s  foreign  policy.  The  Dunkirker  threat  had  been  removed,  an  alliance  
with  a  major  continental  power  had  been  established,  and  the  colonial  American  
Empire  had  been  expanded  through  the  capture  of  Jamaica.  The  Anglo-Spanish  
War  had  thus  fulfilled  its  purpose,  and  not  a  moment  too  soon.  The  war  itself  was  
never  completely  popular  and  at  the  onset  was  rather  unpopular.  Parliament  
o en  struggled  to  allocate  funds  to  properly  fight  the  war,  and  was  usually  more  
concerned  with  domestic  affairs  and  creating  a  more  ‘rightly  ordered  society.’  It  
must  be  remembered  that  mid-17th  century  England  was  a  revolutionary  state  
and  that  the  domestic  political  situation  was  constantly  evolving.  The  letters,  
House  of  Commons  Journal,  and  other  contemporaneous  documents  span  a  
breadth  of  concerns  for  the  English  government.  Not  least  among  these  was  
funding  such  a  government.  
Problems  with  taxation  were  not  a  uniquely  Spanish  problem;  England  too  
suffered  from  a  lack  of  funds  flowing  to  the  government.  The  budget  which  the  
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Humble  Petition  and  Advice  put  forward  set  aside  one  million  pounds  for  the  
military  and  only  300,000  for  all  other  expenses  of  government.   That  same  102
article  established  that  such  funds  were  not  to  be  collected  through  the  hated  
land  tax,  but  the  reality  forced  them  to  ignore  that  provision.  With  such  tension  
regarding  funding  an  adequate  government,  the  Protectorate  could  ill  afford  
economic  collapse.  Financial  ruin  called  into  question  the  regime’s  legitimacy.  
For  this  reason,  they  had  to  reconcile  the  Spanish  war  to  the  economic  hardship  
felt  by  English  merchants  
It  was  devastating  to  merchants  for  two  main  reasons.  Despite  blockades  
at  Cadiz  and  the  seizure  of  Jamaica,  trade  with  England  had  been  embargoed  by  
Spain,  a  move  which  was  felt  harshly  by  the  English  merchants  in  Madrid  and  
London.  The  English  found  markets  closed  to  them  and  goods  no  longer  
available.  If  the  financial  pressure  was  not  enough,  the  second  mechanism  which  
Spain  deployed  to  target  the  English  economy  was  privateering.  Indeed,  the  
military  threat  to  all  English  shipping  presented  by  the  Dunkirk  privateers  was  
also  devastating.  Although  history  tends  to  favor  the  exploits  of  English,  French,  
and  Dutch  privateers  in  the  Caribbean,  these  Spanish-backed  Flemish  privateers  
were  equally  successful.  Having  finally  rid  themselves  of  that  threat,  the  
Protectorate  now  needed  to  turn  towards  peace  with  Spain  to  li   the  embargo  on  
English  shipping.  Had  Cromwell  survived  1658,  perhaps  the  English  could  have  
had  a  seat  at  the  table  for  the  coming  treaty  in  1659  and  shaped  a  peace  to  their  
102  Anonymous,  England  and  Wales  Parliament,  The  Humble  Petition  and  Advice,  London,  Printed  
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liking.  However,  the  reality  was  that  Cromwell  did  indeed  die.  For  the  next  
decade  war  without  conflict  and  peace  without  a  treaty  marked  the  
Anglo-Spanish  relationship.  The  failure  to  conclude  a  treaty  in  1658  or  1659  
created  an  opportunity  for  Spain  to  win  the  peace  in  1670.  
Cromwell’s  death,  despite  his  refusal  of  the  crown  in  May  of  1657,  was  
akin  to  the  death  of  a  monarch.  Despite  numerous  meetings  and  motions  in  
Parliament  in  1657,  the  issue  of  succession  had  never  truly  been  resolved.  Thus,  
while  Cromwell  lay  dying,  members  of  the  government  rushed  to  his  side  to  
extract  his  successor  from  him.  The  choice  was  unsurprising  if  not  disappointing;  
his  eldest  son  Richard  assumed  the  title  of  Lord  Protector.   Now,  although  103
Cromwell  had  refused  monarchy  in  1657,  its  specter  had  been  raised  again  in  
1658  ahead  of  calls  for  a  new  Parliament.  It  was  believed  by  some  to  be  the  only  
means  to  ensure  further  stability  within  the  nation  and  to  consolidate  the  
progress  which  they  had  made.   Before  his  death,  Cromwell  had  asked  General  104
Monck  to  serve  in  the  ‘Other’  house  of  Parliament  which  was  understood  to  be  a  
de  facto  House  of  Lords.  Monck’s  coy  refusal  to  do  so,  and  to  remain  at  his  power  
base  in  Scotland  reveals  that  Monck  may  have  already  been  preparing  for  his  role  
in  the  Restoration.  According  to  historian  C.H.  Firth’s  reading  of  Secretary  
Thurloe,  Cromwell  had  made  up  his  mind  in  1658  to  accept  the  position  of  king.  
In  that  context,  his  naming  of  Richard  as  successor  was  all  too  certain.  It  allowed  
103  "State  Papers,  1658:  September  (1  of  4),"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  
7,  March  1658  -  May  1660 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  (London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  369-380,  British  History  
Online .  




for  the  possibility  of  revising  history  and  naming  Cromwell  as  king  
posthumously,  and  Richard  his  heir.  However,  the  persistence  of  a  political  
climate  which  favored  monarchy  was  dangerous  considering  there  was  already  an  
English  monarch  across  the  channel.   
Indeed,  almost  immediately  following  the  death  of  Cromwell,  Thurloe  
notified  Cromwell’s  son  Henry  of  rumors  about  a  conspiracy  within  the  army.  
Secretary  Thurloe  feared  that  “there  are  some  secret  murmurings  in  the  army,  as  
if  his  highnes  were  not  generall  of  the  army,  as  his  father  was;  and  would  looke  
upon  him  and  the  army  as  divided.”  Thurloe  admitted  that  he  did  not  know  what  
such  thinking  could  lead  to,  but  that  it  did  not  bode  well  for  stability  in  the  
country.   The  year  prior,  Henry  Cromwell  was  concerned  about  the  growing  105
intimacy  between  General  Lambert,  who  had  opposed  monarchy  the  year  before,  
General  Desborough,  and  General  Fleetwood.   If  the  connivance  of  3  106
Major-Generals  was  an  alarming  internal  problem,  the  Fleet’s  letter  to  Richard  in  
October  was  indicative  of  a  growing  external  threat.  The  Officers  of  Fleet  wrote  
to  the  new  Protector  swearing  “to  stand  by  you  to  the  hazard  of  life  and  estate,  
and  to  defend  you  against  Charles  Stuart  and  his  adherents,  and  all  who  
endeavour  to  place  the  legislative  authority  otherwise  than  in  a  single  person  and  
105  "State  Papers,  1658:  September  (1  of  4),"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  
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2  houses  of  Parliament.”   Clearly  the  Fleet  understood  the  vulnerability  of  the  107
Protectorate  following  the  death  of  its  first  Protector.  Indeed  Royalists  abroad  
felt  that  their  moment  was  nearing,  as  the  Earl  of  Norwich  wrote  in  December  
1658,  “We  hear  of  great  disorders  in  England,  and...  Letters  from  Brussels  say  our  
master's  business  in  England  was  never  in  so  fair  a  way  as  now...I  am  confident  
that  before  3  months  we  shall  hear  of  strange  changes.”   Indeed  strange  changes  108
came  to  pass  in  1659.   
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The  End  of  Spanish  Resistance   
The  most  important  development  of  the  Spanish  position  in  Jamaica  
actually  took  place  far  from  the  island  in  the  chamber  of  the  Council  of  the  
Indies.  It  was  in  1659  that  they  finally  decided  to  hold  a  formal  inquiry  into  the  
situation  in  Jamaica  and  what  steps  could  be  taken  to  recover  the  island.  The  
main  testimony  before  the  council  was  given  by  Francisco  de  Leiva  Isassi,  don  
Cristobal’s  brother.  The  questions  asked  and  responses  given  indicate  the  
fundamental  disconnect  between  the  ministers  of  the  council  and  the  situation  
on  the  island.  Technically  though,  the  Council  had  no  authority  or  jurisdiction  
over  the  island  and  never  had.  Recall  that  it  was  the  personal  domain  of  the  
descendants  of  Christopher  Columbus.  From  1494  on,  the  council  had  rarely  
made  any  inquiries  about  Jamaica  and  had  little  knowledge  of  the  island.  
The  report  created  by  the  Council  inquiry  began  with  a  recollection  of  the  
events  on  the  island  before  1659.  The  defeats  at  Las  Chorreras  and  Rio  Nuevo  are  
accounted  for,  and  significant  blame  is  placed  at  the  feet  of  Bayona  y  Villanueva  
and  de  los  Reyes.  This  is  unsurprising  considering  that  the  Governor  of  Jamaica’s  
brother  was  giving  the  testimony,  but  still  it  does  represent  an  important  
acknowledgment  of  their  guilt.  Where  Francisco  de  Leiva  Isassi  perhaps  went  too  
far  is  in  claiming  that  had  Bayona  y  Villanueva  complied  with  the  orders  given  to  
him,  Jamaica  would  undoubtedly  have  been  reclaimed.  At  Las  Chorreras  that  may  
have  been  true,  but  by  Rio  Nuevo  his  mere  compliance  was  not  enough.  The  
knowledge  that  such  a  situation  was  true  was  evidenced  by  the  council’s  pressing  
 
94  
of  Leiva  Isassi  to  indicate  what  size  force  was  necessary  to  reclaim  the  island.  
Leiva  Isassi  dodged  giving  a  direct  answer  and  only  stated  that  what  was  needed  
was  the  assembling  of  a  strong  naval  force  in  that  endeavor.  He  seemed  keenly  
aware  of  the  King  and  Council’s  reluctance  to  commit  too  many  men  to  the  
undertaking.  Instead,  Leiva  Isassi  proposed  a  plan  which  was  not  unlike  the  
Western  Design.  Some  men  and  ships  were  to  be  outfitted  in  Spain,  and  they  
were  to  be  substantially  augmented  by  troops  and  supplies  already  located  in  the  
Caribbean  before  making  for  Jamaica.  Perhaps  a  small  detachment  could  break  
off  from  the  already  scheduled  flotas  and  perform  such  a  task.  When  presented  
with  this  plan,  the  Council  chose  instead  to  counter  with  one  of  their  own  which  
required  a  different  investment  of  resources.  
Their  plan,  or  hope  really,  was  embodied  in  one  of  the  questions  they  
posed  to  Leiva  Isassi.  They  wondered  if  the  English  could  be  paid  to  abandoned  
Jamaica.  While  the  question  was  likely  an  honest  inquiry,  it  demonstrated  that  
the  Council  of  Indies  placed  the  English  control  over  Jamaica  within  the  context  
of  piratical  English  raids.  Underscoring  their  unwillingness  to  risk  manpower  
and  naval  power  from  Spain  directly  to  reclaim  the  island  was  this  fundamental  
misunderstanding  of  the  long  term  intentions  and  consequences  of  the  English  
seizure  of  Jamaica.  It  was  hard  for  these  council  members  to  conceive  of  an  
immediate  need  to  dispatch  the  armada  to  reclaim  the  island  if  they  believed  that  
the  English  might  just  as  well  abandon  it  once  they  recovered  whatever  plunder  
they  sought.   
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Moreover,  such  a  perspective  makes  plain  that  they  believed  the  island  to  
lack  any  foreseeable  value  either  to  themselves  or  to  the  English.  Historians  who  
seek  to  argue  that  the  loss  of  Jamaica  was  immediately  recognized  as  a  crushing  
blow  must  reckon  with  the  persistence  of  these  perspectives  four  years  a er  the  
initial  conquest  of  the  island.  Because  they  did  not  view  the  English  presence  on  
the  island  as  anything  more  than  an  existential  threat  to  hegemony  over  the  
Indies  they  were  not  prepared  to  risk  more  to  remove  that  threat.   
They  simply  did  not  recognize  or  fully  understand  the  potential  disruption  
the  English  in  Jamaica  could  cause.  This  Council  of  the  Indies  was  the  same  
council  which  notified  Philip  IV  of  growing  English,  Dutch,  and  French  presence  
in  the  Lesser  Antilles  without  recommending  any  measures  to  reverse  this  trend. 
  The  hegemony  over  the  Western  Hemisphere  which  Spain  claimed  was  not  109
understood  to  be  as  indefatigable  as  their  claim  over  Portugal.  Its  loss  was  
neither  as  bitterly  felt,  nor  as  fiercely  pursued.  So  while  the  English  on  Jamaica  
once  again  threatened  that  supposed  Spanish  monopoly  of  the  Americas,  Spanish  
men  were  not  to  be  sacrificed  for  that  cause  alone.  Men  like  Leiva  Isassi  resorted  
to  sounding  alarms  that  such  a  presence  posed  a  threat  to  shipping,  in  particular  
the  silver  fleets.  Yet,  anyone  aware  of  the  route  of  the  fleets  understood  that  the  
fleet  only  passed  Jamaica  on  its  way  to  pick  up  silver,  not  a er.  Moreover,  many  
believed  that  the  ‘miracle’  of  Santa  Cruz  could  be  repeated  should  the  fleets  come  
under  attack  again.  
109  Consejo  de  Indias,  “Consultas  Y  Pareceres  Dados  a  S.M.  En  Asuntos  de  Gobierno  de  Indias,  
Vol.  I,”  Consultas  Y  Pareceres  Dados  a  S.M.  En  Asuntos  Del  Gobierno  de  Indias,  1679,  
CODICES,L.752,  Archivo  Histórico  Nacional,  Madrid,  España.  
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Despite  all  this,  Leiva  Isassi  declined  to  answer  the  question  about  if  the  
English  could  be  bribed  to  give  up  Jamaica.  Yet  he  clearly  understood  what  the  
Council  members  wanted  to  hear;  he  responded,   
since  they  have  sown  in  the  island  and  are  reaping  its  fruits  and  carrying  
on  general  trade  it  seems  to  this  declarant  that  they  will  not  evacuate  it  for  
any  inducement  on  account  of  the  many  interests  and  concerns  they  have  
there,  but  that  with  the  death  of  Cromwell  it  may  be  that  the  Commanders  
have  been  changed  and  some  negotiation  can  be  attempted  with  them.  110
By  1659,  it  was  clear  to  colonial  officials  that  the  English  were  setting  up  a  stable  
colony  on  the  island,  much  like  their  islands  in  the  Lesser  Antilles.  However,  
there  was  still  some  hope  that  a  change  in  government  might  produce  the  return  
of  Jamaica  to  Spanish  control.  A er  all,  the  Treaty  of  Brussels  established  that  
should  Charles  return  to  the  throne  of  England,  Jamaica  was  to  be  Spanish  again.  
Most  scholarship  only  considers  that  treaty  in  how  it  shaped  Anglo-Spanish  
relations  a er  the  Restoration,  but  fails  to  consider  its  impact  on  those  same  
relations  before  that  time.  Such  failures  in  the  scholarship  leave  one  perplexed  as  
to  why  the  death  of  Cromwell  made  waiting  the  preferred  method  of  
‘reconquering’  Jamaica.  For  reasons  that  will  become  clearer  in  the  next  section,  
the  conclusion  of  peace  with  France  in  1659  did  mean  Spanish  attention  was  
directed  towards  another  enemy.  However,  Portugal  came  into  the  Spanish  
crosshairs,  not  the  English,  and  certainly  not  English  Jamaica.   
Meanwhile,  Isassi’s  position  on  Jamaica  was  becoming  completely  
untenable.  Isassi  found  himself  desperately  low  on  many  necessities.  In  letters  to  
110  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz,  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  94.  
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Bayona  y  Villanueva,  he  demands  beef  in  an  almost  childlike  manner,  perhaps  as  
a  sign  of  in  what  regard  he  held  Bayona  y  Villanueva.  He  wrote,  “I  have  very  little  
beef,  so  you  will  supply  me  for  I  have  not  enough  for  six  days.  If  you  do  not  help  
me,  we  shall  be  in  a  bad  state  for  beef  is  what  is  needed.  Supply  me  with  beef.”  111
As  usual  any  aid  was  going  to  be  slow  coming  and  records  indicate  that  for  the  
first  time  in  3  years  no  relief  entered  the  island.  Having  committed  himself  to  
small-scale  guerilla-style  warfare,  Isassi  went  to  the  southern  portion  of  Jamaica  
to  harass  the  heavily  fortified  English  presence  there.  He  claimed  to  the  King  to  
have  had  some  success  but  there  appears  to  be  no  such  evidence  of  these  attacks  
in  the  English  sources.  So,  with  his  small  band  of  fi y  men,  Isassi  could  still  
claim  to  fulfill  his  orders  in  maintaining  a  presence  on  the  island.  However,  it  
was  clear  to  anyone  with  authority  that  only  with  a  change  of  the  English  
government  could  control  of  the  island  change  hands.  
As  was  mentioned,  by  1659  the  English  had  truly  established  their  
presence  on  the  island.  It  is  in  this  year  that  we  see  the  central  internal  tension  
that  defined  the  next  decade  in  Jamaica,  take  root.  On  the  one  hand,  the  planting  
interest  was  on  the  rise  as  evidenced  by  new  requests  for  wives  to  join  their  
husbands  on  the  island.   This  demonstrated  that  there  was  a  belief  in  England  112
at  the  time,  at  least  among  some  people,  that  the  island  was  both  safe  and  
respectable  enough  for  these  women  to  desire  to  go  there.  This  is  further  
111  Ibid,  78.  
112  Great  Britain,  Public  Record  Office,  William  Noel  Sainsbury,  Sir  John  William  Fortescue,  Cecil  
Headlam,  Arthur  Percival  Newton,  and  Kenneth  Gordon  Davies,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  
Series:  America  &  West  Indies  1574-1660 ,  Longman,  Green,  Longman  &  Roberts,  1860,  476.  
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demonstrated  by  increased  interest  in  the  creation  of  a  West  India  Trading  
Company  amongst  government  officials  in  London.  While  the  creation  of  this  
company  did  not  come  to  fruition,  it  was  still  an  important  indicator  of  the  
change  occurring  on  the  island.  What  many  had  previously  been  seen  as  a  thorny  
consolation  prize  of  a  failed  military  expedition  was  becoming  an  opportunity  
worthy  of  investment.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  then  that  the  first  officially  
documented  slave  importation  under  English  occupation  was  in  1659.  113
Directly  opposed  to  the  planting  interest  was  the  privateer  or  
buccaneering  interest  in  the  colony.  The  ongoing  guerrilla  resistance  of  the  
Spanish,  as  well  as  the  maroon  and  free-blacks,  meant  that  substantial  military  
resources  congregated  around  Jamaica.  There  were  also  the  persistent  rumors  of  
an  impending  Spanish  invasion  of  the  island  which  required  a  constant  patrol  of  
ships  circulating  around  the  island.  Crewing  these  ships  and  manning  the  forts  
were  men  o en  found  wanting  by  their  commanding  officers.  Moreover,  as  early  
as  1657,  Jamaican  commanders  such  as  Lt.  General  Brayne  had  to  send  out  
soldiers  to  ‘make  their  own  way’  as  it  were  by  engaging  in  activities  like  hunting.  
However,  his  predecessor,  Major  Sedgwicke,  had  also  described  these  men  as  
lazy.  It  was  well-known  that  these  soldiers  were  generally  uninterested  in  
planting,  and  occasionally  deserted  rather  than  work  on  a  plantation.   114
It  is  thus  not  difficult  to  comprehend  why  such  men  preferred  to  be  a  
113  David  Eltis  and  Martin  Halbert,  Voyages:  The  Trans-Atlantic  Slave  Trade  Databas, .  Emory  
University,  2008.  
114  Great  Britain.  Public  Record  Office,  William  Noel  Sainsbury,  Sir  John  William  Fortescue,  Cecil  
Headlam,  Arthur  Percival  Newton,  and  Kenneth  Gordon  Davies.  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  
Series:  America  &  West  Indies  1574-1660 ,  Longman,  Green,  Longman  &  Roberts,  1860,  109.  
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privateer  or  buccaneer.  These  would-be  privateers  found  a  receptive  ear  in  the  
person  of  Captain  Christopher  Myngs,  the  captain  of  the  Marston  Moor ,  who  had  
arrived  to  command  the  Jamaica  station  in  1656.  Much  like  the  relationship  
between  Isassi  and  Bayona  y  Villanueva,  Myngs  and  D’Oyley  were  men  at  odds  
with  one  another.  While  they  both  sought  to  make  Jamaica  safe  and  profitable,  
Myngs  was  more  interested  in  securing  profit  first  and  foremost.  In  1659  he  
chartered  a  course  towards  the  Spanish  Main  much  like  Vice-Admiral  Goodson’s  
4  years  earlier.   
Myngs’  resulting  raids  on  the  towns  of  Cumaná  and  Coro  on  the  northern  
part  of  South  America  were  materially  far  more  successful  than  Goodson’s  had  
been  and  ushered  in  the  creation  of  Jamaica’s  reputation  as  a  haven  for  the  
privateering  sort.  Although  the  inhabitants  in  these  towns  had  fled  into  the  bush  
at  the  sight  of  the  ships,  taking  their  valuables  with  them,  2  Dutch  ships  flying  
Spanish  flags  were  unable  to  escape  Myngs’  fleet.  Estimates  of  the  haul  state  that  
Myngs’  raids  captured  between  £200,000-£300,000  with  the  majority  coming  from  
silver  ingots  inside  two  chests  seized  aboard  the  Dutch  vessels.   It  may  be  115
tempting  to  suggest  that  this  was  another  devastating  blow  to  royal  coffers,  but  it  
must  be  remembered  that  silver  destined  for  Spanish  ports  did  not  mean  it  was  
destined  for  Spanish  hands.  In  any  event  though,  it  marked  a  huge  success  for  the  
privateering  interest  in  Jamaica  and  London  and  proved  that  significant  gains  
could  be  achieved  through  this  policy.  However,  the  raid  was  not  without  
115  Jon  Latimer,  Buccaneers  of  the  Caribbean:  How  Piracy  Forged  an  Empire ,  Cambridge,  
Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  2009,  131.  
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controversy,  and  though  it  has  never  been  conclusively  proven  it  is  believed  
Myngs  divvied  up  the  spoils  with  his  officers  and  crew  before  returning  to  
Jamaica.  D’Oyley  condemned  the  action  and  sent  Myngs  back  to  London.  This  
was  not  the  end  of  the  now  infamous  Captain,  and  he  returned  to  plague  the  
Spanish  Caribbean.  
But  perhaps  the  most  critical  development  in  Jamaica  was  the  English  
discovery  of  a  Black  Resistance  community  in  the  center  of  Jamaica.  It  is  
hypothesized  that  during  the  previous  4  years,  these  communities  had  supplied  
needed  food  to  Isassi’s  men  on  their  way  to  ambush  English  forces.  As  evidence  
for  this,  historians  cite  the  settlement,  or  pelinco ,  of  Juan  de  Bolas.  Covering  
roughly  200  acres  of  farmland,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  think  that  it  provided  
food  for  more  than  just  the  inhabitants  surrounding  it.  Crucially,  it  was  this  
settlement  that  English  forces  under  the  command  of  Lt.  Col.  Tyson  stumbled  
upon  in  late  1659.  They  had  known  that  there  were  3  main  settlements  that  made  
up  the  Black  Resistance  in  Jamaica,  and  now,  having  discovered  one,  the  English  
were  ready  to  find  the  other  two.  To  do  so  they  brought  the  leader  of  that  
particular  community,  de  Bolas,  to  Port  Cagway  to  parlay.   With  their  greatest  116
advantage  now  neutralized,  de  Bolas  recognized  the  need  to  join  forces  with  the  
English  to  ensure  his  community’s  survival  and  autonomy.  The  English  promised  
to  respect  the  sovereignty  of  that  community  under  Juan  de  Bolas  in  exchange  for  
de  Bolas  leading  his  men  against  the  other  two  communities.  In  the  coming  year,  
116  Noël  W.  Sainsbury,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  Series,  Preserved  In...  the  Public  Record  




his  faction  of  the  Black  Resistance  definitively  turned  the  tide  for  England  and  
helped  determine  the  next  phase  of  Jamaican  history.   
1659:  the  European  Context  
Similar  period-defining  events  occurred  in  Europe  as  well  in  1659,  whose  
effects  only  entered  the  Caribbean  context  in  the  next  decade,  if  at  all.  1659  
harkened  the  end  of  Richard  Cromwell  and  hastened  the  Restoration.  This  year  
also  saw  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Spanish  War  with  the  Treaty  of  the  
Pyrenees.  The  fact  that  these  two  processes  occurred  independently  of  each  other  
had  explicit  consequences  for  Anglo-Spanish  relations  especially  in  regard  to  
Jamaica.  The  domestic  situation  in  England  was  running  its  own  course,  
surprisingly  independent  of  foreign  intervention  which  ensured  that  Spain  did  
not  play  a  decisive  role  in  restoring  Charles  to  the  throne.  In  their  Treaty  of  
Brussels,  Spain  was  called  to  militarily  support  Charles’  restoration  and  
a erward,  King  Charles  II  was  to  renounce  the  English  presence  in  the  Americas.  
In  previous  years,  military  intervention  in  domestic  English  affairs  was  deemed  
impossible  due  to  the  war  with  France.  In  1659,  that  war  was  concluded  with  the  
Treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  and  intervention  was  plausible.  However,  events  within  
England  seemed  to  make  that  intervention  neither  necessary  nor  desirable.   
The  political  situation  in  England  became  volatile  almost  upon  the  
ascension  of  Richard  Cromwell  to  the  title  of  Lord  Protector.  As  has  been  
explained,  Richard  represented  the  logical  choice  for  succession  from  a  
monarchical  perspective.  If  that  perspective  is  changed  though,  other  options  
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were  quite  viable.  For  example,  Henry  Cromwell  was  undoubtedly  the  better  
Cromwellian  candidate  for  a  hereditary  Protectorate.  His  experience  governing  
in  Ireland  made  him  an  appealing  option.  However,  he  was  in  Ireland,  had  almost  
no  base  of  support  in  England,  and  did  not  desire  the  position  himself.  There  was  
a  relative  of  Oliver  Cromwell  who  may  have  coveted  the  title,  that  person  being  
Major-General  Charles  Fleetwood.  He  too  had  experience  governing  Ireland,  was  
located  in  England,  and  had  the  respect  of  the  army.  Naming  Fleetwood  his  
successor  could  have  ensured  the  stability  of  the  Protectorate,  but  it  could  have  
just  as  easily  cost  it  its  legitimacy.  It  would  essentially  solidify  the  Protectorate  as  
a  military  rather  than  a  civilian  government.  Indeed,  both  he  and  Henry  were  not  
satisfactory  candidates;  the  political  tide  had  turned  away  from  the  military  
towards  the  civilian  since  the  end  of  the  ‘Rule  of  the  Major-Generals’  and  the  
adoption  of  the  Humble  Petition  and  Advice .  
Sensing  and  fearing  this  turn,  Fleetwood  moved  towards  the  end  of  1658  to  
solidify  his  role  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army.  Even  though  Richard  had  
not  shown  any  indication  to  replace  him  or  place  anyone  above  him,  Fleetwood  
wanted  to  consolidate  his  place  in  the  political  system.   Fleetwood  claimed  that  117
his  maneuvering  was  not  in  defiance  or  opposition  to  Richard,  but  those  in  the  
army,  supposedly  his  army,  saw  the  opportunity  to  question  Richard’s  legitimacy.  
In  one  of  several  letters  to  Henry  Cromwell  at  this  time,  Secretary  Thurloe  wrote,  
117  “Letter  from  John  Thurloe  to  Henry  Cromwell,”  in  "State  Papers,  1658:  November  (1  of  5),"  in  A  
Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  7,  March  1658  -  May  1660 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  
(London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  488-500.  British  History  Online .  
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“Sometymes  the  fire  seemes  to  be  out;  then  it  kindles  againe.”   That  “fire,”  was  118
the  ‘Good  Old  Cause’  and  it  came  roaring  back  in  1659.  
Ambiguously  defined,  the  so-called  ‘Good  Old  Cause’  was  associated  with  
the  sovereignty  of  Parliament  in  a  ‘Free-State’  and  the  rejection  of  the  arbitrary  
power  represented  by  kings,  lords,  and  bishops.  Army  officers  like  Fleetwood  and  
John  Lambert,  alongside  political  figures  like  Arthur  Haselrig,  felt  that  the  
Humble  Petition  and  Advice  had  thrust  such  arbitrary  power  back  to  the  fore.  As  
evidence,  they  cited  the  creation  of  the  ‘Other  House,’  which  was  the  House  of  
Lords  in  all  but  name,  and  the  debate  of  Cromwell  taking  the  crown.  
Underscoring  this  tension  was  the  fact  that  payments  for  the  army  and  navy  were  
both  well  in  arrears,  and  new  revenue  was  a  necessity,  revenue  which  could  only  
be  called  for  by  Parliament.  The  need  then,  was  for  a  Parliament  that  ensured  the  
payment  of  those  arrears  without  using  any  arbitrary  powers.  Richard  as  
Protector  and  the  ‘Other  House’  were  thus  cast  as  impediments  to  securing  this  
end.   
Thus,  once  Parliament  was  convened  at  the  end  of  January  1659,  the  
process  of  stripping  Richard  Cromwell  of  power  and  dismantling  the  
Protectorate  along  with  him  began.  First,  was  the  call  to  reaffirm  Richard  as  Lord  
Protector.  Though  the  vote  passed  and  he  retained  his  title,  the  debates  served  to  
seriously  undermine  his  authority  and  legitimacy.  Moreover,  it  branched  out  into  
debates  which  called  into  question  the  organization  of  the  Parliament  with  
118   “Letter  from  John  Thurloe  to  Henry  Cromwell,”  in  "State  Papers,  1658:  November  (2  of  5),"  in  
A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  7,  March  1658  -  May  1660 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  
(London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  501-510.  British  History  Online .  
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regard  to  the  ‘Other  House.’  Essentially,  a  faction  within  Parliament  dedicated  
itself  at  the  start  of  1659  to  the  repudiation  and  destruction  of  the  Government  of  
the  Three  Nations  under  the  Humble  Petition  and  Advice .  Finding  themselves  
numerous  but  not  the  majority,  their  attempts  at  using  the  House  of  Commons  to  
control  the  entirety  of  government  were  unsuccessful.   
Their  allies  in  the  Army  were,  therefore,  necessary  to  enact  their  vision  for  
the  future  of  the  Three  Nations,  that  is  the  Three  Nations  organized  under  the  
sovereignty  of  the  Commons.  In  April  then,  Fleetwood  called  for  a  meeting  of  
army  officers  to  air  their  grievances  with  the  current  state  of  the  nation.  The  
officers  petitioned  Richard,  asserting  that  they  were  for  the  ‘Good  Old  Cause,’  
which  they  consciously  associated  with  the  payment  of  their  arrears.   Fearing  119
that  he  was  losing  his  grip  on  the  nation,  Richard  called  a  general  muster  later  
that  same  month.  Unfortunately,  the  nation  did  not  rally  to  Richard’s  banner  and  
he  was  from  then  on,  effectively  neutralized  in  politics.  The  uneasy  alliance  of  
Fleetwood  and  Haselrig  reinstated  the  Rump  Parliament,  which  had  last  met  in  
April  of  1653,  on  6  May  1659.  While  many  a  true  republican  might  have  been  
overjoyed,  the  move  did  not  produce  the  desired  outcome.  Agents  of  the  
would-be  King  watched  the  affairs  intently  and  reported  back  to  Charles  that  the  
nation  was  divided  to  their  benefit.  A  royalist  minister  by  the  name  of  John  
Barwick  observed  that  what  once  appeared  as  one  party  was,  in  fact,  three;  there  
119  Anonymous.  To  His  Highness  Richard  Lord  Protector  of  the  Common-Wealth  of  England,  Scotland,  
and  Ireland,  and  the  Dominions  and  Territories  Thereunto  Belonging  the  Humble  Representation  and  
Petition  of  the  General  Council  of  the  Officers  of  the  Armies  of  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland .  London,  
Printed  by  Henry  Hills...,  1659.  
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were  the  senior  officers  which  preferred  the  Protectorate  and  Richard  as  ‘puppet’,  
the  junior  officers  in  support  of  the  Long  Parliament,  and  the  MPs  in  favor  of  
that  same  Parliament  but  without  the  interference  of  the  Army.  120
So  when  Fleetwood  found  the  Rump  not  to  his  liking,  he  disbanded  
Parliament  in  the  Autumn.  The  decision  was  fatal  to  English  Republicanism.  To  
simplify  the  political  landscape  at  the  time,  it  might  be  helpful  to  consider  four  
key  factions.  One  being  the  former  cavaliers  and  royalists  who  supported  the  
restoration  of  Charles  Stuart.  Another  group  supporting  the  Protectorate,  with  
some  supporting  its  evolution  into  a  new  Cromwellian  Monarchy.  Then  there  
were  those  who  were  in  the  Rump,  or  who  supported  it,  and  believed  in  the  ‘Good  
Old  Cause’  and  looked  to  the  United  Provinces  as  their  model.   Finally,  there  121
was  the  army;  being  such  a  massive  group,  they  naturally  found  themselves  also  
spread  out  amongst  the  other  three  factions  but  generally  threw  their  support  to  
whomever  could  pay  their  long-overdue  salaries.  Fleetwood’s  dismissal  of  the  
Rump  shattered  this  political  scene  sending  the  fractured  pieces  into  new  camps.  
Whereas  in  May,  the  Army  and  Rump  were  allies,  and  the  army  itself  
united,  by  November  no  such  unity  existed.  The  Senior  Army  Officers,  like  
Lambert  and  Fleetwood,  sought  to  foster  stability  through  the  creation  of  a  
Committee  of  Public  Safety  headed  by  themselves.  This  drew  a  stern  rebuke  from  
120  “Mr.  John  Barwick  to  Sir  Edward  Hyde.”  in  "State  Papers,  1659:  May,"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  
Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  7,  March  1658  -  May  1660 ,  ed.  Thomas  Birch  (London:  Fletcher  
Gyles,  1742),  666-678,  British  History  Online .  
121  Lyon  Freeman,  The  Common-Wealths  Catechism.  Published  to  Inform  the  Good  and  Plain  People  of  
This  Common-Wealth,  in  Arms,  and  out  of  Arms,  and  to  Prevent  the  Designes  of  Hypocritical  Ambition.  
Humbly  Dedicated  to  the  Members  of  Parliament,  and  Their  General  Monck,  London,  Printed  by  John  
Clowes,  1659.  
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junior  officers  as  well  as  the  Army  of  Scotland,  led  by  General  Monck.  Indeed,  
Monck  indicated  that  while  he  did  not  want  continued  civil  war,  he  was  prepared  
to  engage  in  it  if  the  Long  Parliament  was  not  restored.   Adding  to  the  122
uncertainty  were  members  of  the  general  public  who  pleaded  with  Fleetwood  to  
restore  the  Rump  and  avoid  exercising  arbitrary  power.  There  were  even  those  
who  questioned  what  right  he,  or  Lambert,  had  to  call  any  such  Parliaments  
going  forward.  Those  people  recognized  that  an  army  general  calling  Parliament  
to  order  was  a  military  government  with  the  trappings  of  the  ‘Good  Old  Cause.’  
This  situation  had  made  the  more  monarchical  side  of  the  spectrum  bolder  in  
their  public  appearance,  both  Cromwellian  and  Royalist.  
By  the  end  of  1659,  Richard  tried  to  reinsert  himself  into  the  political  
scene  as  Lord  Protector  by  invoking  one  of  Aesop’s  fables,  that  of  Zeus  and  the  
Frogs.  Richard  deliberately  and  explicitly  cast  himself  as  ‘King  Log’  thus  
resurrecting  the  specter  of  a  Cromwellian  dynasty,  albeit  a  far  less  frightening  
prospect.  However,  the  analogy  and  the  earnest  attempt  it  represented  failed  to  
lead  to  the  desired  outcome.  This  was  probably  because  Richard  was  appealing  to  
the  Stork,  not  the  Frogs.  The  failure  of  his  ‘Humble  Petition’  was  truly  Richard’s  
exit  and  the  ultimate  end  of  the  Protectorate  as  a  model  of  government.  With  
Richard,  and  therefore  the  Protectorate,  no  longer  a  viable  option  for  the  Three  
Nations,  General  Monck  had  precious  few  options  when  he  began  his  march  to  
122  George  Monck,  Duke  Of  Albemarle,  Three  Letters  from  the  Lord  General  Monck,  Commander  in  
Chief  of  the  Forces  in  Scotland,  and  One  of  the  Commissioners  by  Act  of  Parliament  for  the  Government  
of  the  Army  of  This  Commonwealth,  Viz.  to  Mr.  Speaker,  to  the  Lord  Fleetwood,  to  the  Lord  Lambert ,  
Edinburgh,  printed  by  Christopher  Higgins,  in  Harts  Close,  over  against  the  Trone  Church,  1659.  
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London.  Many  desired  his  intervention  though,  as  they  saw  their  cause  reflected  
in  his  personage.   
This  destabilization  was  naturally  viewed  by  Charles  and  his  supporters  as  
extremely  favorable  to  their  cause,  but  not  without  its  own  perils.  There  was  a  
fear  that  the  internal  turmoil  could  cause  England  to  seek  a  peace  with  Spain,  
thus  stripping  Charles  of  a  key  ally.  Indeed  there  was  an  ambassador  sent  for  just  
such  a  purpose.  Meanwhile,  within  England,  speculators  worried  how  their  
current  political  situation  alienated  their  French  allies,  or  any  other  foreign  
powers  interested  in  partnering  with  them.   Lockhart,  the  English  ambassador  123
to  France,  traveled  to  Dunkirk  and  then  requested  to  leave  his  post  and  return  to  
England  upon  hearing  of  the  restoration  of  the  Rump.  The  Dutch  meanwhile,  
sought  to  reaffirm  their  friendship  with  England,  despite  a  period  of  rising  
tensions,  due  primarily  to  the  Dutch  relationship  with  Spain.  A er  Fleetwood’s  
dismissal  of  the  Rump  though,  the  famous  Admiral  De  Ruyter  angrily  notified  
Ambassador  Nieuport  not  to  trust  any  further  treaties  or  alliances  with  England,  
“till  I  see  some  effects  of  those  conventions,  which  we  have  already  made  with  
that  state.”   124
At  the  same  time,  the  French  had  turned  their  attention  from  England  
towards  the  all-important  peace  with  Spain.  The  internal  English  situation  meant  
that  Spain,  for  the  first  time  since  1656,  could  afford  to  look  at  affairs  in  England  
123  Anonymous.  The  Good  Old  Cause  Explained,  Revived,  &  Asserted... .  London,  s.n.,  1659.  
124  “De  Witt  to  Nieupoort,  the  Dutch  ambassador  in  England,”  in  "State  Papers,  1659:  October  (2  
of  2),"  in  A  Collection  of  the  State  Papers  of  John  Thurloe,  Volume  7,  March  1658  -  May  1660 ,  ed.  
Thomas  Birch  (London:  Fletcher  Gyles,  1742),  763-771,  British  History  Online .  
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as  a  distant  concern.  Looking  back  on  1659,  King  Philip  remarked,  “the  affairs  of  
that  Kingdom  are  in  such  turmoil  with  each  other,  that  while  their  unrest  lasts  
they  will  not  bother  us  much…”   The  turmoil  which  Philip  IV  cited  provided  a  125
convenient  excuse  to  avoid  dispatching  relief  from  Spain  to  Jamaica.  
Furthermore,  it  led  Philip  IV  to  believe  that  the  bargain  he  struck  with  Charles  II  
was  about  to  come  to  fruition.  Also,  both  Spain  and  France  were  ready  to  
negotiate  with  each  other  without  worrying  so  much  about  England’s  place  in  the  
treaty.  For  France,  the  simmering  conflict  between  England  and  Spain  to  France’s  
west  freed  them  up  to  pursue  their  own  interests  on  their  eastern  border.   
Spain  pursued  the  end  of  24  years  of  war  for  much  the  same  reason  as  
France,  in  a  sense.  Peace  with  France  was  essential  to  pursuing  Philip  IV’s  
ultimate  aims  in  Europe  and  his  obligations  as  a  Habsburg  Monarch.  Peace  on  
their  eastern  border  gave  them  a  free  hand  to  pursue  the  final  thrust  for  Iberian  
unification.  The  24  years  of  inconclusive  warfare  in  which  they  had  been  engaged  
had  fundamentally  sunk  Spain.  The  French  war  had  destabilized  Spain  
domestically  (i.e.  Castilla  and  Aragon)  and  threatened  to  separate  her  from  her  
important  European  possessions  in  Italy  and  Flanders.  However,  the  greatest  and  
most  enduring  losses  that  Spain  suffered  as  a  result  of  this  war  were  dealt  to  
them  by  England  and  Portugal.  Dunkirk,  Jamaica,  and  the  whole  of  Portugal  were  
lost  forever  to  Spain.  At  the  time  though,  the  permanence  of  these  losses  was  not  
imminently  apparent.  Rather,  from  the  Spanish  perspective,  it  all  seemed  to  be  
125  Ibid ,  607.  
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within  reach  through  peace  with  France  In  September  1659,  with  the  Treaty  of  
the  Pyrenees  nearing  its  completion,  France  broke  off  its  military  commitments  
to  England.  In  Madrid  it  was  rumored  that  in  the  coming  days  the  Spanish  
Governor  of  Flanders  was  going  to  enter  Dunkirk  and  see  it  peacefully  returned  
to  Spain.   126
The  appeal  of  recovering  from  the  greatest  losses  to  Spanish  prestige  and  
power  was  too  strong  to  be  denied.  Therefore  it  was  imperative  for  Spain  to  seize  
the  opportunity  offered  by  Mazarin  and  France.  To  such  an  end,  King  Philip  
offered  his  daughter,  the  Infanta  Maria  Theresa,  as  the  bride  of  Louis  XIV.  King  
Philip,  in  being  so  eager  for  peace,  had  ordered  his  ambassador  in  Paris  to  agree  
to  much  of  the  treaty  as  early  as  the  end  of  April.   The  territorial  losses  of  Artois  127
and  Roussillon,  while  major,  were  far  more  palatable  when  seen  in  the  larger  
context.  From  the  perspective  of  traditional  Habsburg  policy,  King  Philip  could  
claim  to  still  be  preserving  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Habsburg  monarchy  by  
not  losing  the  entirety  of  the  dominions  which  those  cities  were  a  part  of.  By  
concluding  a  peace  now,  in  1659,  King  Philip  was  ensuring  that  the  bleeding  
stopped  there  and  that  losses  stopped  on  other  fronts,  namely  Portugal.  The  
centrality  of  Portugal  in  King  Philip’s  domestic  and  foreign  policy  should  not  be  
forgotten.  In  the  secret  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  the  Pyrenees,  France  agreed  to  
cut  off  aid  to  Portugal,  and  to  cease  harboring  Portuguese  ‘rebels.’  France  also  
126  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo,  Avisos  de  D.  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo  (1654-1658):  precede  una  noticia  de  
la  vida  y  escritos  del  autor ,  M.  Tello,  1893,  248.  
127  María  de  Jesús  de  Ágreda,  Francisco  Silvela,  y  Felipe  IV  Rey  de  España,  Cartas  de  La  Venerable  
Madre  Sor  María  de  Agreda  Y  Del  Señor  Rey  Don  Felipe  IV ,  Est.  tipográfico“  Sucesores  de  
Rivadeneyra,”  2013,  576. 
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agreed  to  stop  supporting  England  in  its  war  against  Spain.  These  secret  articles  
should  have  therefore  provided  Spain  with  the  free  hand  it  needed  to  deal  with  
both  kingdoms  swi ly  and  definitively.  First  Portugal  would  be  retaken,  then  
Dunkirk  and  finally  even  Jamaica.   
However,  the  Treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  is  o en  regarded  as  unimportant  
primarily  because  it  did  not  provide  the  long  term  peace  which  it  should  have.  
Despite  the  centrality  of  the  Habsburg-Bourbon  marriage,  France  proved  
unmoved  to  respect  the  sovereignty  and  borders  of  their  new  in-laws.  Moreover,  
the  impending  Restoration  did  not  usher  in  swi   peace  with  England  as  it  should  
have.  As  will  be  seen,  once  Charles  was  given  control  of  Great  Britain  he  charted  
a  political  course  that  matched  his  new  role  as  king  better  than  his  former  role  of  
exile.  What  this  meant  for  Jamaica  was  that  the  promise  of  having  it  handed  over  
on  behalf  of  Charles  II  had  to  be  abandoned.  The  difficult  work  of  planning,  
preparing,  and  executing  a  reinvasion  of  the  island  had  to  be  carried  out.  This  
could  only  take  place  once  Portugal  had  been  reunited  with  Spain.  The  English  
and  French  both  continued  to  work  against  Spain  on  the  Portuguese  front  
effectively  keeping  Spanish  power  from  crossing  the  Atlantic.  
1660  Prior  to  the  Restoration  
Back  in  Jamaica,  the  turbulence  of  England  and  the  resolution  between  
France  and  Spain  had  little  impact  on  the  internal  conflict  still  gripping  the  
island.  King  Philip’s  relief  at  the  political  situation  of  England  was  indicative  of  
how  little  he  factored  Jamaica  into  his  vision.  When  King  Philip  thought  of  
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Jamaica  at  all,  it  was  inextricably  linked  to  his  treaty  with  Charles  II  and  his  
restoration.  This  in  part  explains  why  1660  was  not  the  year  in  which  we  see  a  
Spanish  armada  outfitted  to  rendezvous  with  Governor  Isassi  and  retake  the  
island.  The  restoration  of  Jamaica  to  Spain  could  be  worked  out  by  diplomats,  not  
generals.  As  a  result,  this  year  marks  the  anticlimactic  end  of  Isassi’s  resistance.   
Isassi  was  steadfastly  committed  to  the  idea  that  he  could  lead  and  execute  
a  guerrilla  resistance  until  a  larger  sea-borne  force  relieved  him.  To  that  end,  he  
remained  on  the  island  with  his  men,  including  a  special  military  advisor  named  
Juan  de  Tovar,  also  committed  to  the  cause.  These  two  leaders  found  themselves  
completely  outmatched  by  Juan  de  Bolas  by  midyear.  Recall  that  in  1659,  de  Bolas  
and  his  pelinco  had  been  stumbled  upon  by  the  English.  As  part  of  his  
arrangement  with  the  English,  de  Bolas  agreed  to  pursue  and  destroy  the  other  
Black  Resistance  communities  as  well  as  the  Spanish  Resistance.  Unfortunately  
for  the  other  two  main  Black  Resistance  communities  and  the  Spaniards,  de  Bolas  
had  all  the  information  necessary  to  rapidly  carry  that  out.   
It’s  unclear  when  exactly  the  two  other  Black  settlements  were  attacked  by  
de  Bolas,  but  by  February  1660,  word  of  his  alliance  reached  the  Spaniards.  
Although  they  had  not  yet  met  de  Bolas  in  open  conflict,  the  Spaniards  were  well  
aware  they  were  doomed.  On  22  February  they  resolved  to  leave  Jamaica  stating,   
...in  view  of  the  news  that  had  been  received  that  the  settlement  of  Juan  
Lubolo  had  joined  the  enemy.  All  the  Captains  present  were  of  the  opinion  that  
the  island  should  be  abandoned  for  the  reason  that  the  negroes  are  so  
experienced  and  acquainted  with  the  mountains  that  no  success  could  be  
obtained  there  but  that  we  were  all  exposed  to  the  known  risk  of  being  murdered  
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without  escape.   128
Just  the  mere  fact  that  the  Black  Resistance  had  allied  with  English  was  enough  
to  make  the  Spanish  surrender.  It  was  at  this  point  that  the  leadership  
understood  well  that  these  communities  were  not,  and  had  never  truly  been,  
under  their  command.  With  that  support  withdrawn,  they  knew  their  cause  was  
lost  and  their  choice  was  between  death  or  departure.  Just  four  days  later,  their  
fear  came  to  fruition  as  they  were  routed  by  de  Bolas  with  the  loss  of  roughly  140  
men.  At  this  point,  Lt.  Col.  Tyson  offered  terms  to  Isassi  and  the  process  of  
evacuating  the  island  began.  The  importance  of  the  Black  Resistance  in  the  
overall  schema  of  Spanish  Resistance  is  evidenced  by  just  how  quickly  the  
Spanish  surrendered  upon  hearing  of  their  defection  to  the  English.  Isassi  and  
the  fi y  or  so  men  who  remained  with  him  a er  the  defeats  of  Las  Chorreras  and  
Rio  Nuevo  were  loyal  to  King  Philip  IV  and  believed  in  the  righteousness  of  their  
cause.  Jamaica  was  their  home  and  had  been  the  home  of  their  respective  families  
for  generations.  They  refused  to  leave  the  island  time  and  again  and  were  willing  
to  withstand  malnutrition  and  English  attacks.  Yet,  they  were  decidedly  
unwilling  to  endure  attacks  from  the  Black  community  of  Jamaica.  Isassi’s  final  
official  surrender  was  drawn  out  over  the  course  of  the  next  3  months  due  to  the  
difficulty  of  communicating  quickly  and  arguments  over  prisoner  exchanges.  But,  
in  May  of  1660,  an  important  channel  crossing  was  made.  Don  Cristobal  Arnaldo  
Isassi  looked  back  from  his  small  boat  towards  the  island  he  had  fiercely  
128  Frank  Cundall  and  Joseph  Luckert  Pietersz.  Jamaica  under  the  Spaniards,  Abstracted  from  the  
Archives  of  Seville ,  Kingston:  Jamaica,  Institute  of  Jamaica,  1919,  98.  
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defended  for  5  years  and  which  he  never  returned  to  again.  
The  Spanish-American  effort  to  reconquer  Jamaica  failed  for  two  basic  
reasons:  the  first  was  external  in  that  other  officials  pursued  the  preservation  of  
their  islands  and  colonies  first  and  foremost,  leaving  Jamaicans  on  their  own.  
While  scholars  point  to  the  two  failed  relief  expeditions  as  evidence  of  Spanish  
inability  and  inadequacy,  they  are  more  indicative  of  Spanish  apathy  towards  
Jamaica.  It  was  well  understood  in  Jamaica  that  the  best  men  were  not  dispatched  
to  assist  them,  and  that  food  and  other  supplies  were  o en  withheld.  With  
stubborn  governors  like  Pedro  de  Bayona  y  Villanueva,  who  needed  enemies  like  
Colonel  D’Oyley?  The  advantage  of  keeping  their  best  men  at  home  to  defend  
against  further  English  raids  and  the  advantage  which  further  English  trade  
presented  was  overwhelming  in  ensuring  that  the  Jamaican  effort  was  poorly  
supplied.  The  second  reason  was  internal;  it  lay  with  the  Spanish  inability  to  fully  
understand  the  Black  Resistance.  This  failure  ensured  that  they  did  very  little  to  
court  or  entice  their  support  throughout  the  entirety  of  their  resistance.  By  
misunderstanding  the  Black  desire  for  freedom  and  independence  as  loyalty  to  
their  King,  the  Spanish  did  nothing  to  solidify  or  create  common  cause  with  what  
was  arguably  the  island’s  most  powerful  force.  Indeed,  the  development  of  these  
groups  into  the  Maroon  communities  ensured  that  Jamaica  was  not  fully  pacified  
until  the  middle  of  the  next  century.  
Simultaneously,  the  Peninsular  Spanish  effort  to  retain  Jamaica  was  
oxymoronic;  there  was  never  going  to  be  any  real  effort  coming  from  Spain  
 
114  
proper.  If  the  galeones  and  flotas  were  able  to  complete  roundtrip  voyages,  Philip  
IV  saw  no  issue.  The  European  theater  was  always  more  pressing,  with  Portugal  
becoming  particularly  acute.  King  Philip’s  obsession  with  an  Iberian  Union  
continued  to  rob  the  Americas  of  a  consistent  and  effective  Spanish  naval  
presence.  The  Franco-Spanish  war  ended  in  1659,  and  a  truce  was  declared  with  
England  in  1660.  Rather  than  utilizing  those  mobilized  forces  in  the  Caribbean  
theater,  Philip  IV  deployed  those  forces  and  more  in  returning  Portugal  to  
Habsburg  control.  The  same  pre-occupation  which  prevented  the  silver  fleet  
from  making  a  detour  to  Jamaica  in  1658  continued  to  prevent  such  action  
following  Charles  II’s  Restoration.  In  the  absence  of  significant  naval  opposition  
to  Restoration  Buccaneering,  Spain  relied  on  her  diplomats  to  defend  Spanish  
Imperial  interests  from  the  capitals  of  Western  Europe.    
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Conclusion:  Jamaica  and  the  Dowry  of  Charles  II  
While  Isassi  was  crossing  the  small  channel  between  Jamaica  and  Cuba,  
Charles  II  was  making  a  far  better  known  channel-crossing.  The  Treaty  of  
Brussels  should  have  meant  that  Charles’  restoration  resulted  in  the  restoration  
of  Spanish  territory  lost  to  the  Protectorate.  That  this  did  not  happen  is  worth  
investigating  to  conclude  the  present  history.  One  of  the  main  concerns  of  the  
restored  monarchy  was  funding  itself.  The  Convention  Parliament  of  Charles’  
restoration  managed  to  limit  the  power  of  the  monarch  through  the  power  of   the  
purse  so  as  to  not  outwardly  be  seen  as  constraining  the  King.  They  settled  on  
£1,200,000  for  his  annual  revenue,  a  sum  which  had  Charles  II  begging  before  
Parliament  to  resolve  his  dire  situation.  He  pleaded  saying,  “I  come  to  put  you  in  
mind  of  the  crying  Debts  which  do  every  day  call  upon  me  for  some  necessary  
Provision.”   To  satisfy  those  debts  and  continue  to  pay  for  what  was  needed  to  129
‘defend  the  kingdom,’  Charles  had  to  look  beyond  Parliament.  One  of  the  most  
promising  avenues  for  the  33  year  old  king  was  through  marriage.  A  dowry  could  
provide  a  quick  and  substantial  influx  of  money  to  his  royal  coffers.  The  only  
questions  then,  was  how  much  and  whom?  
For  the  next  two  years,  King  Philip  sought  to  provide  the  answer  to  these  
questions.  The  marriage  of  Charles  II  was  a  matter  of  the  peace  and  security  of  
Spain  because  Charles  was  the  missing  piece  in  Philip  IV’s  diplomatic  isolation  
of  Portugal.  Marrying  Charles  into  his  family,  and  away  from  the  Braganzas,  
129  "The  second  parliament  of  Charles  II:  Second  session  -  begins  20/11/1661,"  in  The  History  and  
Proceedings  of  the  House  of  Commons:  Volume  1,  1660-1680 ,  (London:  Chandler,  1742),  46-60,  British  
History  Online .  
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offered  him  a  free  hand  with  which  to  crush  that  rebellion.  Critically  missing  
from  this  plan  though  was  a  daughter;  Maria  Theresa  had  just  married  Louis  XIV  
and  carried  an  unpaid  dowry.  His  younger  daughter  Margarita  was  both  10  and  
already  betrothed  her  uncle  and  cousin,  Leopold,  the  Holy  Roman  Emperor.  To  
solve  this  problem,  the  desperate  Philip  IV  offered  to  adopt  a  Princess  of  Charles  
II’s  choosing.  He  first  offered  the  Princess  of  Parma,  along  with  a  dowry  
equivalent  to  whatever  the  Portuguese  were  offering.  When  the  Princess  of  
Parma  was  no  longer  a  viable  option,  Philip  continued  to  offer  Princesses  to  
Charles,  even  sacrificing  his  firm  religious  stance.  To  assuage  anti-Catholic  
sentiment  in  England,  Philip  IV  offered  the  Princess  of  Denmark,  Saxony,  and  
Orange  to  Charles.   However  earnest  and  competitive  these  offers  were,  they  130
were  also  fundamentally  flawed,  and  therefore  unacceptable  to  Charles.   
Two  key  factors  prohibited  the  union  of  Spain  and  England  through  
marriage,  both  regarding  the  proposed  dowry  and  directly  affected  by  Jamaica.  As  
far  as  the  ‘cash’  involved  in  the  dowry,  the  Portuguese  were  offering  England  
roughly  £500,000  in  various  trade  goods.  Even  though  Spain  was  prepared  to  
match  that  amount,  the  prevailing  opinion  was  that  Spain  was  offering  an  empty  
promise.  In  1659,  they  had  agreed  to  a  sum  of  500,000  écus  as  the  dowry  for  Maria  
Theresa.  As  Charles  was  considering  marriage  proposals,  that  sum  was  not  yet  
paid  to  Louis  XIV.  It,  in  fact,  was  never  paid  and  hungover  Spain  until  1714.  
130  Sir  Richard  Fanshawe,  Original  Letters  of  His  Excellency  Sir  Richard  Fanshaw,  During  His  Embassies  
in  Spain  and  Portugal:  Which,  Together  with  Divers  Letters  and  Answers  from  the  Chief  Ministers  of  State  
of  England,  Spain  and  Portugal,  Contain  the  Whole  Negotiations  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  Between  Those  
Three  Crowns ,  Abel  Roper,  1701,  68.  
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Charles  needed  money  as  soon  as  possible  and  even  the  current  delay  of  Maria  
Theresa’s  dowry  was  too  long  for  him.  Moreover,  as  another  historian  has  put  it,  
“if  [Philip]  denied  the  payment  of  the  dowry  to  a  true  infanta  of  Spain,  no  
guarantee  existed  that  a  surrogate  would  get  hers.”   Even  if  King  Philip  were  to  131
offer  more  cash  as  part  of  the  dowry,  his  credit  was  literally  too  low  to  be  able  to  
pay  it  and  Charles  was  acutely  aware  of  this.  Their  treaty  of  Brussels  should  have  
guaranteed  Charles  roughly  £100,000  to  support  his  restoration,  but  Spain’s  
actual  payments  never  matched  that  promise.   The  difference  between  the  132
Portuguese  and  Spanish  proposals  becomes  even  greater  when  the  territories  
offered  are  considered.   
In  addition  to  the  £500,000,  Portugal  offered  the  territories  of  Tangier  in  
North  Africa,  and  Bombay  in  India.  If  Charles  accepted  the  Spanish  match,  he  
had  to  restore  both  Dunkirk  and  Jamaica.  Just  on  this  surface  level,  it  is  
stunningly  obvious  why  he  never  agreed  to  any  marriage  proposals  offered  by  
Spain.  It’s  tempting  to  ask  why  Philip  didn’t  offer  those  two  places  as  part  of  the  
dowry:  it  helped  Philip  rationalize  their  loss  within  his  role  as  a  Habsburg,  and  it  
could  have  actually  secured  the  match.  However,  as  has  been  stated,  the  
prevailing  belief  at  the  court  was  that  both  places  were  to  be  returned  shortly.  
The  Marquis  of  Carecena,  governor  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  was  preparing  to  
reincorporate  Dunkirk  into  his  fortifications  budget.  Meanwhile,  news  came  that  
131  Francisco  Martin  Sanz,  La  Política  Internacional  de  Felipe  IV:  Guerra  y  Diplomacia  en  el  Siglo  XVII ,  
Segovia:  Francisco  Martín  Sanz,  2003.   
132  Gerald  L  Belcher,  “Spain  and  the  Anglo-Portuguese  Alliance  of  1661:  A  Reassessment  of  
Charles  II’s  Foreign  Policy  at  the  Restoration,”  The  Journal  of  British  Studies  15,  no.  1  (1975):  75-77.  
 
118  
an  English  ship  had  been  stopped  by  Spaniards  and  told  them  they  were  headed  
to  Jamaica  to  inform  the  English  there  to  surrender  it  back  to  Spain.   Moreover,  133
the  Spanish  tended  to  misunderstand  the  importance  of  Spanish  trade  in  
England.  When  presenting  potential  matches  to  Charles,  the  Spanish  ambassador  
to  England,  Baron  de  Batteville,  opened  by  stating  that  was  necessary  to  England.  
It  wasn’t  entirely  false,  as  the  unpopularity  of  the  war  among  the  merchants  
showed,  but  it  was  exaggerated.  Philip  IV  fundamentally  believed  he  was  owed  
Jamaica  through  his  treaty  from  1656  and  should  receive  Dunkirk  through  the  
pressure  of  the  English  merchants.   
On  the  contrary,  English  merchants  were  actually  pressuring  Charles  to  
keep  Jamaica  despite  what  seemed  like  the  end  of  the  conflict.  Almost  
immediately  upon  Charles  II’s  restoration,  a  truce  was  agreed  between  the  two  
powers.  The  Restoration  government  found  this  war  too  much  at  such  a  critical  
juncture.  For  one  thing,  it  was  unpopular  and  had  been  started  by  his  hated  
predecessor.  Even  D’Oyley,  who  was  on  one  of  the  front  lines  of  the  war,  called  it  
in  1660,  “the  unsuccessful  war  with  Spain.”   Unsurprisingly  he  greeted  the  news  134
of  the  truce  with  joy  publicly,  but  with  confusion  privately.  When  notification  of  
the  truce  reached  him  in  February  1661,  it  was  not  accompanied  by  marching  
orders.  In  a  letter  to  a  distant  cousin,  Secretary  Edward  Nicholas,  D’Oyley  wrote  
that  he,  “Has  impatiently  expected  orders  from  his  Majesty,  how  to  carry  himself  
133  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo,  Avisos  de  D.  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo  (1654-1658):  precede  una  noticia  de  
la  vida  y  escritos  del  autor ,  M.  Tello,  1893,  325.  
134  Great  Britain,  Public  Record  Office,  William  Noel  Sainsbury,  Sir  John  William  Fortescue,  Cecil  
Headlam,  Arthur  Percival  Newton,  and  Kenneth  Gordon  Davies,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  
Series:  America  &  West  Indies  1574-1660 ,  Longman,  Green,  Longman  &  Roberts,  1860,  26.  
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in  this  great  and  happy  change,  but  in  their  absence  has  pursued  his  former  
instructions.”   By  ‘former  instructions,’  D’Oyley  meant  hostile  action  against  135
Spain  in  the  form  of  privateering.  Continuing  the  war  in  the  Caribbean  was  both  
acceptable  in  contemporary  diplomatic  thinking,  and  in  line  with  Charles  II’s  
intentions  to  keep  Jamaica  and  make  it  profitable.   
While  the  English  goal  was  peaceful  free  trade  in  the  Indies,  they  utilized  
the  commonly  held  belief  of  ‘No  peace  beyond  the  line’  to  obtain  that  goal.  So  
while  in  February  1661  D’Oyley  ordered  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  the  very  next  
month  he  reversed  course  and  held  that  the  truce  with  Spain  did  not  apply  to  this  
side  of  the  line.   In  addition  to  profit  through  privateering,  the  English  in  136
Jamaica  were  encouraged  to  pursue  trade  with  the  Spanish,  specifically  in  Cuba.  
But  Royal  Officials  understood  well  that  there  might  be  Spanish  resistance  to  
English  merchant  activity.  In  1662,  the  new  governor  Thomas  Windsor  was  
ordered,   
To  endeavour  to  obtain  and  preserve  good  correspondence  and  free  
commerce  with  the  plantations  belonging  to  the  King  of  Spain,  but  if  the  
Governors  of  said  King  refuse,  to  endeavour  to  settle  such  trade  by  force ,  and  by  
doing  such  acts  as  the  Council  shall  judge  most  proper  to  oblige  the  Spaniards  to  
admit  them  to  a  free  trade ”  (emphasis  added).   137
135  “Col.  Edward  D'Oyley,  Governor  of  Jamaica,  to  his  kinsman,  Sec.  Nicholas,”  in  "America  and  
West  Indies:  March  1661,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Colonial,  America  and  West  Indies:  Volume  5,  
1661-1668 ,  ed.  W  Noel  Sainsbury  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1880),  14-21,  British  
History  Online .  
136  “Col.  Edward  D'Oyley,  Governor  of  Jamaica,  to  his  kinsman,  Sec.  Nicholas,”  in  "America  and  
West  Indies:  March  1661,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Colonial,  America  and  West  Indies:  Volume  5,  
1661-1668 ,  ed.  W  Noel  Sainsbury  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1880),  14-21,  British  
History  Online .  
137  “Additional  instruction  to  Thomas  Lord  Windsor,  Governor  of  Jamaica,”  in  "America  and  West  
Indies:  April  1662,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Colonial,  America  and  West  Indies:  Volume  5,  
1661-1668,  ed.  W  Noel  Sainsbury  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1880),  84-89,  British  
History  Online .  
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Herein  lies  the  central  double  standard  of  English  policy  in  the  Caribbean  at  this  
time.  England  was  attempting  to  violently  pry  open  the  jaws  of  the  Spanish  
monopoly  of  the  Indies  while  engaging  in  diplomatic  negotiations  in  Madrid.  By  
1664,  the  policy  failed  and  Charles  II’s  ministry  actively  distanced  itself  from  the  
actions  of  buccaneers  that  claimed  to  be  serving  the  same  monarch.  
So  despite  false  reports  they  were  preparing  to  return  the  island,  all  the  
documentary  evidence  shows  that  the  English  were  planning  to  consolidate  their  
control  over  the  island.  While  officials  in  Jamaica  were  told  to  treat  Spaniards  
like  stubborn  hoarders,  wresting  anything  of  value  from  their  hands,  they  were  
also  ordered  to  cultivate  a  peaceful  domestic  atmosphere.   The  goal  very  early  on  
was  to  replicate  the  success  of  Barbados  in  Jamaica  in  nearly  every  way.  One  of  
the  cornerstones  of  that  plan  included  sending  colonists  from  Barbados  itself  to  
rapidly  build  the  plantation  economy  in  Jamaica.  This  included  the  promise  of  30  
acres  of  land  to  any  settlers  that  quickly  relocated  there.   To  ensure  speedy  138
settlement,  the  Governor  of  Barbados  was  ordered  to  promote,  rather  than  
inhibit,  the  movement  of  settlers  from  his  island  to  Jamaica.  Moreover,  as  early  as  
November  1660,  England  sought  to  transform  Jamaica  into  a  slave  hub  in  the  
West  Indies.  James,  Earl  of  Marlborough  advised  Charles,  “To  persuade  the  Royal  
[African]  Company  to  make  Jamaica  the  staple  for  the  sale  of  blacks.  The  King  to  
138  “The  King's  proclamation  for  the  encouraging  of  planters  in  Jamaica,”  in  "America  and  West  
Indies:  December  1661,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Colonial,  America  and  West  Indies:  Volume  5,  
1661-1668 ,  ed.  W  Noel  Sainsbury  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1880),  61-66,  British  
History  Online .  
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contract  with  that  Company  for  100  negroes  to  be  delivered  at  the  island.”   They  139
also  wanted  Jamaica  to  serve  as  a  gateway  for  slave  trading  into  Spanish  cities  
and  ports.  In  1662  some  200  enslaved  Africans  had  officially  been  sold  from  
English  ships  to  Spanish  cities,  to  make  no  mention  of  those  illegally  smuggled  
into  Spanish  ports.  In  June  1661  D’Oyley  himself  was  accused  of  having  sold  140  
slaves  to  a  Spanish  ship  which  had  passed  by.  That  same  year,  the  President  of  
the  Audience  of  Panama  detained  an  English  ship  that  had  entered  the  port  on  
the  pretense  of  trying  to  catch  English  pirates.  The  claim  was  believable  enough  
but  President  Aguero  felt  they  were  lying  and  that  “the  truth  is  that  his  principal  
care  was  to  see  if  there  is  a  way  to  introduce  the  blacks  and  merchandise  which  
were  brought  in  the  vessel.”   In  this  particular  case,  Aguero  chose  to  deny  these  140
men  entry  and  relay  the  information  to  Madrid  rather  than  engage  in  the  illicit  
trade.  
While  the  appearance  of  English  sails  in  his  port  was  tense,  it  still  ended  
peacefully,  a  marked  difference  from  similar  moments  both  before  and  a er.  Less  
than  a  year  a er  this  affair  was  Christopher  Myngs’  raid  on  Santiago  de  Cuba  in  
October  1662.  A  raid  like  this  was  undeniably  foreseeable  given  the  
likemindedness  of  officials  in  London  and  Port  Royal.  In  April  officials  in  
London  had  given  Windsor  permission  to  force  open  free  trade.  By  August  he  had  
139  Great  Britain,  Public  Record  Office,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  Series:  America  &  West  
Indies  1574-1660 ,  ed.  William  Noel  Sainsbury,  Sir  John  William  Fortescue,  Cecil  Headlam,  Arthur  
Percival  Newton,  and  Kenneth  Gordon  Davies,  Longman,  Green,  Longman  &  Roberts,  Google  
Books,  1860.   
140  Fernando  de  la  Riva  Agüero,  “Carta  Del  Presidente  Fernando  de  La  Riva  Agüero,”  Cartas  Y  
Expedientes  Del  Presidente,  Oidores  Y  Fiscal  de  La  Audiencia  de  Panamá,  
PANAMÁ,22,R.6,N.124,  Archivo  General  de  Indias,  Sevilla,  España.   
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received  word  from  the  governors  of  Santo  Domingo  and  Puerto  Rico  that  they  
were  resolved  not  to  engage  in  trade.  From  that  point  forward,  Windsor  had  all  
the  justification  necessary  to  order  a  raid  on  a  Spanish  city.  In  September,  the  
council  approved  a  ‘design  by  the  sea’  led  by  the  Centurion  commanded  by  Myngs. 
  Myngs’  justified  the  decision  to  sack  Santiago  de  Cuba  by  highlighting  its  role  141
in  resupplying  the  Spanish  resistance  before  1660.  This  may  have  been  due  in  
part  to  the  fact  that  he  found  Isassi  leading  part  of  the  defense  to  his  raid,  whom  
he  described  as  a  “great  friend.”   To  ‘revenge’  the  harm  which  Santiago  de  Cuba  142
had  done  to  the  English  for  5  years,  Myngs  allowed  the  complete  destruction  of  
the  town.  According  to  one  Spanish  official  there,  “they  burnt  and  blew  up  the  
Holy  Church  Cathedral,  some  hermitages  and  most  of  the  houses  of  this  said  
City...demolished  the  Castillo  del  Morro  and  ruined  some  platforms  at  the  mouth  
of  this  port.”   Clearly  then,  there  was  no  peace  beyond  the  line  in  1662.  In  143
Europe  too,  the  situation  seemed  to  be  on  the  brink.  
In  1662,  despite  the  attempts  and  protests  of  Philip  IV,  Charles  married  
Catherine  of  Braganza.  The  marriage  alliance  called  for  Charles  to  provide  
soldiers  for  the  rebel  cause,  an  article  which  alone  should  have  caused  war  
between  the  two.  If  that  wasn’t  enough,  the  Spanish  feared  that  the  English  
141  "America  and  West  Indies:  September  1662,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Colonial,  America  and  
West  Indies:  Volume  5,  1661-1668 ,  ed.  W  Noel  Sainsbury  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  
1880),  107-111.  British  History  Online .  
142  C.  H.  Firth,  “THE  CAPTURE  OF  SANTIAGO,  IN  CUBA,  BY  CAPTAIN  MYNGS,  1662,”  The  
English  Historical  Review  XIV,  no.  LV  (July  1,  1899):  539.  
143  Pedro  de  Bayona  y  Villanueva,  “CARTAS  DE  GOBERNADORES,”  Cartas  y  Expedientes  de  Los  
Gobernadores  de  Cuba  Y  La  Habana,  SANTO_DOMINGO,104,R.5,N.45,  July  8,  1664.  Archivo  
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123  
squadron  sent  to  take  command  of  Tangier  was  secretly  planning  an  attack  on  
that  year’s  flota .  Highlighting  Spanish  precariousness  and  importance,  a  Dutch  
convoy  led  by  Admiral  De  Ruyter  offered  to  protect  the  fleet  and  saw  it  safely  
delivered  to  Cadiz.   Further  compounding  the  calamities  was  another  English  144
insult,  namely  their  sale  of  Dunkirk.  Charles  decided  to  sell  the  city  for  much  the  
same  reason  he  chose  Catherine  of  Braganza,  ready  money.  While  again  the  
Spanish  had  made  a  competitive  offer,  Charles  chose  to  sell  it  to  France.  In  
combination,  these  events  led  many  in  London  and  Madrid  to  believe  that  war  
was  imminent.  In  his  diary,  Pepys’  remarked,   
I  am  sorry  to  hear  that  the  news  of  the  selling  of  Dunkirk  is  taken  so  
generally  ill,  as  I  find  it  is  among  the  merchants...Indeed  I  do  find  every  
body’s  spirit  very  full  of  trouble;  and  the  things  of  the  Court  and  Council  
very  ill  taken;  so  as  to  be  apt  to  appear  in  bad  colours,  if  there  should  ever  
be  a  beginning  of  trouble,  which  God  forbid!   
The  prevailing  feeling  was  that  this  action  was  enough  to  cause  war  with  Spain  
and  that  merchants  were  going  to  once  again  lose  out  on  the  Spanish  trade.  
However,  that  same  month  Philip  explained  to  Sister  Maria  that  he  refused  to  
fight  any  new  wars  unless  violently  provoked  first;  Philip  was  firmly  on  the  
defensive.   145
What  this  meant  was  that  England  and  Spain  essentially  found  themselves  
staring  at  each  other  waiting  for  the  other  one  to  officially  declare  war.  Neither  
side  actually  wanted  open  conflict  in  Europe  so  each  stopped  short  of  actual  
144  Francisco  Martin  Sanz,  La  Política  Internacional  de  Felipe  IV:  Guerra  y  Diplomacia  en  el  Siglo  XVII ,  
Segovia:  Francisco  Martín  Sanz,  2003.  
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outright  violence.  England  wanted  to  maintain  and  strengthen  their  trade  
partnership,  and  Spain  was  committing  all  military  efforts  to  Portugal.  This  is  
not  to  say  that  there  wasn’t  conflict  by  proxy.  The  military  assistance  from  
England  to  Portugal  certainly  constituted  one  example  of  this  kind  of  low-scale  
conflict  but  it  was  far  from  the  only  example.  When  Portugal  handed  Tangier  
over  to  the  English,  the  Spanish  were  not  the  only  ones  to  feel  slighted  by  the  
transaction.  North  African  forces  under  the  leadership  of  Abd  Allah  al-Ghailan  
were  engaged  in  besieging  English  forces  in  the  area  on  and  off  until  his  death  in  
1673.  During  this  time,  he  was  sponsored  by  Philip  IV  and  received  assistance  
from  Spain.  At  court,  the  meticulous  letter-writer  Jéronimo  de  Barrionuevo  went  
so  far  as  to  refer  to  al-Ghailan  as  “a  friend  and  our  supporter.”   Spanish  support  146
of  al-Ghailan  was  more  effective  but  far  less  intriguing  than  their  attempts  to  
create  another  revolution  in  England.   
As  Robert  Stradling  alleges,  Spain  was  allocating  funds  and  fostering  
contacts  in  England  who  could  lead  and  manage  an  uprising  against  Charles’  
government.   They  had  even  identified  a  potential  leader  in  Edmund  Ludlow  147
and  were  utilizing  the  services  of  Ignatius  White  as  their  chief  spy.  In  a  letter  
written  by  one  of  his  assistants,  the  Spanish  cause  was  explicitly  identified  as  a  
response  to  the  sack  of  Santiago  de  Cuba.  He  wrote,  “The  Spaniards  are  greatly  
incensed  because  some  English  went  ashore  in  the  West  Indies,  killed  several  
146  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo,  Avisos  de  D.  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo  (1654-1658):  precede  una  noticia  de  
la  vida  y  escritos  del  autor ,  M.  Tello,  1893,  345.  
147  R.  A.  Stradling,  “Spanish  Conspiracy  in  England,  1661-1663,”  The  English  Historical  Review  87,  
no.  343  (1972):  274–77.  
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Spaniards,  and  plundered  the  country;  they  will  try  to  raise  a  mutiny…”   The  148
recipient  of  the  letter  promptly  notified  the  Earl  of  Clarendon  and  the  plot  was  
snuffed  out  in  Ireland.  However,  efforts  like  this  show  that  rather  than  meekly  
accepting  the  insults  laid  upon  them  by  England,  Spain  was  able  to  instead  wage  
covert  warfare  and  back-off  when  it  suited  them.  The  contemporary  thinking  
which  allowed  Charles  to  commit  hostile  acts  in  the  West  Indies  without  
breaking  a  truce  forced  Philip  to  use  underhanded  techniques  in  Great  Britain.  In  
certain  respects  these  actions  form  the  core  ‘playbook’  of  the  hegemon;  sowing  
discord  secretly  and  then  disavowing  it  publicly  continues  to  be  a  tactic  used  to  
create  favorable  outcomes  for  powerful  nations  seeking  to  protect  their  
reputation.   
The  reason  why  Spain  was  trying  to  refrain  from  appearing  as  an  
aggressive  power  was  because  they  could  not  afford  to  lose  the  support  of  the  
Dutch,  who  had  maintained  a  good  relationship  with  the  English.  Dutch  
protection  of  the  flotas  was  absolutely  critical,  as  was  their  construction  of  
warships  for  Spain.   Despite  this  close  relationship,  the  Dutch  sought  to  149
conclude  a  long  and  ongoing  war  of  their  own,  one  borne  out  of  their  struggle  for  
independence  from  Spain.  Unfortunately  for  Spain,  this  meant  that  the  Dutch  
were  entering  into  negotiations  with  the  Portuguese.  Seeing  the  favorable  terms  
which  the  marriage  to  Catherine  had  brought  England,  the  Dutch  sought  to  also  
148  "Charles  II  -  volume  73:  May  1-18,  1663,"  in  Calendar  of  State  Papers  Domestic:  Charles  II,  1663-4 ,  
ed.  Mary  Anne  Everett  Green  (London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1862),  128-143,  British  
History  Online .   
149  Francisco  Martin  Sanz,  La  Política  Internacional  de  Felipe  IV:  Guerra  y  Diplomacia  en  el  Siglo  XVII ,  
Segovia:  Francisco  Martín  Sanz,  2003.  
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‘cash  in’  on  the  Portuguese  desire  for  allies.  The  resulting  Treaty  of  the  Hague  
secured  all  Portuguese  colonies  except  Guinea  and  granted  the  Dutch  the  same  
trading  privileges  as  the  English,  along  with  a  four  million  reil  indemnity  for  the  
parts  of  Brazil  which  the  Dutch  had  captured.  The  Dutch  did  not  completely  
sever  ties  with  the  Spanish  as  a  result  of  the  treaty,  but  they  were  neutral  going  
forward  and  sold  crucial  supplies  to  the  Portuguese  until  the  war’s  end.  
Philip  thus  had  to  fully  commit  himself  and  subjects  to  the  Portuguese  
rebellion  if  there  was  any  hope  of  success.  To  this  end,  Philip  pressed  hard  for  a  
naval  blockade  of  Lisbon  and  a  patrol  of  the  Portuguese  coast.  The  naval  build-up  
that  accompanied  this  spread  contracts  across  Spanish  possessions  to  build  
warships  and  outfit  them.  In  March  1661,  the  council  of  war  had  ordered  50  
warships  to  be  prepared  for  use  against  Portugal.  This  was  in  addition  to  the  
30,000  man  army  they  were  trying  to  gather.   The  annual  sentiment  regarding  150
Portugal  was  that  this  was  the  ‘last  year’  or  the  ‘last  thrust’  and  that  the  current  
campaign  season  was  going  to  result  in  the  successful  invasion  of  Portugal  and  
the  final  flames  of  the  Braganza  pretense  smothered.  Perhaps  the  highest  cruelty  
for  Philip  was  that  each  campaign  season  brought  a  wave  of  hope  only  to  end  in  
some  sort  of  despair.  In  1661,  the  despair  was  due  to  the  death  of  his  prime  
minister,  Don  Luis  de  Haro.  The  news  was  greeted  on  the  Portuguese  front  by  his  
illegitimate  son  Don  Juan  de  Austria  with  glad  tidings.  He  is  said  to  have  
remarked,  “The  king  has  lost  a  Great  Minister,  my  Lord;  but  let’s  go  hunting”  
150  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo,  Avisos  de  D.  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo  (1654-1658):  precede  una  noticia  de  
la  vida  y  escritos  del  autor ,  M.  Tello,  1893,  362. 
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clearly  feeling  that  with  de  Haro  gone,  the  king  was  about  to  allocate  more  
resources  to  Portugal.  151
Even  though  the  king  absolutely  wanted  to  put  all  the  remaining  strength  
of  Spain  into  the  campaign,  his  highest  remaining  officials  saw  the  writing  on  the  
wall.  Philip  reorganized  his  bureaucracy  a er  de  Haro’s  death  and  le   matters  of  
Spain  and  the  Indies  to  him  alone.  Meanwhile,  he  le   affairs  to  the  West  and  
North  to  the  Duke  of  Medina  de  las  Torres,  one  of  the  key  figures  of  influence  
going  forward.  The  Duke  had  been  mentored  by  Count-Duke  Olivares,  but  had  
come  into  his  own  as  viceroy  of  Naples.  He  was  seen  by  many  and  still  is,  as  
pragmatic  when  confronting  the  numerous  challenges  faced  by  the  beleaguered  
monarchy.  For  years,  he  had  advocated  for  a  truce  with  Portugal  as  a  prelude  to  
an  honorable  and  satisfactory  peace  with  the  rebels.  Now,  finally  realizing  the  
influence  which  Olivares  desired  for  him,  Medina  de  las  Torres  could  actively  try  
to  bring  that  about.  He  was  not  alone  in  this  thinking  though,  the  Count  of  
Peñaranda,  one  of  the  delegates  at  Westphalia  and  one  of  Medina  de  las  Torres’  
rivals,  also  felt  that  a  truce  with  the  Braganzas  was  necessary.  However,  
Peñaranda  believed  that  a  truce  should  necessarily  be  followed  by  a  regrouping  
and  renewed  hostilities.  Given  that,  it  is  less  surprising  that  the  two  statesmen  
o en  disagreed  on  a  course  for  the  House  of  Austria.   
With  mounting  pressure  to  put  an  end  to  the  fighting,  however  
temporarily,  Philip  had  to  find  ways  to  fund  the  annual  campaigns.  Having  
151  Ibid,  409.  
 
128  
already  reduced  the  salaries  of  those  ministers  holding  multiple  offices  to  the  one  
of  their  choosing,  Philip  resolved  to  utilize  the  full  wealth  of  the  Indies.  He  
believed  that  there  was  still  an  abundance  of  silver  and  gold  which  they  need  only  
scoop  up  onto  their  fleets  and  bring  back  to  Spain.  He  was  cautioned  against  
burdening  the  Indies  too  heavily  though,  as  the  fear  was  that  in  doing  so,  he  was  
allowing  smuggling  to  flourish.   Indeed  the  leadership  in  Tierra  Firme  had  seen  152
illegal  trade  start  to  flourish  around  Maracaibo,  effectively  cutting  the  governor  
off  from  that  port.   153
The  thinking  on  display  by  Philip  IV  showed  exactly  where  his  priorities  
were  at  the  start  of  the  1660s  and  where  they  had  always  been.  At  a  time  when  
there  was  a  flurry  of  Spanish  naval  activity,  so  much  so  that  the  English  were  
awaiting  an  invasion  of  Jamaica,  Philip  IV  directed  it  to  the  familiar  Portuguese  
coasts  rather  than  remote  Jamaica.   When  that  invasion  did  not  come,  Governor  154
Windsor  was  ordered  to  disband  the  army  and  allow  for  the  fullest  development  
of  a  civilian,  planter  society  within  the  island.  Facilitating  this  transition  was  the  
nearly  1,400  enslaved  Africans  sent  across  the  Atlantic  to  the  island  between  
1661-1663.   Another  critical  moment  had  slipped  through  Philip  IV’s  fingers,  155
yet  he  did  not  see  it  that  way.  For  in  his  mind  he  was  fulfilling  his  ultimate  duty  
152  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo,  Avisos  de  D.  Jerónimo  de  Barrionuevo  (1654-1658):  precede  una  noticia  de  
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Caracas  y  Venezuela,  Archivo  General  de  Indias,  Sevilla,  España.   
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and  pursuing  the  reunion  of  Portugal  will  the  fullest  rigor  possible.  Jamaica  was  
an  insult  to  his  honor,  yes,  but  so  was  the  sale  of  Dunkirk,  the  marriage  to  
Catherine,  and  deference  shown  to  French  ambassadors  over  his  own.  He  had  
tolerated  all  of  these  because  they  were  nothing  but  distractions  from  what  had  
become  his  only  obsession.  In  1659,  the  diplomatic  isolation  of  Portugal  was  
nearly  complete  and  all  that  was  le   was  the  dispatch  of  a  triumphant  army  
across  the  border.   
Yet  by  1663,  the  Portuguese  were  receiving  Dutch  war  materiel,  found  
their  forces  augmented  by  English  veterans,  at  the  head  of  which  was  a  former  
French  Marshal.  This  utter  reversal  in  such  a  short  time  meant  that  the  force  
necessary  to  recapture  Jamaica  wasn’t  even  a  consideration  in  civil  discourse.  In  
any  case,  as  far  as  the  Indies  were  concerned,  there  was  little  to  complain  about.  
In  this  same  timeframe,  the  galeones  and  flotas  had  each  made  2  successful  
roundtrip  journeys  to  the  Indies,  something  which  had  not  been  done  since  1653. 
  So  despite  the  hardship  and  suffering  felt  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  the  more  156
immediate  threat  of  the  English  in  Tangier,  Philip  IV’s  primary  hopes  for  his  
New  World  possessions  were  coming  to  fruition.  His  ministry,  and  the  ministers  
that  outlived  him,  were  going  to  be  responsible  for  discovering  how  best  to  
engage  with  the  English  of  Jamaica  and  their  attempts  to  ‘force  a  free  trade.’   
Meanwhile,  Charles  II’s  ministry  dispatched  Ambassador  Richard  
Fanshawe  to  Madrid  to  begin  work  on  the  treaty  of  peace  and  commerce  which  
156  Bartolomé  Antonio  Garrote,  Manifiesto...  En  Que  Demuestra  Que  Las  Armadas  Y  Flotas  de  Nueva  
España  Y  Tierrafirme  Han  Salido  de  Estas  Reynos  Para  La  América  Todos  Los  Años  Successivamente,  
Desde  El  de  1580  Hasta  El  de  1699 ,  Sevilla,  1699.  
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eventually  became  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  in  1670.  They  sent  over  a  new  governor  
to  Jamaica  who  was  explicitly  instructed  on  numerous  occasions  to  refuse  
commissions  to  privateers.  As  the  ambassadors  Fanshawe,  Sandwich,  and  finally  
William  Godolphin  worked  on  securing  peace  beyond  the  line  with  Spain,  the  
Jamaican  Governor  Thomas  Modyford  found  carrying  out  his  orders  difficult.  
Modyford  found  himself  at  the  mercy  of  the  privateers  and  buccaneers  that  called  
Jamaica  their  home.  With  limited  Royal  Navy  presence  in  Jamaica,  it  was  easier  
for  Modyford  to  issue  commissions  rather  than  risk  the  buccaneers  turning  on  
Jamaica.  While  privateering  raids  largely  failed  to  make  the  Spanish  receptive  to  
trade,  Modyford  continued  to  pursue  the  policy  until  he  was  removed  from  office  
in  1668.  For  that  reason,  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  was  a  protracted  negotiation  of  6  
years  because  it  was  stalled  whenever  word  reached  Madrid  of  English  
depredation  in  the  Caribbean.  When  it  was  finally  completed  in  1667,  and  then  
explicitly  revised  to  its  final  form  in  1670,  it  called  on  England  to  repudiate  and  
crack  down  on  piracy  and  privateering  and  opened  up  Spanish-American  ports  to  
English  merchants.  Crucially,  it  explicitly  recognized  Jamaica  as  an  English  
possession  in  the  Caribbean.  The  breakdown  in  the  Spanish  monopolization  of  
the  Americas  suffered,  but  the  commerce  and  wealth  which  the  Americas  
brought  to  Spain  did  not.  Instead,  the  most  profitable  years  of  the  Empire  lay  
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